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A Living Citizenship Model for the Public Schools:  
The Philosophical Foundations of Friendship in the Works of  
Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson

A Dissertation

by

Debra Sherblom

In partial fulfillment of requirements for

The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Lesley University

Spring 2012

### Abstract

In an interdisciplinary, hermeneutical study using primary and secondary documents from history, philosophy, political theory, and critical pedagogy, the dissertation focuses on dialogue, friendship, and citizenship. The philosophical foundations of friendship in the works of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson are discussed. Included in the study is the history of citizenship and analysis of works on dialogue and community. A critical consciousness is significant for real dialogue to precipitate friendship. The philosophical foundations of friendship in the works of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson are echoed in the Peaceable Schools Model for secondary schools. Based on social justice and the avoidance of conflict, the Peaceable Schools Model ministers a progressive pedagogy and fosters a living citizenship for students in public schools and in the community.



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## Preface

The 21<sup>st</sup> century school community resembles the global community. The school community, once a melting pot of different cultural norms and traditions from across the world, is today rich in multiculturalism and diversity. Schools symbolize and treasure the differentiation of peoples, the uniqueness of cultural traditions, and the recognition and contribution of all individuals. The acknowledgement and inclusion of all cultures, however, brings challenge to the school curricula, particularly, citizenship education.

The civic curriculum advances nationalism or civic pride, patriotism, virtue, and, of course, knowledge of history and government (Gutman, 1989, Macedo, 1995, Coleman, 1998). This notwithstanding, the pedagogical approach to the curriculum is significant particularly with regard to a mobile or changing school population.

Citizenship education is, therefore, faced with challenge. School demographics continue to change. How can citizenship education accommodate the growing and changing population? How can citizenship education encourage inclusion for all students? Also, how can interaction amongst individuals and groups enhance citizenship not only in the school community but in the greater community and in the nation?

My goal is to create a living, active citizenship model for public schools where all groups participate regardless of race or ethnicity. Early research into the notion of citizenship revealed a myriad of theories each significant and contributory in its attempt to sustain citizenship in the nation in light of changing populations. However, in order for citizenship to accommodate changing demographics, it is important to establish a

dialogue and friendship between individuals with an ultimate view towards the good of the nation.

The challenge is a primary task for schools. Students are the most important resource for the future. Through citizenship practice, they will posture the nation throughout the generations ahead. A citizenship model for schools based upon dialogue and friendship assures students open the pathway to citizenship and sustain our country through its practice.



## Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful for the guidance, wisdom, and constructive criticism of my Senior Advisor and Committee Chair, Dr. Abraham Abadi at Lesley University. He encouraged me to delve deeply into ideas known and unbeknownst to me in prior and current work. His support and invaluable suggestions were enormously helpful and beneficial to the dissertation. Deep thanks go also to committee members Dr. Lorraine Greenfield at Lesley University and Dr. William Marchione, formerly from Massachusetts Bay Community College. Without the patient diligence and consideration of my committee, my work would not have come to fruition. My thanks go also to the dedicated faculty and staff of Lesley University. Thank you all.

I have been a teacher and a student throughout most of my adult life. My education brought me to four universities. Each university experience, particularly at Lesley, left an indelible impression on me and contributed to the educator I am today. Thank you to the faculty and staff from Northeastern University, Worcester State University, Harvard University, and again to Lesley University for never failing to captivate my interest across the disciplines.

My family supported me through every endeavor towards this end. They stood by me during every phase, at every university, in every season. Together we experienced a lifetime of study and achievement. I will never forget the sacrifices they made and the words of encouragement they willingly and lovingly voiced so that I could accomplish

my goal. Thank you to my husband, Greg, and our children, Christopher, Jason, and Jennifer for your unwavering support.

## Introduction

A democratic nation depends upon the active participation of its citizenry. Whether motivated by a common passion that advocates the ends of existing government or the interests or passions that are adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the community, the democratic nation depends upon the active participation of its citizenry. James Madison wrote, the liberty to express either passion is “essential to political life”. “As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed” (Madison, Federalist 10, in Rossiter, 1961 p.78 ). Regardless of ideology, religion, race, ethnicity, or socio economic background, if government is constructed to meet the needs of its citizens, then all might be in agreement.

Active citizenship, participation in the democratic process, assumes a connection between the individual and the political process. The participation of the individual in the political process or active citizenship results from the bond created through dialogue and friendship. Literature reveals friendship is significantly present where citizenship is evident in the community. Aristotle suggested friendship in the community was a reciprocal relationship nourished by love and desire. Friendship builds community and enhances citizenship because of a common view towards participatory government (Pakaluk, 1991). Augustine suggested friendship was a union of souls who experience love and justice amongst themselves (City of God, 1984). Thomas Hobbes (1996) valued friendship as integral to community. It was man’s nature to need a friend, expeditious to his very being. Immanuel Kant saw a friend as another self so long as mutual care or

concern between men was evident (Pakaluk, 1991). Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) observed individuals in the United States combine their well being with that of their fellow citizens. Self love motivates the individual to help others and creates a bond amongst people identified by self interest and ultimately community interest. Community interest or commitment to association in community is a standard of citizenship that Emerson thought was a strong characteristic of citizenship (Scorza, 2004). Citizenship is dialogue and friendship, a critical consciousness, between individuals. Individuals are self reliant with a willingness to engage in a reciprocal relationship with others. This be said, the virtuous ideals of responsibility, respect, trust, truth, honor, wisdom, autonomy and integrity to self, the other, the community, and to the nation are consequential. An active citizen exudes critical consciousness of self, others, equality, and tolerance. Active citizens possess a critical consciousness, are self reliant, assertive in the community, responsible, and accountable for their actions. Active citizens exude a civic virtue and pride in both community and county.

A critical consciousness, necessary for dialogue, evolves with awareness of social reality. The conditions, ideological views, or cultural characteristics of one's life may not be the same as another's life. Communities form with inhabitants from all walks of life, from a variety of religions, races, ethnicities, and socio economic backgrounds. For each individual, what is present or true for them may not be for the other. One individual does not mirror another. Therefore, a critical consciousness is essential to qualify true dialogue. With a critical consciousness, individuals are not distinct or exclusive of the other; they are *with the other* (my italics) and aware of the other. Yet, awareness of another's social reality alone does not define the critical consciousness. Once cognizant

of these conditions or another's social reality, individuals, through acceptance and understanding of their own being, open their self to the other as a being. Individuals engage in dialogue and share perspectives of their physical world. Common themes emerge such as poverty, ethnic bias, racism. Reflection on these conditions leads to action. Individuals do not manipulate or overpower each other through dialogue. They create a consciousness or analysis of why conditions in social reality exist as they do. The dialogue between the persons is constantly evolving, exposing the causes of social reality that bring about social injustice and aim towards social reconstruction. Emerson, too, suggests that individuals be accepting and understanding of their self and, therefore, open their self to the other as a being and engage in dialogue (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844). Freire reiterates Emerson when he wrote that "I can only become myself when other men also become themselves" (Freire, 2008, p. 40).

Individuals reflect about their position in the world, their work, contribution, and influence. The relationship opens social reality to a world of understanding and possibility amongst people. Freire suggests social reality is not static but changing. Historical conditions precipitated by industrial, technological, and social change affect individual well being. Because of these changes and their effects upon the individual, a dialectical, or consistently evolving, relationship with social reality (a critical consciousness) ensues (Freire, 2008). Therefore, dialogue that is dialectical or consistently evolving because of social reality precipitates friendship.

The friendship that defines active citizenship is dialectical as well. Friendship has no bounds or limitations. It does not include particular individuals because of their culture, race, gender, or socio economic status. Friendship assures everyone the

opportunity for a reciprocal relationship. Further, friendship, when shared with a critical consciousness, expresses virtuous ideals such as truth, honesty, and respect that vitalize or create a living citizenship. This unique discourse of friendship assuages the challenges presented by hierarchical relationships in schools and communities. Unlike citizenship absolutely or unconditionally defined by literal guidelines and obligations for the individual, a living citizenship adapts to the needs of social reality, a visceral experience. Rather than a cold, superficial friendship typified with “literary gossip with subtle antagonisms”, friendship based upon a dialectical critical consciousness embraces the other individual (Emerson, 1852. *Collected Works* 202 in McNulty, 1946). Only in this regard, the dissertation suggests, can a discourse of friendship or dialogue and friendship and living citizenship prevail in democracy.

Educators have a responsibility to help students create a discourse or dialogue and ultimately a living citizenship. The dissertation underscores the task is best undertaken through the Peaceable Schools model. Whether in the individual classroom or the school as a whole, the Peaceable Schools model creates an atmosphere where all individuals, students, and staff evolve with social reality. They exercise dialogue, friendship, community and a living citizenship expressed with trust, civility, and equality in a democratic society.

The notion of Peaceable Schools began in the 1990s when schools were faced with the mandate to develop curriculum models that assuaged social injustice and violence in society. Images of sexual promiscuity, drug use, discrimination and violence disturbed parents, children, and alike. These images further incited interpersonal and systemic violence. In response, a vision of Peaceable Schools and Communities

developed. Ideals of democracy and diversity were put into practice in schools through curriculum, climate, governance, and in neighborhoods and communities ([http://www.lesley.edu/academic\\_centers/peace/institute.html](http://www.lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html)).

Peaceable Schools envision a community that embraces empowered learning, consensus building, excellence, and equity for all members. The schools are built with values of working on the systemic transformation on all levels. Diversity is viewed as a resource, not as a problem. The significance of the self, reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power is important. Also, holistic solutions, conflict as an opportunity for change, and equity in the community characterizes the growth or lived process of Peaceable Schools. ([http://www.lesley.edu/academic\\_centers/peace/institute.html](http://www.lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html)).

The dissertation asserts the philosophical foundations of Peaceable Schools are rooted in the Greek and the American tradition particularly as embodied in the writings of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Epicurus (341-270 BC) and Ralph Waldo Emerson (19<sup>th</sup> century) wrote extensively on friendship. In Greece, Epicurus asserted a *Garden* as an appropriate forum where individuals discover the self and others. In Concord, Massachusetts, Ralph Waldo Emerson lectured extensively in the *Lyceum* where he praised individual self reliance and friendship amongst people. For each philosopher, it is important for the individual to not only discover self and other but to evolve with actual existence or reality.

My study argues that the works of Epicurus and Emerson, written centuries apart, are the cornerstone for the Peaceable Schools model.

### Significance of the Study

I hope to enhance citizenship behavior amongst individuals in secondary educational institutions using documents or a theme from history, political theory, and philosophy. I have developed a plan of study that includes citizenship, citizenship education, friendship, ethics, and morality that guided my research. As a teacher, I am in an excellent position to undertake this study because I see the interactions amongst my students everyday. My classroom is my laboratory. While this is an advantage, I realize the limitations as well. Particularly, I have steadfastly recognized the possibility of bias and the need for reflection, reason, and ethics.

It is important that teachers recognize student diversity when setting goals for citizenship. The diversity of our student body inspires knowledge, compassion, and critical understanding of where people come from and how these roots or cultural norms affect their manifestation of citizenship. These differences are a catalyst for a reexamination of school curricula. The Massachusetts frameworks do not provide a particular course of study to enhance citizenship. My dissertation will hopefully be a model for state or national frameworks in the Social Sciences and beyond.

Through interdisciplinary exploration I, as a researcher, have experienced knowledge and growth that students and educators will experience as well. The use of primary source documents as they relate to friendship, oppression, and inclusion have



been vital to the hermeneutical study asserting the connection between the Greek and American tradition and Peaceable Schools.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century gave birth to an age unlike any other age. Ours is a world typified by transition in society described by migration, immigration, interracial and cross cultural relationships. As new and diverse ethnic groups enter our schools, citizenship education is faced with the challenge of accommodating this growing and changing population. Each group brings its own cultural norms and interpretations that influence their understanding of citizenship. Because of these norms and interpretations, citizenship practice could change as our country becomes more populated with diverse people. My exploration of citizenship theories, religion in democracy, and compassion from different cultural perspectives is an integral part of my study.

I am drawn to history, political theory, and philosophy that serve as a guide for our students to learn citizenship. In the early days of the United States, the nation had a diverse ethnic population for its time. The new American man was a “mixture of English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes. From this promiscuous breed, that race now called Americans have arisen” (deCrevecoeur, 1770 in Bailey and Kennedy, p. 87). Further, “The American ought therefore to love this country much better than that wherein either he or his forefathers were born.” (deCrevecoeur, 1770 in Bailey and Kennedy, p. 87). Love for country is significant, however, unlike the 18<sup>th</sup> century and beyond, where immigrants were part of a melting pot or created a meshed or mailed citizenry, today, the United States is a diverse population that treasures and lives its cultural heritage (Kerber, 1997). Diversity is not denied as the history of citizenship shows, but welcomed and applauded. How, then can educators create a bond in our

diverse society? With love of country, I committed myself to a discourse with an interdisciplinary foundation to help students understand the ideals of citizenship as it could apply to a republican democracy. Understanding our past can serve as understanding for our present and future. My goal is to create a basis for citizenship discourse today.

My dissertation encourages compassion, respect, and toleration amongst all students. It encourages citizenship for our diverse American culture. This study is not for one culture or one socio-economic or political ideology. Rather it celebrates the diversity of our American culture. It reasserts the hope of the early founders in American History in the 21<sup>st</sup> century classroom. All cultures will be able to use this document as part of citizenship study.

Our students and our country deserve constant attention with regards to citizenship. As a teacher, I embrace the diversity of my students. I also value my students. I value the future they create for themselves and for country. I am committed to finding a way to help make them better citizens who will enhance democracy. I seek to understand their differences and bring about a common ground. The challenge before me offers an outstanding opportunity to reexamine a pathway for community and citizenship education in our schools.

I seek a constructive citizenship model for secondary education students characterized by dialogue, friendship and community. A *constructive* discourse of friendship and citizenship encourages critical thinking, understanding, negotiation, and collaboration amongst secondary students. A constructive discourse engages all students,

regardless of class or background. While the discourse is innovative in the school it is transferrable both to the outside community and globally.

The idea of a discourse of friendship developed after reading an article on *Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship* (Scorza, 2004). Jason Scorza (2004) asserts friendship can contribute to good citizenship because it fosters a reciprocal behavior that is rich in tenderness, trust, and compassion.

Individuals act on friendly motives based on their principles of moral right (Sherman, 1987). Friendship, according to Immanuel Kant, is a central tenet in the pursuit of happiness which is obtained not in the actual sentiments of friendship but in the reasoning that governs these sentiments. Aristotle asserts that friendship includes motives of attachment in harmony with the ends of a good life. Civic virtue, according to Aristotle can be encouraged by the quality of friendships (Sherman, 1987). Happiness or doing and living well require not only ethics and intellect but activities that manifest these virtues. This is expressed in friendship. The consequences of friendship are in concert with the ends of a good life (Sherman, 1987). Friendships are reciprocal relationships that are characterized by a common bond. (Sherman, 1987). An individual's happiness depends upon the happiness of others. There is an obvious attachment within the relationship. Yet, the actual activity of friendship depends on the happiness of the other person. If there is no regard for the other person, there is no friendship (Sherman, 1987). To enhance this, compassion and understanding as noted earlier can contribute to this friendship.

Can friendship develop through moral development or character education?  
Aristotle writes virtue is established in the state of nature. However, do students

experience this today? In Great Britain, the Crick Report recommended that compulsory citizenship education include a moral component. The moral component included character traits and virtues that seek to motivate individuals to act responsibly. This moral component would also motivate tolerance and a “determination to act justly” and have a “disposition to work with and for others” (Arthur, 2005, p. 244). In the United States there are a number of organizations, courses, and curriculum materials that seek to promote character or ways to improve the behavior of children. In Massachusetts, character and civility are included in the 1999 curriculum frameworks. In these frameworks there is an excerpt from the Constitution of Massachusetts, “Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as *virtue*...are considered being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties...” (Character, Civility, and the Massachusetts Curriculum Frameworks, 1999, p.1). Wisdom, knowledge, and virtue in the community depend on the opportunities and benefits of education. Yet, there is no consensus as to how character education could be implemented. Why are virtue, ethics, and character significant to friendship and ultimately to citizenship? These traits help individuals to reason their decisions and judgments before they act them out in the community.

Schools strive to do their part to promote good citizens and citizenship. Heather Higgins aptly quotes Gordon Wood,

In a monarchy, each man's desire to do what was right in his own eyes could be restrained by fear or force... each man must somehow be persuaded to submerge his personal wants into the greater good of the whole...a republic was such a delicate polity precisely because it demanded an extraordinary moral character in people (Wood, 1979, p. 171).

A diverse population typifies the school community. Within these communities, individuals form friendships that are critical for "democratic connectedness" (Katels in Scorza, 2004). Forming friendships contributes to the moral development of the individual's character and the shared democratic culture. Friendships promote an element of respect, reciprocity in a relationship, and a vision toward a common goal which is community or simply getting along. Friendships are formed with an element of civility. Civility creates a tie, a bond. Scorza cites Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) when he notes "primary relationships between citizens emerge as the focus of civic identity and activity" (Scorza 2004, p. 86). Friendship allows people to feel valued and respected. Consequently, justice and law are maintained in the state. The extension of personal friendships based on virtue is an independent check on civic corruption (Scorza, 2004). Clearly, this is not the case with all friendships. Relationships can be built upon friendship bonds but they are not always with virtue and compassion. If individuals are virtuous and compassionate, they might be less apt to engage in negative activities. Moral character is especially significant. As people develop and act as civic friends, they

have the capacity to reach a broad consensus on public policy matters. A friendship is a relationship based on trust and respect.

Is trust absent in citizenship? Willman (2004) suggests trust is absent in citizenship (Willman in Scorza 2004). There is no sense of trust, compassion, or reciprocity. There is no emotional bond in relationships of citizens. Scorza doesn't disagree per se but rather looks to trust as a positive attribute of friendship and citizenship. Because friendships are consensual, there is an obligation to giving preference and care to fellow citizens (Scorza, 2004). Friendships could exhibit trust, compassion, and reciprocity. Civic education should start from the values and institutional processes learned in schools through its ethos and organization.

Circumstances, however, potentially separate individuals and make friendships difficult to establish. Despair and conflict could influence an individual's citizenship. Yet, compassion and friendship in the community can enhance democratic citizenship. Students can be encouraged to use compassion through critical thinking. They can be taught to act with compassion and imagination as part of the continuing dialogue of citizenship (Arendt, Habermas in Waghid, 2005). Compassion is the most important emotion (taught through moral development and critical literacy) to prepare people to engage in deliberation and just action in life (Nussbaum, Arendt in Waghid, 2005). Predicaments arise when an individual acts, listens, and responds to another individual who is *different from one's self*. Hannah Arendt has developed an account of action as the means whereby conflict in class status can be met head on. Action, according to Hannah Arendt, is the process of the initiative, (when students question an argument without having to be told or asked by teachers to do so), risk taking, (when students

announce what they do, have done, and intend to do with regards to a given situation), listening and responding, (where students can have the capacity and willingness not only to disclose their inner voices through speech, but also to encourage listening and responding to others without being inhibited in doing so), and hopefully lasting dialogue students engage in for thoughtful deliberation (Arendt, in Waghid, 2005). While predicaments or conflicts arise, individuals act *compassionately* to resolve the predicament and come to a mutual conclusion. According to Nussbaum, students and teachers can extend democratic citizenship through the realization of one's vulnerabilities. This requires moral development of the individual (Nussbaum in Waghid, 2005). This is particularly useful in areas where conflict amongst people is apparent. This can be applied to inner cities or countries. How can this development occur?

For moral development, as it regards compassion, the predicaments of others are serious. Also, these predicaments do not always result in conflict. The experiences encountered are not unique to the individual. The individual with compassion experiences the predicament. (Nussbaum in Waghid, 2005). In other words, all parties in dialogue are susceptible to conflict and undesirable predicaments. The goal is to act compassionately toward others, to act justly and humanely and bring about civil dialogue that enhances democratic citizenship. Waghid aptly cites this educational virtue with application to students who have experienced apartheid in South Africa, who experienced conflict and injustice through no fault of their own. Compassion is best cultivated in a school community where moral development prompts teachers and students to question meanings and imagine alternative possibilities, modify judgments, foster respect and

develop critical engagement (Waghid, 2005.). To bring this compassion to fruition, the teacher articulates the methodology to include “compassionate imagining” (Nussbaum in Waghid, 2005, pp. 334-336).

“Compassionate imagination” (Greene in Waghid, 2005) allows teachers and students to look at things as if they could be otherwise or look at things anew. Greene suggests this view awakens the inner voices or “multiple voices” and “multiple realities” of others’ situations. When individuals see, hear, and connect with others new and various judgments occur (Greene in Waghid, 2005). Simply put, the teacher develops a space that is conducive to students entering a lived world of the others and ultimately seek social justice and equality acting upon *values* taken for granted. If individuals do this, civic engagement and civic reconciliation has great potential. The imaginative process prompts connection with others rather than simply participating in other’s predicaments (Waghid, 2005). Of course, compassion and imagination pedagogy include the understanding of many histories and cultures of people best manifested through critical thinking and moral reasoning. Compassion and imagination bring people together and also enhances character education. Compassion and imagination notwithstanding, the question of how this is implemented begs answer.

Dialogue and friendship are the ultimate means for this to occur not only for character education but for citizenship education. Richly significant, however, is the critical consciousness in individuals that is present in dialogue. A critical consciousness begins with the acceptance and understanding of one’s own being and then of the other’s being. When individuals are aware of each other’s being, the social reality or the conditions present in their life such as poverty, ethnic bias, and racism, they begin to



engage in dialogue and share perspectives of their physical world. Reflection on these conditions leads to question and action. Freire wrote,

Critical consciousness always submits that causality to analysis; what is true today may not be so tomorrow. Naive consciousness sees causality as a static, established fact, and thus is deceived in its perception. Magic consciousness is characterized by fatalism, which leads men to fold their arms, resigned to the impossibility of resisting the power of facts (Freire, 2010, p. 39).

Critical consciousness is never at rest. Individuals do not manipulate or overpower each other through dialogue. They create a consciousness and analysis of why conditions in social reality exist as they do. Through dialogue an action corresponds to the social reality. An individual realizes he is not only in the world, but engages in its “relations with the world...and adds to the world, which he did not make” (Freire, 2010, p. 39). If critical consciousness is absent, real dialogue and friendship will not be present.

Citizenship through dialogue and friendship, I argue, needs a critical consciousness.

Critical consciousness qualifies dialogue that opens paths to the civic definition of friendship. If citizenship education is grounded in dialogue and critical consciousness is lacking, active citizenship will be a descriptive only for citizenship and not a means to live citizenship.

## The Goal of Citizenship Education

According to Rakove (2001), politics in pre Revolutionary America was local, primarily in towns with no real government influence. Citizenship was not an issue. The question of a civil society was not apparent but rather what was the influence of the state on the individual? The task of the post Revolutionary era was not to create a civil society but to constitute the role of the state through what was ultimately the Constitution. In the community, a public spiritedness, willingness to subordinate public interest to the public good was evident. Individuals had a common view to the general good and knowledge of rights in order to monitor the government for pernicious ambition (Rakove in Ravitch, 2001). There was also the tendency for individuals to undertake civic duties and share a republican commitment. The founders had hoped that individuals engage in activities that supported and maintained a fair and just political order (Sinopoli, 1992).

If republicanism ideology was to succeed, it was inherent citizenship education had to be taught (Rakove, 2001). Citizenship education was primarily undertaken by the families or independent schools. “Republican Motherhood” symbolized the mother’s role to instill virtue into her children. Males who did not attend independent private schools followed the footsteps of their fathers as craftsmen, merchants, or farmers. The idea of state funded schools was not popular given the anti tax mentality of the people (Rakove in Ravitch, 2001).

When America emerged as the nation of United States, schooling and books were needed to create a new American society. A new national identity, a character was

needed with a common language with distinct American pronunciations. This helped to promote a common bond amongst individuals and nationalism through education.

Thomas Jefferson wrote the best safeguard against tyranny was mass education.

Individuals must “know ambition under all shapes and be prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes. The government depended on an informed public...citizens could arm themselves with literature and defend themselves against incursions of a powerful government” (Ravitch, Viteritti, 2001, p. 16). With literacy, they could defend themselves and protect their freedoms (Ravitch, Viteritti, 2001). In the period of the early republic primers and children’s literature was a common means of educating young citizens.

In 1837, as Secretary of Education in Massachusetts, Horace Mann wrote “common schools” were the teachers of patriotism and civic values. Mann asserted that schools were connected to freedom and democratization through teaching about democracy and equality amongst individuals. In the common school, all children were sent to learn together absent of difference, class, and social condition. Mann was essentially anti Catholic and supported nondenominational Protestantism. He did not object to the Bible in schools but did not want to see a specific religion, such as Catholicism, advanced (Ravitch, 2001). There were critics indeed, but common schools became increasingly popular because of their goal of moral and political integrity (Ravitch, 2001). By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had a popular public school system with nearly free education from first to twelfth grade (Ravitch, 2001). The relation between democracy and education was strong and school reformers wrote the goal of the democratic school system was school efficiency to promote

citizenship (Ravitch, 2001). Not only would the school promote citizenship, ideally, it was a means for moral and political development as well as social progress. In all, a civil society developed and nurtured democracy through its participants.

John Dewey wrote that education was a process of development and growth. He compared his view of education to Rousseau, when he noted the development of a seed into a full grown plant (Dewey, 1964). Educators must judge and devise conditions, materials, physical constraints or concerns, moral and social concerns that interact with the existing powers and preferences to bring about transformation of the individual. This individual would participate in democracy. “Democracy” according to Dewey (2009), is more than a form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, a communicated experience. Dewey hoped this interaction amongst individuals in a community would break down barriers of race, gender, class, religion, ethnicity and all other inhibitors of the common experience. Dewey was not a pluralist nor an advocate of special groups that had interest of their own or what he called an “anti social spirit” (Ravitch, 2001).

Dewey’s approach to education implied that individuals should engage in orderly and ordered activity. He noted that a democracy needed a certain fund of common values so it could function as a community with a purpose or vision of a good life. The learning of a certain fund of common values in a community would be done through instruction and purpose. Instruction was to be undertaken with underlying values inherent in Republicanism (Dewey in Ravitch, 2001).

Today, citizenship education is part of the social studies curriculum. Mission statements seek responsibility and accountability in society. Courses in government abound in programs of study, but do they teach citizenship?

It is important to me to determine appropriate pedagogy for citizenship. Not all high school graduates attend and graduate from post secondary institutions. For many students, the secondary classroom is the last opportunity to learn about democracy, civic knowledge, and civic responsibility. I hope to provide this opportunity for citizenship education through dialogue and friendship rooted in history.

### Research Design

In a hermeneutic study of documents and writings, I have written a philosophical, historical, and educational dissertation. The product is an interdisciplinary, constructive approach to citizenship education.

In Chapter 1, a sampling of the literature addresses the ideal and practical philosophical foundations in friendship from the ancient civilizations to modernity. In Chapter 2, a historical overview of citizenship reveals tensions and challenges in early citizenship, the evolution of the individual, and the evolution of the liberal democratic model of citizenship. Challenges to citizenship in the United States are also discussed. Chapter 3 reveals the context of Epicurus and Emerson's relevant work. The contexts, centuries apart, strike parallels where self reliance is realized and friendship results. Chapter 4 discusses Epicurus's and Emerson's philosophical notion of friendship. Chapter 5 illuminates the 20<sup>th</sup> century works of Martin Buber and Paulo Freire. The critical consciousness between individuals advanced by these philosophers is the conduit

to dialogue. Without a critical consciousness, dialogue and friendship are absent. In Chapter 6, the study asserts the Peaceable Schools model appropriate for citizenship education. The model, I assert, rests upon foundations of the Peaceable Schools model in Epicurus and Emerson. The significance of the study for secondary education forms the subject matter of Chapter 7.

## Chapter 1

### Friendship: An Overview

What is friendship? What or who is a friend? A sampling of literature reveals the notion of friendship with both distinctions and commonalities that edify citizenship. The ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophers included in this section represent the hopefulness of friendship and the recognition that true friendship, a reciprocal friendship, is difficult to achieve. The sources indicate that true friendship is attainable depending upon the intent of the individual and the reciprocity of the other.

Socrates wrote there was no clear definition of friendship, but the inference that friends are reciprocal and equal with a mutual belonging out of sameness was evident. Individuals gravitate to each other out of desire (Socrates in Pakaluk, 1991). “Love is reciprocal; friends are equal in rank” (Socrates in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 27). Individuals seek each other not for what they are or what is “like” but rather for belonging to each other. Man’s self sufficiency in happiness includes friendship. Aristotle wrote that friendship implies a virtue and is necessary for living. Friendship involves equality. In a reciprocal relationship both parties get the same and wish the same to each other or exchange one thing for another. In the community, friendship is a reciprocal relationship characterized by love and desire. “Friendship cannot be between a soulless thing. There is no mutual loving and you do not wish good to it.” (Aristotle, in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 30-32.) To a friend, you must wish goods for his own sake. If good is wished in this way and the same wish is not returned by the other, one is said to have goodwill and not a reciprocated good

will or friendship. Friends are aware of the reciprocated good will. Friends seek a mutual understanding that goodwill is for the other no matter what the circumstance. Understanding is apparent.

But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in themselves. (Hence they wish goods to each other for each other's own sake.) Now those who wish goods to their friend for the friend's own sake are friends most of all; for they have this attitude because of the friend himself, not coincidentally (Aristotle in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 33).

Some friendships are good and others are simply called good. Important to the good friendship is conversation. "Distance does not dissolve friendship unconditionally, but only its activity. Lack of conversation has dissolved many a friendship." (Aristotle in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 36.) The verbal exchange between individuals strengthens friendship.

Aristotle revealed that friendship involved individuals with two or more parts. In other words, friendship amongst individuals meant friendship towards oneself first. "An extreme degree of friendship resembles one's friendship to oneself." (Aristotle, in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 56). This is an early indication of self reliance or awareness or comfort with one self. Man learns to accept himself for what he is. He approves of himself and supposes he is decent in mind and spirit. "If man is at odds with himself, he has an appetite for one thing and a wish for another. Cowardice takes control of him and he



refrains from a friendship.” (Aristotle in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 56). Therefore, man should be comfortable with himself first and ultimately with others. If man finds self awareness and comfort, he is able to create friendship. He is able to engage with the other. He experiences friendship that is pleasant, with good fortune, and relieving of pain or discomfort. “A friend consoles us by the sight of him and by conversation, if he is dexterous, since he knows our character and what gives us pleasure and pain.” (Aristotle in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 67).

Friendship gives foundation to an individual’s virtue and the life of the political community. Friends are reciprocally bonded together in a community of shared reason and love (Lord, 1984, Doyle and Smith, 2002). Aristotle wrote:

In loving their friend, they love what is good for themselves, for the good person, in coming to be a friend comes to be a good for his friend. Each loves what is good for himself and returns like for like in what he wishes and in giving pleasure (Aristotle, 2000, p. 150).

Fidelity in friendship edifies the community and enhances citizenship. Aristotle defines citizenship as a multitude of individuals who, in a democracy, share in decision or office (Lord, 1984). Individuals share a view to a self sufficient life in a city. These individuals look towards what Aristotle calls a *regime*, or government. The immediate view of the city’s population may change but the general view of the regime or a government seemingly does not. Aristotle implies the overall good of the regime is vital to the general

welfare of the citizen. Citizens can become dissimilar but preservation of the partnership between the individuals and the regime is a constant goal.

For Aristotle, the virtue of the good friend and the good citizen is important. (Lord, 1984). Conditions or norms result in service, moral attainment; self control, devotion, and activity in the life of the city or state are significant. The honor or good name of the city is the guardian of government with generosity to forgive and forget in the face of common danger or view to a common cause (Lord, 1984). The goal for individuals is always the good of the city. Character assures this goal. Admittedly, Greek citizenship is not all inclusive. Women and slaves are not included. Indeed, it is a privileged citizenship that excludes certain social groups from citizenship. However, it is Aristotle's assertion that the citizens are virtuous with a view towards the *good of the city* that is significant.

Cicero believes that true friendship is possible only amongst good men. Like Aristotle, Cicero wrote that friendship is based on virtue or ethics. Unlike Aristotle, however, virtue was a priori to friendship. Friendship, according to Cicero, is part of man's nature. "In nature, something propels as to the open hand and heart...we judge it desirable because all its profits are encompassed by the feeling of love which it generates" (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 90-91). Individuals form a compact when there is indication of virtue that shines from within and "fastens itself to this as to something like itself, and when this happens love is bound to arise" (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 98). Friendship exists only between good men. Men are models of virtue with integrity, justice, and generosity. There is no sense of greed, lust, or insolence. Friendship is necessary. "Men are meant by nature to have some sort of companionship with one

another” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 86-87). Friendship improves the quality of life. It makes life worth living. It is wonderful, according to Cicero, to share life with someone with whom one speaks freely, rejoices in another’s happiness, and shares the suffering of the other. Friendship is a “ray of hope into the future” that keeps it from “faltering on the wayside”. When friends are together, “they are rich when poor, together when separate, strong when weak. They live on after they have died, so great is the honor that follows them, so vivid the memory, so poignant the sorrow” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 88).

Men acknowledge the other as a vision of themselves. An openness and awareness exists between them. Yet, there are limits to Cicero’s friendship model. They are without reservation, dishonor or deception, hypocrisy, and rank. If these limits circumscribe the relationship, there is no friendship. Good is the essence of friendship.

Cicero doubted friendship existed amongst men in politics and state affairs. He was convinced there was deception and hypocrisy. Yet, when anyone in either of these circumstances shows himself to be “reliable and loyal, we are bound to adjudge him a species virtually divine” (Cicero in Pakaluk, 1991, p.103).

In the Roman republic, networks of friends formed the micropolitics of political society. Political community was similar to friendship relationships. Both were based on a goal, love of country, and love of self and other. Friendship was considered the ultimate expression of love. Like Aristotle, St. Augustine saw the connection between community and friendship but like Cicero, St. Augustine feared the danger modern politics posed to community. Traditions and identities are easily destabilized. Identities, the base of friendship are often in question. The Roman republic faced this challenge.

The challenge of establishing identities prevails throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century as well. The challenge is overcome if friendship is priority.

St. Augustine asserted the community of friends informed the polis. Friends create a communion of souls who experience love of self and other. Love and justice guide reasoning about politics. “Kingdoms are gangs of criminals” without love and justice (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 139). Kingdoms or political communities fail because “criminal gangs” or men from “demoralized ranks” are bound by plunder (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 139).

In the community that experiences friendship, citizenship is not an afterthought or an occasion. Individuals experience diverse traits and then common traits of objects of love and virtue. A harmony amongst individuals exists.

In the case of music for strings or wind, and in vocal music, there is a certain harmony to be kept between the different parts, and if this is altered or disorganized the cultivated ear finds it intolerable; and the united efforts of dissimilar voices are blended into harmony by the exercise of restraint. In the same way a community of different classes, high, low and middle unites, like the varying sounds of music, to form a harmony of very different parts through the exercise of rational restraint; and what is called harmony in music answers to concord in a community, and it is the best and closest bond of security in a country. And this cannot possibly exist without justice (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 74).

Friendship eventually solidifies the relationship. It tempers potential hostility in the polis.

Augustine saw friendships form from a spiritual perspective. If man has love of God, he is a man with good intentions towards his fellow man.

When a man's resolve is to love God, and to love his neighbour *sic* as himself, not according to man's standards but according to God's he is undoubtedly said to be a man of good will, because of this love (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 557).

In the Roman Empire, the idea of community and citizenship was not widespread but rather within the small group of patrician families with outstanding evidence of service. Imperial and local citizenship extended to a privileged class. Citizenship did not extend to lower classes. Rome made demands on character, virtue and manliness (Matheson, 1897). Foreigners could not become citizens. When nations were conquered, they were allowed to retain their language and culture so long as they remained loyal to Rome (Matheson, 1897). Friendship and community were absent. "In a global community, friendships form around the goods they share" (St. Augustine in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 128). This was not the case in the Roman Empire. A deformed polis eroded the empire.

By the 6<sup>th</sup> century, the Roman Empire had fallen in Western Europe and new nation-states and a new liberal democratic citizenship emerged. The new citizen was part of a town and a larger polity. The citizen experienced a new development in political

life, that of representation, particularly in shires or burroughs. In England, this representation was very limited, a sign of a long struggle between the monarch and Parliament. For the most part, however, the struggle was a civil struggle. It was not a bloody struggle as the French Revolution was a bloody struggle for representation and citizenship. There was a certain amount of autonomy and respect in the British model of citizenship. During the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, men argued and bickered, indeed, but this conflict was contained within the Parliament, not the streets (Gross, 1999). The individual and political rights advanced by Parliament were a long process frequently interrupted by social injustice, economic strife, and civil wars. English civil war gradually led to the limitation of power of the crown and the state to the extension of individual rights and religious freedom and toleration. Voltaire wrote, “Here is the most essential difference between Rome and England: the results of civil wars in Rome has been slavery, the fruit of turmoils in England, liberty” (Voltaire, *Philosophical Letters of 1773* in Gross, 1999, p. 87). In this atmosphere, the views of Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant are insightful.

Thomas Hobbes (circa 1651) was an advocate for monarchy albeit with liberal policies. He affirmed friendships were important but they would not sustain the human condition. Friendships could prevail but they need a power to enforce justice while they pursue the common good. “The Laws of Nature without the terrour *sic* of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like” (Hobbes 1996, p.117). Still, however, Hobbes valued friendships as integral to the community. Men “suffer” or experience “grief” so someone needed to guide them (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88). This was natural in Hobbes’s view.

Hobbes emphasized the need for justice because friends act unjustly toward others. He thought this contrary to the notion that friends are naturally oriented to happiness, which was higher than justice as Aristotle asserted.

Men, in Hobbes's view, become friends by chance. No two human beings are natural friends. By nature, men are enemies. There are numerous potential legitimate causes of quarrel and with no standard of conduct to adhere to men are at a loss for someone to mediate the situation. Yet, "every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he values himself" (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88). However, rather cynically, Hobbes asserts a friend is someone who "desires such things as are necessary to commodious living" (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88). Men form friendships for "fear of death" or allies where "men join together to give them security" (Hobbes, 1996, p. 90). Man is fit for society not by nature but by training. He seeks to live with others in peace and unity but these are not natural tendencies but conscious efforts towards a means to an end that is security.

Therefore, the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring but also to the assuring of a contented life and differ only the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in the divers (*sic*)men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired (Hobbes, 1996, p. 70).

Hobbes sees no sincere, genuine reciprocal relationship between men. Rather, friendship is always motivated by power, material gain, or reputation. Greed is associated with friendship. Even the hermit has needs so he will seek a friend. He seeks a friend for protection, for fear of death or a desire for things necessary for a comfortable life filled with goods or the hope to obtain them. Men do not enjoy friendship, or have any love for society itself except for the safety they afford and opportunities for success they bring. “Men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power to overawe them all” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 88). Hobbes, regrettably, saw a human reality he wanted to change. He took prevailing tendencies into account and tried to protect man from corruption, injustice, and greed.

Immanuel Kant is more generous to man's nature than Thomas Hobbes. Yet, he is reserved in the practice of friendship contrasted with the true idea of friendship.

‘A friend is another self’ ...if men, however, were so reminded that each one looked to the happiness of others, than the welfare of each would be secured by the efforts of his fellows. If we felt that others would care for our happiness as we for theirs there would be no reason to fear that we should be left behind. The happiness that I gave to another would be returned to me. There is an exchange of welfare, no one would suffer, for another would look after my happiness as I looked after his. It might seem that I should be the loser by caring for the happiness of others, but this care were reciprocated, there would be no loss and the happiness of each would be promoted by the generosity of others. This is the idea of



friendship, in which self love is superseded by a generous reciprocity of love (Kant in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 210-211).

Kant did not think everyone could be a friend in the true sense. The challenges in society precluded this.

Such citizens are very rare. They are men of kindly disposition who are always prepared to look on the best side of things. The combination of such goodness of heart with taste and understanding characterizes the friend of man and in itself constitutes the high degree of perfection in man (Kant in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 217).

As a rule, man forms rather particular relationships or relationships with a motive because this is natural in contrast to the true reciprocal idea of friendship.

Friendship as a relationship is absent or without treatment in the Early Republic in American History. There is little mention of it as important in an ordered civil society. Still, however, there was a need for loyalty, trust, and understanding. Attitudes that relate to social friendship are significant. What is necessary for a just and effective national government? What binds or creates unity for the people? Opportunity needs to exist where this occurs.

Notions of friendship are illuminated surrounding the ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America. Once the Constitution was complete, it was sent to the states of ratification. A debate ensued between two groups, Federalists and

Anti federalists. Federalists supported the Constitution and its focus on a strong national government. Anti federalists were fearful of a strong national government and supported strong state governments. Small or local communities shared a common good.

Localism defined the American landscape during the 18<sup>th</sup> century. It found support in Protestantism that demanded political autonomy. In many respects, the teachings and practice of Christianity provided foundations for friendship and unity at local levels (DeSorba, 2003).

Small communities shared acquaintances, habits, affection, and attachment. Conversation, understanding, and intimacy amongst individuals were evident. The close relationship amongst individuals and between individuals and the government guarded the people's liberty and their voice (De Sorbo, 2003). Hopeful individuals who may have thought otherwise were impractical. There was fear that the republican government over such a broad territory would fail. Anti-Federalists sought to keep as much as possible the vitality of local government, in which rulers and ruled could see, know and understand each other. They sought close association. The Constitution challenged this goal (De Sorbo, 2003).

“Brutus”, or Robert Yates, a New York politician and judge, the most vocal of the Anti-Federalists feared the diverse republic would affect the central government

(The Founding

Fathers,[http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution\\_founding\\_fathers\\_new\\_york.html](http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_new_york.html)).

In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good... Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions' and their sentiments are by no coincident. The laws and customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; each would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be composed of such heterogenous and discordant principles, as would constantly be contending with each other

(Brutus, <http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus01.txt>).

The Federalist response cautioned against this assertion.

Americans could unite under the new Constitution. The most influential proponent of the Constitution, James Madison, assuaged the Anti Federalists' fear.

Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire (Madison, Federalist 14, in Rossiter, 1961, p. 103-104).

Americans were divided. It was clear Anti federalists perceived the absence of conditions of a social friendship they felt necessary for harmony and social order. Federalists were criticized for being unconcerned with social friendship and focused on controlling competing interests. Typical were the claims they were not concerned with behavior and attitudes thought necessary for an orderly nation. (The Constitution was eventually ratified by 1789 after a Bill of Rights was included.)

How does the large republic create a bond or unity to secure the general welfare? Alexis de Tocqueville observes this conceptually in a “doctrine of self interest well understood.” (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 500). He recognized that Americans set their sights on justice, the ends of good government and democracy. Majority rule is absolute for democracy. The majority is the people of America who elect officials to the legislature. As elected officials they are named to office directly by the people and briefly in term. Their purpose is to submit to the general views and passions of the people or the majority. Tocqueville contends the majority is founded on the notion that the likelihood of enlightenment or wisdom found in many united is greater than that to be found in one. The majority is founded on the principle that the interests of the greatest number are

preferred to those of the few. Often, however, the majority has the tendency to become problematic or tyrannical. Freedom is in peril when the power of the majority becomes so powerful that nothing stops it or moderates it. This is evil and dangerous in itself.

I see only God who can be omnipotent without danger, because his wisdom and justice are always equal to his power. There is, therefore, no authority on earth so respectable in itself or vested with a right so sacred that I should wish to allow to act without control and to dominate without obstacles. Therefore, when I see the right and the ability to do everything granted to any power whatsoever, whether it is called people or king, democracy or aristocracy, whether it is exercised in a monarchy or in a republic; I say: There is the seed of tyranny, and I seek to go live under other laws (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 241).

Where is the guarantee against tyranny? Even though a majority may be well informed on an issue and their intentions are good, they may not always be prudent. What if the measure supposed prudent is incompatible with lifestyle or inconvenient to an established precedent? Tocqueville warns against democracy rehabilitating despotism. Can a large group determine the common good and implement the means towards that end? Tocqueville asserts the doctrine of self interest well understood safeguards the common goods.

In the United States, individuals combine their well being with that of their fellow citizens.

American moralists do not claim that one must sacrifice oneself to those like oneself because it is great to do it; but they say boldly that such sacrifices are as necessary to the one who imposes them on himself as to the one who profits from them (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 501).

The love of themselves lures them to the aid of others. They sacrifice a part of their time to the good of the state. Americans much prefer allegiance to their philosophy than their individual desires. This notion keeps democracy grounded. “It forms a multitude of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, and masters of themselves” (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 502). It might not lead them to virtue, but it certainly keeps those who would fall far below it to attain it and retain it. Egocentrism and greed could lead one to “stupid excess”. Yet, if the individual yields selfishness to the prosperity of those like them, misery is avoided (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 503).

The doctrine of self interest well understood is evident not only in the political arena but in the local associations and communities. Even though these are local they are concomitant with a social relationship that ensures reciprocity amongst individuals with a view towards good ends. “Sentiments and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another” (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 491). “As soon as several of the inhabitants...have conceived a sentiment or an idea that they want to produce in the world, they seek each other out; and when they have found each other, they unite” (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 492). Tocqueville

was confident the doctrine of self interest well understood assured encounters were positive and renewed civilization.

Jason Scorza (2004) notes friendship between individuals is a means to exercise citizenship. In a friendship, individuals are respectful, truthful, and accountable to each other. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in Scorza (2004), suggested friendship was a normative model for the standard of citizenship through the notion of democratic connectedness or a strong commitment to association. Through the very practice of friendship and its norms of truth and tenderness, Scorza (2004) writes that these norms are transferable to political communities. Individuals interacting in associations within communities as “friends” will know something about what it is to be a good citizen because of the norms of truth and tenderness. This idea of good citizenship practice is at least possible initially because the same norms of “truth and tenderness” will also work to preserve and strengthen the city or state even in the face of diversity (Emerson, 1841 in Scorza, 2004, p. 95). Scorza (2004) suggests these crucial norms of friendship, truth and tenderness between individuals in the community can gradually come to be a more open form of deliberation, a more stable form of disagreement and ultimately a more democratic connectedness. He implies that everyone deliberates and disagrees, but to do so with truth and tenderness will prevent volatile exchanges. Truth and tenderness between individuals is critical to maintain while winning a point or argument is secondary.

Friends are frank with each other. Citizens through friendship seek the truth and deal with the truth even if it prompts an element of incivility. The ultimate norm, that of tenderness in the relationship helps to stabilize the relationship. A “Rough Civility” produces a social union (Crick in Scorza, 2004, p. 103). A “rough civility” is the means

whereby a society recognizes divisions and tensions while individuals who exercise tenderness working against silence and violence promotes a more durable social union and greater harmony. In this atmosphere, personal freedom, social justice, and civil peace are developed and demonstrated in society not constrained (Scorza, 2004). Scorza writes “to be a citizen is to be a friend to an individual” (2004).

Generosity is part of friendship (Kristjansson, 2006). Generosity suggests a citizen has an obligation to be a friend and also an obligation to be generous in kind and spirit. By being ungenerous one is uncivilized. Selfishness precludes good government (Kristjansson, 2006). Generosity is an indicator or norm of good citizenship. This generous behavior, part of one’s character is something to be cultivated through education (Kristjansson, 2006). It is to be established as a political ideal as well as a personal one. If an individual is generous the individual has character. This enhances good government and good community, or good citizens, in a community. In this state of community, there is an element of reciprocity. It is for the good of the giver and the receiver. Individuals can make their character better by benefitting another individual (Collins, 2003).

Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (2004) assert citizenship is an identity, an expression of an individual’s membership in a community. Citizens are encouraged to exercise responsibility and virtue, including self-reliance, participation, and civility (Kymlicka, Norman, 1994). There is also a need to encourage a common experience or a source of unity in society through friendship (Kymlicka, Norman, 1994).

Geoffrey Stokes (2004) offers an interesting approach to differentiated citizenship where many voices are heard and deliberated. It is a theory of global citizenship. At the



outset, he notes “we should regard all men as our fellow countrymen” (Stokes, 2004, p.19). He looks to global citizenship as a type of civic identity and practice that goes beyond national citizenship and boundaries of the nation state. The interest goes beyond the narrow interest of the nation. The problems or challenge of the world beyond the nation is the responsibility of all people and citizens. There is a broad range of moral and political norms that encompass rights and obligations to humanity sometimes even beyond the environment (Stokes, 2004).

Stokes (2004) credits the Greeks with this view toward global citizenship. “Diogenes, the Cynic” (412-333 BC) called himself a “citizen of the world” (p.19). The idea was the cosmic polis, a city or universe where all human beings could live in peace under universal law (Heater in Stokes, 2004). According to Stokes, there was a notion of a common humanity where citizens of the world could put universal loyalty above their own. It was a given that citizens had dual obligations or duties and rights to be a citizen of the state and a citizen of the world. This idea has become popular since the 1960s with movements such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross.

Critical for the study is how the common experience or source of unity suggested by the literature is formulated or in the case of Hobbes and Kant, avoided? If this common experience encourages citizenship how is it constructed? Further, how can diverse groups exercise citizenship? Regrettably, the history of citizenship reveals iniquities amongst peoples that build barriers to dialogue and friendship.

Any nation can have citizenship, but a citizenship that exudes a dialogue and friendship that begins in the secondary school will sustain the citizenship ideals rooted in American History.

Given ethnic diversity and multiculturalism in the United States, my study reveals the Peaceable Schools, with roots in Greek and American History, as an appropriate citizenship model that creates a bond, friendship amongst all individuals to construct a common experience with a vision toward the community.

## Chapter 2

### The History of Citizenship

Different concepts of citizenship require different political arrangements. Some view citizenship as “possession of private rights against the state and against other citizens.” Others view citizenship as it regards the individual “who shares the obligation to govern” (Schwartz, 1985, pp. 530-531). In each of these ideas there is a common area for citizenship. It is the city or the community. Western political theory that grew out of city states in ancient Greece treated citizenship as one activity that occurred in a social setting, the city. Particular social conditions were significant: wealth, birth, merit, and unity (Schwartz, 1985). Classical liberal democratic theory born in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century values individual natural law (rights are a priori in humans) and natural rights. This theory is the basis for citizenship and government in the United States. In a reciprocal relationship, individuals seek natural rights and the government assures the security of body, person, and property. Where citizenship and equality are linked together, individuals experience equality in all matters.

What is citizenship? In our democracy, citizenship is defined by equality, dialogue and friendship amongst individuals. Individuals are self reliant with a willingness to engage in a reciprocal relationship with others. The virtuous ideals of responsibility, respect, trust, truth, honor, wisdom, autonomy, and integrity of the self, the other, the community, and to the nation are consequential. The history of citizenship identifies a distinct evolution of active citizenship. Active citizenship is not, however, without challenge. For each challenge throughout history, dialogue and friendship

underscores and strengthens resolution, implementation, and progression for individual citizenship in our democracy.

This section surveys the history of citizenship in five areas: first, the history of citizenship and citizenship theories shows a tension between the recurring idea of citizenship as a shared and active life and citizenship as a passive status. Second, it reveals the spirit of individualism injected into the concept and workings of citizenship and how this transforms citizenship into a vehicle of “liberation.” Third, challenges to the modern civic model of the liberal civic state and citizenship that arose in the 17<sup>th</sup> century are discussed. Fourth, liberal democratic principles may be at odds with other models of civic belonging. The history of the United States suggests claims of liberalism and democracy has been at odds with the exclusionary, boundary-staking functions of citizenship laws and policies. The historical evolution of citizen practice conflicts with classical liberalism and democracy. For example, marginalized groups such as women, African Americans, Native Americans, and ethnically diverse groups have had to struggle to gain citizenship rights. Finally, some countries that do not live in a classical liberal democracy presently seek this model as their form of government. In particular, the recent unrest in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya illustrates the desire of individuals to express their voice in government.

## Part I

### Active and Passive Citizenship

Citizenship as a shared and active status and citizenship as a passive status describes individuals who in the former participate in political life, and individuals who are indifferent or non participatory in the latter. Non participatory or passive citizenship indicates status only. Individuals are without participatory rights and privileges; they are citizens in name only. These are used interchangeably. The tension between passive and active political life was evident throughout the ancient citizenships of Greece, Rome, and the Middle Ages. The effect of this tension was really two forms of citizenship that influenced unity and loyalty of government, but more importantly, the sovereignty or autonomy of the individual as it pertained to rule. Better said it was a reflection of citizen as ruler and citizen as subject. The individual participated not from a subjective standpoint of his own needs and desires but rather with a view toward the good of the city as determined by those in power.

In Greece, not everyone was a citizen. It was a status for an elite group of men who, based upon their economic status in the polis, were eligible for citizenship. The polis or the Greek city state was a political community that provided economic conditions to people who could take care of their own needs. Activity in this town or polis was synonymous with one's citizenship status. Individuals participated in the public life of the city. For Greek citizens, participation was essential. Pericles suggested if there was no interest in the public or life of the city, one was considered isolated from public service of the polis. Individuals were active because they contributed to the common

good separate from their private needs. In his funeral oration, he claimed that a democracy offered an equal justice to all, regardless of economic differences, social standing, or class considerations. Equal justice extended to all, regardless of economic differences or social standing, brought about an active citizenship (Pericles, The Funeral Oration in Clark, 1994).

Overall, citizenship in Greece was taken quite seriously. Not to be among men (a citizen) was not to be a human. It (citizenship) was a way of being, a way of life. To be an Athenian citizen was a privilege and Athenians regarded this as very significant and integral to their culture. A mere fraction of the diverse Athenian population that included foreigners and traders and slaves were citizens. Foreigners had a special status, some with a legal identity, some rights and an obligation to serve in the military and pay taxes. They could not participate in government. Women and children were not citizens but enjoyed the legal protection of Athens through their husbands and fathers. Overall, the active citizen class (16-66 years of age) was no more than 18% of the population (Clark, 1994, p. 85). In Athens, this small select group defined an active participatory democracy.

Active citizenship bred equality and tolerance in the personal life of the citizen and adherence to law in the public life. There was to be a distinction private from public but the public was the priority. An active citizen in the public sphere or polis engaged in discussion as preliminary to any wise action.

Political bonds grew but Greece still clung to the citizenship notion of *jus sanguine* or citizenship through blood relation. Those of “unpure birth” were removed from registers and often sold. The punishment for murdering an Athenian was higher

than that for a non Athenian. Given the virtuous philosophy of government that Athenians advanced, this is harsh by contemporary standards (Clark, 1994).

Greek citizenship changed with Kleisthenes (600 B.C.) when the “demes” or small social communities or units were part of the city state. These demes brought about a solidarity that transformed citizenship from tribal to political (Clark, 1994). A new political bond between an individual and the state emerged. *Jus sanguine*, or citizenship through blood relation, was shifting to *jus soli*, or citizenship through place of birth or birthright. This shift became a practical measure to provide justice and assure morally grounded citizens. While it had its limitations, it provided the basis for active citizenship.

In Plato’s (427-347 B.C.), “The Crito”, the dialogue between Crito and Socrates illuminates the ideal citizen in Athens. Socrates was imprisoned and sentenced to death. Crito informed Socrates of his opportunity to escape to Phthia and live the remainder of his life in exile. Socrates explained to Crito that he could not leave Athens. To leave would be unjust. To avoid his punishment (evil) by another evil (to violate the law and escape) does no service to citizen or country. A man must be truthful to himself, do the right thing and not betray what is right. If Socrates was to escape Athens he would escape the very principles which he acknowledged to be just in the first place. The decisions of law were not to be overthrown. There was evil in avoiding the sentence of the state (Socrates in Plato in Somerville & Santoni, 1965). Why? The state nurtured and educated the citizen. To avoid the sentence was a violation of the state’s good faith. If an Athenian did not like what he had experienced throughout his years as a citizen in the state he was free to leave and “take his goods with him” (Socrates in Plato in Somerville & Santoni, 1965, p. 55). The individual who had experienced the manner in

which Athenians ordered justice and administered the state and remained through “an implied contract” wrongs his parents, “authors” of his education and the state (Socrates in Plato in Somerville & Santoni, 1965).

Socrates took this view and his contract with the state seriously. He was just and faithful to virtues of wisdom, temperance, and courage throughout his life. To depart after he had the opportunity to choose banishment rather than death at his trial was to forget the sentiments and respect for law and go “running like a slave” (Socrates in Plato, p. 56). The dialogue between Socrates and Crito helps to define the active citizen as one nurtured and educated by parent and state with political virtues of wisdom, temperance, and courage. These virtues were lived and exemplified through man’s will. To lose sight of these virtues was to violate one’s citizenship. For Socrates to have lived outside or without the polis or the city was to violate these virtues.

Plato sought to instill in the individual a sense of responsibility and consciousness with regards to the city. In each social class, from lower to upper, the individual performed his job or fulfilled his station. The individual also had affection for one’s peers as citizens. Individuals learned this through education. Beyond one’s job or station, however, the individual was non participatory in an undemocratic society.

Plato’s student, Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.) expounded the notion of virtue and citizenship. He wrote that the citizen had a responsibility to the city. He also acknowledged that while the citizen had a responsibility to the city, the city also had a responsibility to the citizen. It was a reciprocal relationship. The individual participated as one who ruled and as one ruled. Citizen served on juries, assemblies, in the military, or in general discussion (Schwartz, 1985). The city consisted of a partnership of citizens.



Whether or not the citizens were similar in their task, they had an obligation to preserve their partnership and their city (Aristotle). The virtue of the citizen was with a view toward the city and the regime. In Aristotle's view, the governed could participate in political decisions but the goal was the welfare of the state. This was the essence of citizenship. As Plato before him, Aristotle asserted that virtue was significant for the citizen. Men could be good, but that was not the same as the excellent citizen in all states or regimes. The active citizen practiced virtue with a view towards the city during the Athenian age. The partnership of citizens, the shared life was typical of citizenship in the city (Aristotle). This notion of active citizenship changed with the advent of the Roman Empire.

The early Roman government was monarchical but by 509 B.C., Rome was a republic. There was a shift toward greater exclusivity or a thin, shallow citizenship. Class status or patricians and plebeians characterized Roman citizenship. Both were citizens but religious and social restrictions confined the lower class, the plebeians, from achieving the high offices that patricians could attain. Because of this, plebeians were not able to participate in the republic. This was an early example of active and passive or participatory and non participatory citizenship in the Roman Empire. Patricians were clearly active citizens. Others shared only a status. Unlike the Greeks, where citizenship was a way of life, Rome's was a citizenship based on class. There was a shift from the community nature of the polis toward a less intimate way of life. An individual's concern with particulars of public life such as how politics affects their life (*res publica*) rather than simply political life was evident in the community. Herein lay the beginning

of the tension that was characterized as sharing a political life (active) and sharing a status (passive).

In its early history, Rome was surrounded by Latin nations. Rome formed an alliance with the Latins and a dual identity evolved. Latins had a broad Roman identity and a Latin identity. “Citizenship” was separated from the tribal and consanguineal community. Roman citizenship extended to the Latin population. New citizens were not ethnically Romans. There was a separation of the political from the ethnic. While alliances were made, citizens did not acquire full rights, thus the non participatory citizen. Revolts arose and the question of “that we are called Romans ensued” (Clark, 1994, p. 31). The ethnic citizenship created bond and loyalty. The political bond with the Roman Republic created duties, responsibilities, and sacrifices. There was citizenship without a vote. Their citizenship was dual and passive. It was as Clark asserted, “a contradiction of close association, alliance, and incorporation” (Clark, 1994, p. 37).

As Rome acquired a variety of nationalities into a multiethnic or civic state, it became politically expedient to create citizenship. It created a device for ethnic diversity, an association of free citizens and diverse ethnicity. In the Roman Empire (31 B.C. to the latter part of the 5<sup>th</sup> century A.D.), nearly the entire civilized world was politically united and generations of peoples experienced internal peace (Palmer, 1995). Rome was the center around which lay the “circle of lands” or the known world in the west (Palmer, 1995, p. 14). Dual citizenships or multiple identities defined identification with the state and a particular ethnic community. This dual citizenship was of a passive nature in contrast with the citizen of Rome, an active citizen. What was important for the passive citizen was a simple adherence to Roman law. The result of this passive citizenry was a

lack of unity and loyalty that eventually led to the demise of the long standing empire and contributed to the establishment of Medieval cities and citizenship.

As the Medieval cities developed, an active citizenry developed in some but not all cities. They were “islands” of civic and urban freedom within feudal society. They were independent and democratic. The goal was not to create war and conquer lands but rather to create economic growth through trade or capitalism. A town economy emerged with the domination of the guilds (craftsmen/artisans who shared a common skill or craft). There was a share of government in the ‘urbs’ or urban areas, personal liberty and active membership. A civic identity was extended to all members irrespective of origin and identity. The citizens of the burghers were as free as participatory citizens were in Rome. There was a broad territorial solidarity. It was based on *jus soli*. Individuals were members of the urban community who participated in guilds, voted in administrative government, and even though foreign born, were active members of the community. The goal for this citizen was to maintain access to their occupation and livelihood and restrict competition from other areas. Further, to create a more democratic community, individuals were compelled to serve in the military. This according to Weber, brought about the control of the non aristocratic masses. By putting arms into their hands they also put political power into their hands (Weber, 1998, p. 46). This resulted in democratization in the cities.

The active or participatory citizen stood in contrast to serfs who were subjects to the king and part of a passive hierarchy of God-King-Knights-Nobles-Women. Status in this regard indicated where an individual stood in society. This was different in the city states where they held on to their autonomy and cities acted as refuges for those seeking

freedom. The clash between the two, passive and active was eventually absorbed by the nation-states (Gross, 1999). An active citizenship ultimately emerged with the French Revolution.

Prior to the revolution in France, the nation state was divided into three estates: first, the clergy, second, the nobility, and third, the business and professional classes, the peasantry and city workers. Rights and privileges depended upon the class or estate to which one belonged. Church bodies owned between 5 and 10 percent of the land. They were the greatest of the landowners. The nobles were exempt from most taxes simply because of their position in society. The third class or estate, the commercial and professional classes were not well off compared with the church and the nobility (Palmer, 1995). The ancient regime was stratified, fixed, and unequal. There was no universal bond. The monarch was the supreme arbiter of a society divided into privileged and disadvantaged sections (Gross, 1999). This was an indicator of passive or non participatory citizenship, which ended with the French Revolution.

In August 1789, national unification came to fruition and a Declaration of Rights precipitated the French Revolution. Active citizenship was associated with the people, patriotism, liberty, and democracy. Active citizenship grew with the rise of nationalism. Citizenship was extended to all. It was a symbol of freedom (Gross, 1999). In essence, “citizenship” was associated with interest in law, social contract, and government. The idea of republicanism and citizenship became conversation amongst the debating republic and in the mass media. Finally, a state governed by representatives of men who enjoyed equal rights and were not divided by status manifested itself in a legislature. An active citizenry had evolved and a civic life was significant (Gross, 1999). Citizenship was

associated with French nationality and French culture. It was a citizenship established by *jus sanguine*. Here, the modern national state developed. Evident and complimentary to nationalism were patriotic symbols, verses, art, and messages of freedom.

In Great Britain, individual and political rights were an essential part of the modern concept of citizenship. They were established through bargaining or political struggles. The English people have been credited with “committee sense”, a desire to discuss until compromise and agreement was reached. Gradually, the Parliamentary power was extended and the monarchy’s power diminished. A House of Lords and a House of Commons had a greater balance of power. Consequently, individuals had greater individual, civil, and political freedoms (Gross, 1999).

Unlike the Romans where the result of civil wars was slavery, in England, the result of conflict was liberty (Gross, 1999). The Great Charter or the Magna Carta of 1215 gave evidence of this. The power of the Prince had the “force of law” (Gross, 1999, p. 87). National representation in Parliament was slowly being established. There was not total representation of the nation, but there was an adherence to the principle of Rule of Law. There was a relentless process toward a society governed by the will of the many and toward individual and political rights for all.

In Britain, early representation began in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. Shires, or territorial units of government had elections of knights, two citizens from each city, and two burgesses from each burrough. In each, there was self government and election of administrators. The citizens assessed their taxes by a jury of neighbors and by the 14<sup>th</sup> century, money grants and taxation was initiated by their peers in the House of Commons (Gross, 1999). There was a view towards protecting individual and political rights of

citizens. These citizens exercised active citizenship and with a fidelity or loyalty to the political system continued to advocate these rights. While “paying taxes” is not participatory assessing them is participatory.

The tension between active and passive citizenship was evident in participation and status. The exercise of rights (political and individual) and the commitment to the general good was reflected in each. One or the other did not make an individual a better citizen. It was a matter of the level of participation. One’s class status indicated the level of participation. The idea of subject and sovereign was evident. Individuals seeking political and individual freedoms caused repercussions between subject and sovereign by the beginning of modern citizenship. While individuals noted the difference between subject and sovereign, they were beginning to acknowledge the significance of their own individualism in citizenship practice. As a result of this, the individual began to think of his morality, needs, and desires.

## Part II

### The Spirit of Individualism and Citizenship

The spirit of individualism and citizenship began as an idea with the “City of Man, City of God” written by St. Augustine and evolved as an expression of citizenship through the guilds of the Middle Ages and finally as a means to govern during the Enlightenment and early nation-states.

In St. Augustine's "City of Man, City of God"(354-430 A.D.) it was written that man must render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and render under God that which is God's (St. Augustine, 1984). Here, Christians became dual citizens. There was citizenship in the real world and more importantly an awareness that in this world, this earthly city could not take away or claim anything that was God's. The significance of this was the rise of subjectivity or the acknowledgement of the individual, the eternal over the temporal. The emphasis was on the individual self. This emphasis became apparent because, of course, the individual sought salvation in the heavenly city which was with God. In the Roman Empire, this was particularly appealing for slaves and for women who were not considered citizens, which caused much concern in Rome. St. Augustine, through his writings, made citizenship available not only to the individual but to the downtrodden as well. Yes, people could give service to country, but they also had to think of the larger picture which was the heavenly city.

Even the heavenly city, therefore, while its state of pilgrimage avails itself of the peace of earth, and so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessities of life and makes this earthly peace bear upon the place of heaven; for this alone can be truly called and esteemed the peace of reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God...when we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal (St. Augustine, 1984, pp. 877-879).

An individual lives his life as a self sacrificing individual and with a vision toward the eternal life. This serves a twofold measure for the individual. Man sought to live a good life on earth, one that was virtuous and with good citizenship as St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 A.D.) wrote (St. Thomas in Clark, 1994). Individuals followed laws that were virtuous. If citizens were virtuous, the common good of the state flourished. By being virtuous, the individual was not only living in a meaningful way but he was his own object of attention. He forsook his own selfish needs and desires for the ultimate heavenly city. In this citizenship practice, the individual might not be participating in government as an individual participated through a social contract, but he was at least thinking of the justice that can be achieved in the end for himself. Human Law was synonymous with Divine Law. Divine Law dictated a Natural Law (or derived through the senses) which resulted in Positive Law or Human Law. In this aspect of dual citizenship advanced by the City of God, the individual was beginning to think of his actions on a personal level. An individual stake in citizenship practice had taken shape that was not earlier apparent (Clark, 1994).

As civilization progressed, the Roman Empire fell and the Middle Ages were taking shape. Roman Law and tradition survived in areas that were one with the Roman Empire and spread throughout universities and cities with great enthusiasm. Citizenship once established in Rome continued into the Middle Ages. Politics that were thought of during the Roman Empire (*res publica*) were also thought of during the early Middle Ages. Individuals pondered government administration and their part or function within it. Christianity prevailed and brought about a new sense of unity. This unity was grounded not in *jus sanguine* but in values. In the Middle Ages, however, citizenship



was not in the tradition of Rome. There was no universal institution of free inhabitants. The very definition of citizenship varied from country to country. Craftsmen formed guilds in cities. The spirit of individualism became part of the concept of citizenship (Gross, 1999). These cities were centers of urban and civic freedom. They had limited autonomy but they fought for their rights and legal and administrative autonomy.

Individuals ruled through the theory of natural law and a simplistic version of a social contract (Gross, 1999). They were sovereign. Citizenship in the cities meant a share in government, personal liberty, and active membership in the urban political community. There was solidarity and identity (a bond) that was extended to all members irrespective of origin and ethnicity. Burghers or inhabitants of cities were free as were participatory citizens in Rome (Gross, 1999).

Fugitive serfs sought cities as a refuge. “The air of the city makes you free” (Gross, 1999, p. 57). Birth meant little and however stigmatized the child was at birth, this stigma vanished in the city. Cities were centers of liberation because they were foundations of freedom, equality, and a market economy. The city’s aim (a growing economy) blended with the individual aim to seek freedom and contribute to the economy. Yet, this aim was not the end result for all. Not all cities could boast this objective. For the successful tradesman, the city was a source of wealth and culture. For the unsuccessful serf mired in poverty, the city was symbolic of exploitation and oppression. The cities marked the beginning of alienation. Self worth diminished as individuals became objects of trade rather than directly responsible for production. Still, however, an urban solidarity evolved because many cities were islands of toleration. Not only were citizens tied economically, they were tied in terms of defense. Defense of the

cities was tied to the guilds. Individuals usually lived in the same area. Therefore, it was their obligation to defend the city.

Not only was the individual part of the defense of the guilds, the wealth of the guild and culture, he was also part of the administration or governance of individuals, individual citizens, and burghers. There was a voluntary agreement amongst citizens or individuals. This city was a distinct corporation. It had its own pride and identity where public property was distinguished from private property. In the city, citizenship was a thriving political institution, not based in consanguineal communities but in territorial solidarity. Yet, it wasn't universal as it was in Rome. Citizenship was limited to an estate. It did not embrace all inhabitants as a right but was a privilege. Clark (1994) wrote that cities were springs of western culture. This references the theory and idea of government by consent advanced by Marsalis of Padua in the 14<sup>th</sup> century who wrote the will of the people was the only legitimate source of rule. Marsilius challenged the church's political power. He claimed it was in conflict with the state of nature (Marsilius in Clarke, 1994, p. 70). Centuries later Johannes Althusias wrote of a "community of men living together and united by real bonds which a contract of union, expressed or implied institutionalizes" (Althusias in Clark, 1994, p. 63).

In England, individual rights were part of modern citizenship. In the 12<sup>th</sup> century, shires were units of territorial government or a self government. Burroughs had self government as well and elected their own administration. Citizens were here, as they would be in France, subjects as well as rulers. Laws were based on consent.

After the Magna Carta or the Great Charter of 1215, the power of the crown was limited and the personal and civil rights of the individual were extended. The king lost his power to rule by his whim or pleasure (Gross, 1999).

In England, representation in Parliament had legitimacy of law. Authority was given to “the consent of the majority of all free men and the principle of government by consent had been slowly but firmly established” (Gross, 1999, p. 88). This was not the same as 21<sup>st</sup> century universal suffrage. One of the key features of the successful British model was simply “Fidelity to the political system” (Gross, 1999, p. 88). Englishmen called for legitimacy and stability in Parliament. Ancient traditions and customs were not to be discarded. Adherence to their heritage contributed to the stability of the English monarchy (Gross, 1999).

The birth of English territorial representation dates back to the thirteenth century. “Shires” or units of local government had characteristics of self government. Eventually, these shires formed a House of Commons. The connection of these formed a united representative institution (Gross, 1999).

During the 12th century, taxes were assessed by a “jury of neighbors” or representatives of taxpayers. The notion of taxation and representation was born. By the 14<sup>th</sup> century, no tax could be imposed without the consent of Parliament, in particular, the House of Commons (Gross, 1999).

Europe’s history does not mirror England’s. Parliaments, particularly in Poland and Hungary, represented the nobility and the clergy and not the common man. The peasantry was harshly treated and oppressed over time. The limitation of the power of the state or crown was outlined in the British and English Parliaments. Major principles

in the Bill of Rights were discussed in Parliament. The brief Cromwell Era (1649-1660) disrupted liberal ideals. After beheading the crown, hopes of constitutional and parliamentary government were dashed. Cromwell opposed religious toleration and eventually placed England under military rule. Malcontents, vagabonds, and “bandits” were repressed. The eleven year reign was a mix of “moral Puritanism” and political dictatorship where religious toleration and free speech was absent (Palmer, 1995, p. 175). When the crown was restored in 1660, the restoration of pre Cromwell liberal ideas were in place. Representation and freedom of speech avowed early in the 15<sup>th</sup> century were acknowledged. Humanitarian efforts were established as well prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and protection from arrest and excessive bail (Gross, 1999). The creation of a humane government and political institution eventually inspired political and social philosophers to contemplate democratic rule and citizenship.

Citizenship was expressed in the will of the individuals. It was an early form of the social contract or expression of the general will that identifies the Enlightenment period in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. As earlier noted, the sovereignty of the individual was evident in citizenship. This sovereignty was liberating from monarchy and from church rule. It lent itself to fairness, personal, and economic liberty. Even in its narrowness, these city dwellers (citizens) were vehicles of democratic government. The equalization of classes and removal of restraints on freedom became a central focus in the development of the dominant city (Weber, 1998).

At the end of the Middle Ages, a “megaculture” covered the nation states of Europe. A civic bond in cities or “urbs” was prevalent. Moral autonomy and individuality evolved in accordance with Divine Law. Individuals concerned with the

eternal life over the temporal life developed political thinking that stressed respect and responsibility in government amongst men. Adherence to Divine Law guided political thinkers in their autonomous development of the Social Contract, notions of consent, rights of man, equality, and liberation or liberal thinking. Divine Law was the foundation of moral autonomy. Moral autonomy and individuality evolved into liberal thinking. As mentioned earlier, in city states individuals retained their autonomy. These city states or local urbs were replaced with nation states. Through Natural Rights theory, rights had been established a priori. With this in mind, citizenship and equality and liberation were linked together.

During the Enlightenment or the period during which these nation states evolved, civil society or civil persons evolved. At this time, the idea of good government through a liberated citizenry was invoked. Individuals were “liberated” when the nation, the source of sovereignty, was not with any authority that was not expressly derived from it (Paine, in Clark, 1994, pp. 123-125). This became clear when the individual (through Liberal Theory) realized that he was part of his government. He, through a social contract, decided what was best for governance and because of a general will, which would be a will for all, for the maintenance of peace or for common defense (Rousseau, 1964, Hobbes, 1996, Clark, 1994). Locke asserted a social contract was an agreement where men consent to make one community or government and

create a body politic where the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest... By doing this, “every man by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under obligation to everyone of that society to submit to the determination of the majority and to be concluded by it...or else this compact would signify nothing (Locke, 1952, pp. 54-55).

Locke’s works resonated throughout the modern world. France applied Locke’s work in the aftermath of 18<sup>th</sup> century revolution.

In the days following the French Revolution, all authority would be subjected to reason. Individuals or citizens sought a government that respected reason. Individuals were morally sovereign. They would be politically sovereign as well. Individuals became subservient through a general will to the state (Rousseau, 1964). Through the general will there was a sense of belonging of people who shared a territory with common norms, principles, and ideas. Also, individuals or citizens became part of a contract to rule and be governed. This was an individual and liberating act. There was no hierarchy in France. All were free, equal citizens in a republican democracy. Citizenship through this contract or a submission to a general will was a citizenry based on the individual and extended to all based on loyalty and nationalism. “Each of us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole” (Rousseau, in Somerville & Santoni, 1965, p. 214). Montesquieu wrote that this was a time when individuals were interested in government, natural law, and social contract.

Discussion was alive and well not only in France but in Europe as well. A new concept of citizenship was sought (Clark, 1994).

The term “citizen” was defined as a positive norm, associated with a free society. It eventually became a symbol of freedom and equality before the law. With these ideas, a government ruled by representatives who enjoyed equal rights was a real possibility (Clark, 1994). In 1789, French citizenship rights were stated in a declaration that would eventually become law. Citizenship was associated with the people and nationalism, patriotism, liberty, and democracy. Privileges were abolished and rights were proclaimed. There was equality amongst citizens. Its simple language or form appealed to all individuals. This republican democracy recognized government by consent, by the will of the people. The citizen herewith was a symbol of equality and freedom, a subject and a sovereign. Hobbes wrote there was no difference. The citizen was a sovereign because he governed and a subject because he submitted to authority, the rule of his government (Hobbes, 1996).

From the *City of Man*, *City of God* to the nation states of the Enlightenment the individual had become synonymous with citizenship. This citizenship was one of liberation from monarchy and oppression and integral to republican government. The very infusion of the individual into citizenship practice liberated him from being subject only to subject and ruler. The very notion of a contract, compact, or general will assures that individuals obeyed no one but themselves or their own will. This was the essence of liberation for the individual.

The individual now defined membership in the nation state. Yet for all the worth of his part, the nation state was challenged as a center of citizenship.

Part III  
Challenges to the Civic Model  
of  
Citizenship

The modern, civic model of citizenship arose in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in the midst of protracted class, religious, and ethnic conflict. From the 1700's to the present, the liberal civic state has established itself as the appropriate unit of organization and membership. Yet for a variety of reasons, both practical and philosophical, the nation state, as the locus of citizenship, has been challenged and the nature of membership contested from within and without.

Since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the civic model of citizenship evolved in light of social class, religious, and ethnic conflict. This was best exemplified by the works of Marx and the Jewish question (a critique of liberal democratic citizenship) (1843) and T.H. Marshall (1992) and notions of social citizenship juxtaposed against Marx's critique of democratic citizenship. The religious and class conflict was addressed by Karl Marx and T.H. Marshall during the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Liberal democratic theory, the nation state, and traditional models of citizenship that were challenged by Marx and thoughtfully resolved by Marshall have been challenged by multiculturalism, globalization, and questions of integration and belonging or identity. For all the efforts of theorists, the challenges are still evident with no real means to overcome them. A brief historical analysis of early challenges follows. These helped to determine the nation state as appropriate. Also discussed are challenges to the nation state since World War II.



Coming out of feudalism or a hierarchic society, democracy developed gradually. There were elements of capitalism amongst workers in burroughs or shires and an element of free contract where individuals had the freedom to make their own contract in the economic realm. Individuals wanted the same freedom in the political realm and so democracy developed. Free workers emerged to make their own contract. For those individuals who sought to create business and spend capital in the marketplace, this was very liberating. Yet, the distribution of resources was not equal even though the opportunity was equal. Individuals sought the same distribution at least as the opportunity presented itself. Equality of opportunity implied equality of outcome. Marx did not see this in the development of the modern market. He saw social division. He also saw religion as contributing to societal conflict.

Marx was averse to capitalism. Historically, he did not acknowledge equal opportunity as it related to equal resources. He described a complicated arrangement of society, characterized by class antagonisms, new forms of oppression and struggle. He viewed cities as arenas of struggle and exploitation of one class to another. They were not only internally divided amongst industrialists, merchant, and farmer, they were antagonistic without any opportunity for balance. The city was ever changing. Cities were areas that appropriated goods with a view towards preservation of self and world. These did not necessarily coincide, but had a view towards preservation of self and world (Marx in Schwartz, 1985).

Marx described the ancient city and medieval city. In the ancient city, rural land and houses as well as urban houses and markets made up the city. There was unity. In the medieval city, rural territory was not part of the city. The city consisted of rural

householders who owned private property in land. Householders chose to come together for specific communal purposes. Private ownership existed before communal. Later, urban burghers separate from the land voluntarily associate as individuals to form a communal association. Other associations (particularly, by class) were separate. The city was not a community, but only a variety of associations in the city (Marx in Schwartz, 1985).

To be a citizen was to own property. Citizens who owned property attained economic gain through capitalism. Marx viewed this as an opportunity for economic exploitation. Two groups eventually defined the struggle as being between those with advantage, and those susceptible to exploitation and oppression, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Marx in Someville and Santoni, 1963). Defined particularly, the bourgeoisie referred to the class of modern capitalists, owners of social the means of production, and employers of wage labor. By proletariat, Marx referred to modern wage laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor in order to live (Marx in Somerville and Santoni, 1963). Because of the ongoing intense revolutionary or better said reactionary struggle between the two, Marx asserted the victory of the proletariat who sought to restore the vanished status of the individual workman of the Middle Ages as inevitable. This, of course, because of dialectical materialism was neither practical nor reasonable. There will be ongoing struggle between the two so long as capitalism was the economic standard for growth. The primacy of the individual prevailed. His particular characteristics, such as socio economic class and religion, in a capitalist state were priority rather than the state's good as priority. The reality that one's equal opportunity prevailed for one's own

aggrandizement first, and for the state second ensured dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism was simply incompatible with a dictatorship of the proletariat, typical in the communist state. Therefore, a communal citizenship or communism was Marx's ideal. Individuals came together with an ideal utopian vision of the good of the state. There were no distractions or what Marx termed "bourgeois prejudices" (Marx in Somerville and Santoni, 1963, p. 352). Law, morality, and religion were secondary to the overall view of the state. Marx revealed his view of the religious distraction in a critique of the Assimilation of Jews in German society in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Marx's critique of liberal democratic citizenship with respect to the Jewish question not only described his view of citizenship, it addressed conflict and inequality in the liberal state.

Marx critiqued Bruno Bauer's position on the assimilation of Jews in German society in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In "Salvaging Liberalism from the Wreck of the Enlightenment," Bridges asserted that

members of a liberal political community must, to some extent, come to see themselves as free and equal individuals, not entirely encompassed by family, ethnic, or religious identification. They...should put aside measures of human worth based on family, ethnic, and religious identifications and adopt a very different ranking system, one based on identification as citizen. Distance from ethnic life, class, and religious community is significant, if not critical. Liberal democracy must "generate" some form of civic culture or civic identity (Bridges, 1997 *Modern liberalism and its consequences*, p. 15).

For Jews, in particular, this was difficult, if not impossible. In “Die Judenfrage”, Bruno Bauer wrote that the Jew could not abandon or give up his religion. What is the significance of this for citizenship? Bauer asserted that for the Jews, they need to “emancipate themselves before they emancipate others” (Bauer in Marx, 1994, On the Jewish question, 1843, p. 28).

In this regard, the question arises of the relation between religion and the state. The Jew was not be emancipated because he was a Jew but rather, the idea of Judaism took second place to citizenship. While the Jew sought to be Jewish, this was a private matter not a civic matter. Bauer asserted that the nature of Judaism or the bias of Judaism could not overcome the political obligations of the state. If an individual wanted to retain his essential characteristics as a Jew, he could not be a truly emancipated citizen. His life in the political realm would be a “semblance or momentary exception to the essential and normal” (Bauer in Marx, 1994, On the Jewish question, 1843, p. 28). Bauer asserted that France best exemplified this notion.

In France, the Jew would cease to be Jewish. Essentially, in renouncing religious privileges, church, and practices the Jew became a true citizen. Religion was an “absolutely” private matter. Something akin to the American model of citizenship was useful. No privileged religion or religious practice prevailed. No religion has any power to “excommunicate” or influence in such an extreme one’s way of life in the public or political realm.

If one’s religion is a private matter and not a public matter then individuals may achieve political emancipation. The political emancipation of the religious man, in general, was the freeing of the state from religion. If the individual was able to liberate

himself politically from his religion he would, according to Bauer, free himself within the realm of human emancipation. Religion was private; it neither dictated the spirit of the state nor dictated behavior. It was not as Bauer asserted the essence of “community” but rather the essence of “differentiation” (Marx, 1994, *On the Jewish question*, 1843, p. 35). It separated man from his community and from his fellow man. Yet, if man separated his religious life and political life into private life and public life, he would truly find political emancipation. Marx held that while this was political emancipation, it was not human emancipation.

Political emancipation did not address the idea of equality in the private and the public realms. Political emancipation for Marx was not the same as human emancipation. Marx, unlike Bauer, wanted to eliminate religion altogether. Even though religion was private in America, Marx judged it too strong an influence. Marx asserted that because an individual who was emancipated politically and did not renounce his religion did not yield human or full emancipation. It rather created a dualism. It divided people. In the public life, the government assured equality amongst individuals. In the private life, there was self interest, conflict, and competing interest or divisions. In other words, there was inequality in the private life (Marx, 1994, *On the Jewish question*, 1843, p. 50). The democratic equality in the public realm was not evident in the private realm. According to Bauer and Hegel (Marx, 1994, *On the Jewish question*, 1843) the state mediated collisions because of its autonomy. Yet Marx disagrees. The border between the two (private and public) was impermeable. Rather, the private realm absorbed by self interest captured the public. In the private realm, individuals used their citizenship to reinforce their own self interest.

Citizenship confers equal rights but individuals used equal rights to reinforce their own self interest. Marx held that individuals used rights for their own gains.

This critique used Jews as a scapegoat for Marx's attack on liberal democratic citizenship in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This was how Marx addressed conflict or inequality of opportunity. The world was better served if the private realm (family, schools, the economy) was politicized. This politicization made for full emancipation. Rid the society of self interest or capitalism and society was emancipated. In other words, rid the society of conflict or capitalism and man achieved human emancipation. For Marx, politics should not include conflict. The liberal view advanced that conflict (albeit if controlled) was acceptable but Marx found this unacceptable. Marx's rejection of the liberal view was the architect of social inequality according to T.H. Marshall (Marshall, 1992). It was also one of the earliest challenges to liberal democracy in the state. Marx's view violated equality of opportunity. Marshall's attempt at resolving social inequality and creating equality of opportunity countered Marx's concerns for social inequality. Marshall developed a social citizenship for individuals.

T. H. Marshall (1992) believed that the drive toward social equality began or has been in progress for the last two hundred and fifty years, beginning around the mid 18<sup>th</sup> century. Given capitalism, Marshall sought to rid society of the conflict Marx illuminated. Marshall did not want citizens to have a dual existence. He created a framework on the evolution of the social welfare state. The market place was a place of struggle. Marshall agreed with Marx in this regard. He believed the working classes in England were ostracized from the culture and were denied access to a "common civilization which should be seen as "a common possession and heritage" (Marshall in

Shafir, pp. 172-173). Class lines were distinct in England with little interaction amongst members of different classes. Also, resources were in short supply for lower classes and women. Marshall accepted Marx's assertion but he did not accept Marx's remedy to politicize the private realm. Marshall created a social citizenship which had as much legitimacy as civic and political.

The original source of social rights was a membership of a local community and functional associations. This was ultimately replaced by a Poor Law and a system of wage regulations which, in England, were nationally conceived and locally administered. The Poor Law was incompatible with civil rights in the economic sphere in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with its emphasis on the right to work at what you chose to do. Wage regulation infringed on this individual principle. Conflict began by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Poor Law sought to preserve the existing poor. As the competitive economy grew, the idea of social rights under the law drained away because of demands for progress that superseded social rights. A struggle ensued between a planned society and a competitive one. Social rights sided with the old patterned society and civil sided with the new society (Marshall, 1992).

The Poor Law championed social rights of citizenship. Income was adjusted to the social needs and status of the citizen, not to the market value of his labor. Relief was offered only to those who through age or sickness were incapable of working and sought mercy. Claims were met only if claimants ceased to be citizens. Paupers forfeited in practice the civil rights of liberty, internment in the workhouse and any political right they might possess. A stigma clung to the poor who expressed feelings of resentment and

understood that relief separated the community from the outcast. This was the case until 1918 (Marshall, 1992).

The Poor Law wasn't the only law that terminated one's citizenship. The Factory Acts terminated citizenship as well. Work conditions and a reduction of hours were given to those who needed it but not to citizens of excellence. If women, children, and advocates of women's rights were given protection they had to forego citizenship. This changed by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century but became an edifice of social rights.

Marshall affirmed education was a service of a unique kind. Marshall did not see education affecting the status of citizenship for children because children could not be citizens. Marshall did feel, however, that children's education had a direct bearing on citizenship. It fulfilled the requirements and nature of citizenship. It stimulated the growth of citizens in the making. The right to education was a social right of citizenship. It aimed to shape the future adult citizen. Education was a prerequisite of civil freedom (Marshall, 1992). By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, education was compulsory. Free choice was a right only for mature minds. There was a public duty to educate children because they were unable to appreciate their own interests. Democracy needed an educated electorate and scientific manufacture needed educated workers. Education was the first step to the establishment of social rights of citizenship, which was another challenge to the formidable nation state.

For Marshall, education created a social solidarity. Unlike Marx, Marshall didn't want to destroy capitalism or the nation state. He wanted to enhance it or at the least subordinate the market to social justice. The less well to do were able to enjoy a material civilization unlike before. Social integration spread from one of sentiment into material



enjoyment. As individuals began to share material goods in the state, more effort was directed towards social welfare (Marshall, 1992).

These aspirations suggested a universal right to income which was not proportionate to one's market value. Marshall suggested a "guaranteed minimum" supply of certain essential goods (medical attention, supplies, shelter, and education) or a minimum supply of money available to be spent such as old age pensions, insurance benefits, family allowances (Marshall in Shafir, 1998). Marshall affirmed this was a general enrichment of civil life, a reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between more and less fortunate, between healthy and sick, unemployed and employed, old and active. Equality of status for the individual emerged through the ultimate service right of education. Despite hereditary difference, it allowed for progress. Education was a right of Citizenship.

Marshall closed his argument asserting "social rights imply an invasion of contract by status, the subordination of the market place to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of rights" (Marshall in Shafir, 1998, p. 110). This was a milestone for the downtrodden or disadvantaged. However, there is concern that social rights contributed to the welfare state. Inequality can be tolerated in an egalitarian society so long as individuals continue strive towards progress in society and not simply give up because of hardship in life.

Social rights were efficient only with administration. They were expensive and required bureaucratic oversight. It allowed for individuals to be part of a national citizenship, but Marshall did not anticipate a broadened culture defined by

multiculturalism, globalism, or dual citizenship. With whose culture did people identify? How were individual cultural rights assured during the post WWII era?

The United Nations provided a declaration of human rights based on liberal Enlightenment theory or nation state sovereignty. Enlightenment theory stressed individual rights and a social contract between ruler and subject. National state sovereignty assured the nation state was autonomous in its exercise of power. Yet, beyond this, the social rights or social citizenship that Marshall (1992) asserted was the task of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was to be replaced with the task of multiculturalism, integration, and belonging as the task of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Given multiculturalism, how did the question of identity find answer? Interestingly in “Salvaging liberalism from the wreck of the Enlightenment”, Bridges (1997) asserts in a liberal democracy free and equal individuals and those who regard themselves as such and behave as such are made rather than found. In liberal democracies where citizens fail in sufficient numbers to achieve a particular identity thereby bound in their self definitions to particularistic cultural values, liberal democracies can lose their legitimacy. Therefore, according to Bridges, the success of a liberal democracy depended upon the adherence or allegiance of the constituency it served (Bridges, 1997).

Bridges asserted citizens were not born, they were made through education. Citizens with diverse backgrounds deserved tolerance and respect. As it applied to citizenship, distinct cultures or those in opposition with others deserved recognition. Individuals could not absorb solidarity, they learned it. This applied to multiculturalism. How did this stand juxtaposed to liberal democracies? Bridges wrote liberal democracies

defined citizens as free individuals who were only incidentally members of a particular ethnic, class, or religious community. Hierarchies generated by such communities were irrelevant to the state and its relation to and treatment of citizens. So, public education produced persons who saw their membership in communities subordinated to their membership in the broader community (Bridges, 1997). Public education created citizens, or persons who identified themselves as free and equal individuals. This was civic education. It not only reproduced and strengthened a culture, it developed attitudes, dispositions, and values proper to full citizenship. This modernist liberalist civic culture was challenged by geographic mobility in particular. Different degrees of support to the creation and for the support of a civic attitude contributed to a short life span. When ideas specific to a civic culture lost their enthusiasm or zest, the culture lost its capacity to form habits of citizenship. The incapacity to form habits of citizenship has occurred in post enlightenment liberal civic cultures (Bridges, 1997).

What caused this demise or challenge to the nation state? A cultural neutrality or objectivity was sought through the scientific method. For many, this was license for western imperialism. The notion that cultural neutrality was an option was an oversimplification. With international communications and migration, the view of cultural neutrality was not only an oversimplification, it was impractical and parochial (Bridges, 1997). The challenge for liberal governments to work is for citizens to identify themselves both as members of a particular class, ethnicity, and religious community and as members of a civic community. This was particularly evident as migration and immigration increased. Migrants and ethnic minorities contributed to an erosion of nation sovereignty which is the post national challenge (Koopmans, Statham, 1999).

The rise of new forms of citizenship eroded a national citizenship or at the very least made it insignificant. Additionally, increased diversity in nation states led to the development of a multicultural citizenship. Further, there are studies that reaffirmed the importance of national models of citizenship and affirmed inclusion and exclusion of migrants and ethnic minorities (Brubaker 1992, Castles and Miller 1993 in Koopmans, Statham, 1999). Many theories abound in this regard, but the common ground for all is to take a culture bound to its tradition (usually its family, ethnic, and religious tradition) and create a new civic culture. Through a set of institutions, representations, and a wide means of persuasion, individuals ideally create a bond, a new identity that is either separate from their own or in association with their own. Where is the persuasion? Is it based historically, economically, religiously, or geographically? The biggest concern is social cohesion and individual rights. There are huge clashes regarding language rights, autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, naturalization policy, symbols, and immigration policy (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). This is with application to the European Union in particular as a starting point.

The EU can best be described as an area with plural nationalities. How does one construct citizenship? Weiner (1997) writes citizenship is a dynamic, not simply a status based on rights. The dynamic should have as its most definitive norm a sense of belonging. Is the belonging based on legal linkage or *jus solis* or *jus sanguinis*? Is identity based on residence, the workplace, culture (Weiner, 1997)? The EU sought to answer these questions with the Maastricht Treaty of February 7, 1992. The idea was a community that would transcend the nation state. The treaty includes a set of rights for students and workers. Individuals belong in terms of social labor but not political rights.

Large numbers of people do not live in their native state. They do not seek naturalization and, therefore, are without political rights. Why? According to Hammar (1985), people fear loss of rights in country of origin, seek a return to their homeland, and are bound by homeland ties, or realize few gains.

Having members of the EU who are not willing to become naturalized citizens seems an affirmation of the sovereign nation state or a multicultural nation state where citizens enjoy a national citizenship and a form of belonging. For the multicultural nation three models are of interest.

Will Kymlicka, advocate for a communitarian citizenship, suggests a mosaic, or model of shared values. These values include equality and fairness, consultation and dialogue, accommodation and tolerance, diversity, compassion, support for the environment, commitment to peace and freedom (Kymlicka in Shafir, 1998). Kymlicka asserts this in light of the fact that migrants with strong ties to the homeland are not assimilating into the traditional state (Kymlicka in Koopsman and Statham, 1999). A shared conception of justice is significant as well (Rawls, 1998).

The shared conception of justice is not only formidable, it serves as foundational for other values to fall into place. Where multinational groups share a historical resentment, a common conception of justice is important. This nurtures their national identity. It doesn't simply subordinate identity. A shared concept of justice can be difficult to determine. Justice is based on universal truths. How does one define a universal truth in this regard? It is very difficult to ascertain. Ayelet Schachar's article on cultural vulnerability is a case in point. Schachar (2000) asserts that when various cultural groups attain citizenship their own cultural communities or identity groups are

put at risk because while the law allows individuals to participate as citizens within the state, different communities continue to be governed by their own institutions and traditions. Groups are exempt from certain laws or allowed some degree of autonomy over the identity group participants. Schachar (2000) notes specific group members (Muslim, Christian) who may be subject to mistreatment or abuse by those who try to enforce a hierarchical element of culture. In particular, she cites the plight of Muslim and Christian women who seek divorce in Israel. These religious courts have a broader scope of jurisdiction over personal affairs than Jewish courts. Women are left no choice but to accommodate these religious courts. The Israeli government recognizes the right of each religious community to mark its membership boundaries by its own family law codes and lineage rules. No state mandate can challenge these laws. So, whether or not the state grants divorce, the religious law prevails.

Contrary to communitarian models of citizenship, Michael Walzer (1995) asserts closed borders. Closed borders are necessary and legitimate to defend the shared meanings, values, and civic culture of nation states. In this way, a collective political identity and attachment precipitates a cohesion and solidarity (Walzer in Bader, 1995). This asserts an ethnocentric political model that is not popular. Ethnicity and citizenship can, however, separate and be replaced with a democratic community of consent. Identity is found not in ethnicity but in democratic procedures, talk, and decision-making (Habermas in Bader, 1995). There is no former bond or affiliation to a state integrated by descent, shared tradition and common language. This is not workable. Elements of cohesion are not strong enough without a shared tradition.

Iris Marion Young (1998) suggests a universal citizenship realizing the common ground of groups and not the differences. She asserts this is the best way to realize inclusion and participation of everyone for full citizenship. Diverse groups exercise citizenship through what Iris Marion Young (1998) calls “differentiated citizenship.” In this concept, groups draw rights or exemptions from law as they apply to their own culture. Young advances this approach to citizenship as a response to oppression, i.e., exploitation, powerlessness, random violence, and harassment. This is important, according to Young, for union, community, and common purpose. Young also proposes a citizenship that asserts the right to remain different and express disagreement. Differences are “publicly recognized and acknowledged as irreducible” (Young, 1998). Everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves openly and differently. A commonness of society is cautioned. Young implies difference might work more efficiently (Young, 1998). There is a commitment to tolerance, responsibility, accountability and public participation in public life.

The nation state has faced numerous challenges since the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Efforts by Marx (1994) attempted to deal with the religious question and citizenship was better described as Marx’s critique on liberal democratic citizenship and capitalism. This model does not enhance equality but rather squelches equal opportunity. T.H. Marshall (1992) brought a social citizenship to light with rights provided to an underprivileged class particularly the right of education. Education is the key to opportunity and equality. Concerns about an expanding welfare state and bureaucracy are credible, particularly with regards to cost. The national identity or consciousness that Marshall asserts as a result of social citizenship is not with a vision towards migration.

By the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the liberal nation state founded on enlightenment theory was fraught not with cultural unity but cultural diversity given globalization and multiculturalism and immigration. Policy asserted by the UN for universal rights is well intended but it lacks enforcement. The EU has not seen the naturalization of its citizens due to cultural ties to the homeland. How is identity established? How can individuals naturalize and ultimately vote? Multiculturalism scholars such as Hammar (1985), Young (1998), Weiner (1997), and Kymlicka (1998), have attempted models of community and differentiated citizenship. Rawls's (1998) concept of justice is credible, but the challenge of a universal truth is hard to overcome. Shachar's (2000) illuminating multicultural vulnerability signals a violation of individual rights when religious affiliations challenge what could be understood as universal truth or law. Anti communitarians such as Walzer (1998) assert the notion of closed borders and Habermas (1995) suggests a nation of citizens established in democratic procedure, not in ethnicity. However each of these attempts suggests a new and responsible innovative direction for the nation state, practical membership that creates a new civic culture is still seeking direction. There is, as of the present, no answer. This suggests in the long term, the vitality of a given sovereignty of the nation state in spite of its challenges which is rather paradoxical. Individuals migrate to and from their geographic area but do not change their citizenship with the same zeal.

Sovereign nations and cultural diversity both prevail through education, dialogue, and friendship. Social cohesion and individual rights are secured through dialogue and friendship. If individuals take efforts toward fruitful dialogue and openness, understanding, and awareness, the clashes regarding language rights, representation,



immigration policy, symbols, autonomy, and a shared concept of justice are overcome. Individuals experience a democratic community of consent and a bond amongst themselves. Individuals have opportunity to openly express themselves reciprocally. A commitment to tolerance, responsibility, and public participation in political life that Young purports is achieved dialogically. A curriculum rich in character and a concept of social justice appropriates itself to resolve challenges. Laws and amendments are helpful in the short term, but dialogue and friendship is the key to understanding and creating community and citizenship. Until individuals find a common understanding amongst themselves through dialogue and friendship, the sovereign nation state will continue to face challenge.

#### Part IV

##### The History of Citizenship in

##### The United States

Liberal democratic principles have been at odds with other models of civic belonging and citizenship. The history of citizenship in the United States demonstrates that the universalistic claims of liberalism and democracy have been at odds with the exclusionary, boundary-staking functions of citizenship laws and policies that have periodically prevailed in US history. Liberal principles of national civic belonging are increasingly criticized by formerly excluded sub-groups themselves, which seemingly want to reinstate a status-based notion of belonging. How does the historical evolution of citizen practice conflict with classical liberalism and democracy?

Historically, United States citizenship in practice does not align with liberal democratic citizenship principles advanced by Enlightenment thinkers. This suggests that liberal democratic citizenship does not apply in reality, but rather serves as a backdrop for rights and obligations of citizenship. Not only have claims been at odds with the exclusionary boundary-staking functions of citizenship laws and policies, the very groups that have been excluded seek a status based notion of belonging. In particular, women, racial minorities, and religious groups seek status in a supposedly liberally based non status notion of citizenship. The fact that sub groups seek a status notion of belonging suggests that the liberal model espoused by the founders does not apply in fact. The liberal democratic citizenship model is the theoretical framework and not the practical framework for US citizenship. The ideals of the liberal democratic citizenship model, however, are evidence of the goal of US citizenship in a changing society.

According to Kerber (1997), a citizen is one who rules and is ruled in turn by consent. Rights, and obligations apply in egalitarian terms and citizens pledge allegiance. All individuals regardless of race, gender, and ethnicity are eligible. Kerber (1997) suggests a braided citizenship, different groups who in their own way contribute to an unstable citizenship. These groups include women, African Americans, Native Americans, immigrants, non citizen nationals (those in territories that never became states, voluntary immigrants, some eligible (from Europe) and some ineligible from Asia for naturalization, refugees who never return to their homeland, and those refugees who seek asylum or have been uprooted by disruption. Kerber (1997) weaves these groups in three ropes of race, gender, and class. This does not include ethnicity, or religion which

will be discussed later in this section. These groups that form a braided citizenship experience not inclusivity but exclusivity in citizenship practice.

The first group/case of exclusivity is with regards to women. Historically, women have been destined to the domestic realm. The husband controlled the physical body of the wife. A system of coverture that asserted the woman's civil identity was determined or "covered" by her husband (Kerber, 1997). She had no rights to her property and could not make contracts without the consent of her husband. Throughout US history all married women's identities as citizens were determined by her husband (Kerber, 1997). This aside, rules of naturalization for women were different. Mothers were different than fathers. Until 1934, children whose fathers were not residents of the United States were treated differently than those whose fathers were residents. A legitimate child born abroad was a birthright citizen only if its' father was a born citizen who had resided in the US before the child's birth.

The Cable Act (1922) asserted independence for American women but independence was not evident in practice, particularly when it came to marriage. American women who married Asian men lost their citizenship permanently. Cott (1998) writes in vivid detail of the case of Mary K. Das, an American woman who married a foreigner. Ms. Das married an Indian whom she thought was naturalized. Her husband was not considered of white heritage or lineage so his application was denied and, therefore, he was not naturalized. Her citizenship, because of the Cable Act was stripped. Thoughts of "racial homogeneity" (Cott, 1998, p. 1468) are evidenced by the idea that "the man has always had his right of citizenship. The men have dominated the thing from the beginning" (Cott, 1998, p. 1468). This affirms the notion of the man

having freedom to create and provide for his family. A woman did not fill this role. Further, the fact that the Quota Act of 1921 was repealed so that a man could bring home a wife of any nationality so that he would have freedom to create and provide for a family of his choosing gives further affirmation of man's role in the liberal model as a provider. Nothing is offered with regards to women.

At its height in 1922 when the Cable Act was passed, the restriction of Chinese immigrants was fueled by anxiety on the part of white Americans that the "true" American was being overrun and outmanned, that American standards of life and work were undercut by "non-Protestant hordes" from the Mediterranean, Eastern European, Russian, and Asian parts (Cott, 1989, p. 617). Particularly significant was the Asian American population. American women but not American men were punished if they married an Asian. "The ideal of Americanism should keep any American woman from marrying any foreigner, particularly an Asiatic" (Cott, 1989, p. 618). Important in national thinking and in immigration policy was the ongoing principle that American males ought to be able to create and keep their chosen families. Preference given to males triumphed over racialized nationalism. To serve the goal of racial homogeneity, Congress discarded women out of the American polity for marrying Asian men but sought not to restrict the freedom of American men from selecting Asian wives (Cott, 1989). Congress not only restricted women's citizenship through residence limitations in foreign countries, but also refused any citizenship commitment to American women's foreign husbands (Cott, 1989).

Being a "citizen" did not imply women had the right to vote. In spite of pleas by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton at Seneca Falls, New York, 1848 and

later, women do not acquire the right to vote until 1920 with the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment. In 1867, as the nation struggled to reassert the union during Reconstruction, efforts abound with regards to the male franchise. Opposition to equal female citizenship remained widespread. In spite of the wording of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment, denials of votes to men and not to women were penalized. The 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment assured the vote to white men and Negro men, but not to the Native American nor to women. In the words of Frederick Douglass and Wendell Phillips, it seemed the “Negro’s Hour” and not the “Women’s Hour” (Smith, 1987). Constitutional Conventions were held, one particularly in New York, to endorse suffrage for blacks but not for women.

The 15<sup>th</sup> amendment was frustrating for women as well. The amendment prohibited the federal government from abridging citizens’ voting rights on account of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (Smith, 1987, p. 314). The amendment did not confer any right to vote for women and although it banned racial requirements, it did not prohibit the states to enact other restrictions including property qualifications and exclusions from office. It is perplexing to note the inference that while the federal government asserts voting rights, the state still had the right to encroach upon voting rights as it regarded women and others (Smith, 1987). The notion of states’ rights is significant given early US History evidenced by the Articles of Confederation (1777-1781). States vehemently sought to retain their autonomy in light of the pressing challenges facing the new nation after independence. Also significant was the perceived threat to liberty the national government imposed on the states but it seems the states’ rights to encroach upon individual rights already given by the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment is a threat to liberty as well.

As Cott (1998) writes, marriage and citizenship are not unrelated in U.S. history. Marriage found a women's identity. While marriage asserted independence for men because he was head of household and needed to provide for his family it made women dependent. Her marriage removed from her the right to her property and income or her free will (Cott, 1998). This dependence, noted earlier, is coverture (Kerber, 1997). It seems though that the legal norm of women's dependence was not the case in terms of her actual citizenship. Coverture did not affect her national citizenship. Yet the states could dictate the extent of women's dependence or coverture given marriage.

A women's marriage signaled not only her "dependence" it also signaled her civil rights, especially if she married a foreigner. The fact was that a women's marriage affected her civil rights. An American woman who married a foreigner lost her citizenship. Women who married overseas couldn't pass their citizenship on to their children (Cott, 1998). Clearly, American men had an advantage here. This is clear example of exclusivity in citizenship rights as it relates to gender. The fact that some like John Stuart Mill (Mill in Cott, 1998) gives refuge to this exclusivity because women "consent" to the marriage "contract" does not assuage the condition of exclusivity. The marriage implications placed women in a state of servitude. Republican Motherhood, the women's role to teach to children the virtue and worth of the republican government of the United States in the days of the Early Republic, and notions of women as a moral equal even though they are destined to the domestic sphere does not negate the notion that women indeed were disadvantaged if they married.

Women's exclusivity notwithstanding, the implications for racial exclusion are just as disturbing. The history that tells the story of racial discrimination towards blacks

is well known as evidenced by the three Reconstruction Amendments. (The amendments are 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment that prohibited slavery, 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment which established citizenship rights or due process of law and 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment or the right to vote. These were passed during the Reconstruction period 1865-1870 following the Civil War.) Blacks were considered “hopelessly inferior” (Smith, 1987, p. 293). The civic implications notwithstanding, the biological implications were insultingly tragic. Women were subjected to biological implications of inferiority but in the realm of discrimination, blacks were more seriously affected. Inferiority was described as smaller brain size when “cranial sutures closed off and cut off brain growth” during puberty “unlike white men” (Smith, 1987, p. 294).

The issue for citizenship rights for blacks evolves around what W.E.B. Du Bois and Eric Foner suggest that blacks and other racial minorities could not contribute to the economic growth of the nation through capitalism or free labor. Laissez faire ideology anchored the American system. Failed efforts of the Freedman’s Bureau reasserted that blacks would not have the economic independence needed for America to survive under the liberal model (Smith, 1987).

Economic independence is significant under the liberal model. It stems from John Locke (1952) and the notion of valid property rights, rights acquired from rational, productive labor. All human beings are born equal by “virtue of their self ownership”, their capacity for productive labor (McDonagh, 2002, p. 548). If this be the case, it is not surprising that the national government allowed states to restrict minority rights through measures such as Black Codes and Immigration Quotas. Readings that reveal citizenship rests upon a civic contract through individual rights to property and consent

that was violated with ideas of redistribution of land (40 acres and a mule rescinded by Andrew Johnson) or the lack of economic independence gives literal understanding to measures of exclusivity in the United States. The reality is a bold commentary (Smith, 1987).

Blacks were not the only minority who experienced exclusivity when it came to individual rights. Indigenous peoples were victims of imperialism and globalization. These peoples who inhabited a region or country at the time of colonization or conquest suffered at the hands of their conquerors through deculturalization. Populations were forced to give up their cultural identity and assimilate with a leading colonial or imperial power. Civic contracts extended to populations under the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> Amendments exempted Native Americans as well as Blacks.

Native Americans were classified as “domestic foreigners” (Spring, 2010, p. 22). The granting of citizenship to all Native Americans did not occur until 1924 when Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act. The United States confiscated their lands and forced the adoption of western culture through education. Thomas McKinney, the first head of the Office of Indian Affairs targeted the Five Civilized Tribes for deculturalization. In the 1820’s, a decade before the common school movement, McKinney purported tribal school systems operated by white missionary teachers would transform Native Americans in 20 years. McKinney’s intentions were without notions of Indian resentment and resistance which was not uncommon given the time (Spring, 2010).

Protestant missionaries took the charge of the education process. A seeming violation of the first Amendment, most Americans felt public education and



Protestantism was an appropriate partnership. Protestant missionaries had more influence on the leadership of Native American tribes than other missionary educators.

Presbyterians believed that conversion of the tribal leadership would result in Christianity and civilization trickling down to other tribal members. At issue, was the importance of changing the traditional customs of Native Americans while teaching reading (Spring, 2010).

It was hoped that Native American children would transfer their allegiance from tribal governments to the federal government and instill a sense of community with the white population. Therefore, at the outset, the “Stars and Stripes” should be a familiar object at every school. Also, principles of US Government and American History were included but not the history of Native Americans. Patriotic songs and public recitation was included (Spring, 2010).

Missionaries developed written Native American languages not to preserve tradition but to translate religious tracts to teach western culture. It was also vital that Native Americans learn English. Replacing the use of native languages with English, destroying Native customs, and teaching allegiance to the US Government, children were often isolated from their families, their language and tribal customs. Boarding schools such as the Carlisle Indian School in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, founded in 1879 focused on a work ethic for all Native American children and inculcated values of economic individualism rather than socialism (Spring, 2010).

In 1889, a new education for Indian tribes included tribal control of the Indian and seclusion from tribal influences. In order to “save him, we must take him up into our civilization” (Spring, 2010, p. 35). The Native American was essentially deculturalized.

By 1905, twenty-five non reservation boarding schools were opened throughout the country. “Non reservation” is significant. The philosophy was that children be removed from their families and traditional roots. Educational policies were effective towards acculturation, yet eventually Native Americans demanded restoration of tribal cultures and language (Spring, 2010).

It is interesting in the scheme of history that the liberal democratic model of citizenship has been in tension with individual rights of citizenship as it pertains to race, gender, and ethnicity. In light of a national civic belonging rooted in liberal democratic citizenship, today formerly excluded sub groups seek status based notions of belonging particularly, as it regards religion.

What is citizenship status in terms of religious believers? To recall the Roman model, Augustine implied no earthly government can truly be just. Therefore, dual citizenship evolved. This dual citizenship was eventually fodder for individual rights as part of the liberal democratic model (Clark, 1994). Religion has become a contentious issue with regards to citizenship rights. It is best described as a conflict of loyalties and obligations that McConnell calls “citizenship ambiguity” from Rousseau’s Social Contract (McConnell, 2000, p. 92, Rousseau, 1964). Religious freedom of expression is guaranteed given the First Amendment. No issue taken here, but when the religious expression interferes with the rights of individuals protected under the constitution than the rights of the individual supersede religion as doctrine but not virtues and morality inherent in religious doctrine. The individual is protected by the constitution but can lead a moral and virtuous life privately as suggested by his religion.

In this regard, Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" is valuable to religious expression (Madison in McConnell, 2000, p. 92). Madison supported religion as an inalienable right. The duty to a "Governor of the Universe" is reasonable. Yet this is an inherent moral duty. Religion can "prop" democracy because of the "humanitarian ideals" asserted in each denomination.

...And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle (Washington, 1796, p. 41).

However, religious ideals have no place in civil law in a democracy. One's clothing, practice and prayer is private, but when the private practice becomes a reason or dictate of civil law then the two become separate and the civil or secular law takes precedence. Religion can be lived but secularism must prevail in law. Religious morals can prompt deliberation in a republican democracy. Tocqueville (2000) wrote "Despotism can do without Faith but Freedom cannot" (McConnell, p. 98). One of the privileges of a liberal citizenship is that there is no allegiance to any particular religion or religious good. Rather, there is a wide array of beliefs and practices (Kahane, 1996). Status based notions of belonging should be granted provided they do not interfere with civil law. The

private and the public are separate. Religious affiliations are separate. This is a blessing of liberty and individual rights.

Republics require a virtuous citizenry. It supposes some “obligation to mankind formed in common with the rest of mankind” (Tocqueville (2000) in McConnell, 2000, p. 98). Clearly, these morals are connected to early citizenship ideals. A tolerance for other religious ideals is significant as well. However, it is also important that these ideals do not put civil society at risk of life and limb. Religious and political neutrality is appropriate. An individual can be moral because of secular motivation. An individual can exercise virtuous conduct that can be colored by religious motivation but, hopefully, the secular rationale is powerful enough to not press religious views about the issue. Religious convictions are private (Audi, 1989).

What then is the meaning of American citizenship? Ennis (1943) asserts the American citizenship derives its power from the greatness of the US and the US in turn derives its power in part from the protection of rights of citizenship. This citizenship ideal is with reference to service. Ennis (1943) asserts naturalization is closely tied to service. There is a “reciprocal gift” implied in the naturalization process and this is service to country (Ennis, 1943, p. 6). The United States opens the naturalization process to soldiers because of their service and allegiance to nation. This gives evidence of the duty or obligation implied in liberal democratic citizenship. Yet, the acknowledgement of duty or obligation is absent amongst many individuals. This is one of the greatest challenges of US citizenship. How can citizenship and civic duty be developed?

The US population is made up of diverse backgrounds from other lands. As Wilson asserted in 1916, our country does not depend upon the “multiplication of their

own native people”. Ours depends on those from other lands. Naturalization should be without restriction and all capable should serve. There are four other obligations for citizens significant for citizenship. They are to be loyal and refrain from treason, to be industrious and avoid vagrancy, to pay taxes, and to serve on juries (Kerber, 1998 in Perry, p. 646).

Status based notions of belonging should be granted provided they do not interfere with civil law. The private and the public are separate. This is a blessing of liberty and individual rights (Hill, 1924).

All human beings have an equal capacity for culture and cultural adaptation (Taylor in Barry, 2001). The notion that cultures and groups are so rigidly locked together that they can’t adapt to other norms is anachronistic and unreasonable. Adaptation to common norms can be achieved through education, dialogue, and friendship. Through a virtuous citizenry, a moral citizenry, one that is essential for a deliberative republican democracy, there needs to be some common level of understanding of good connected to life (Kahane, 1996, Sandel, 1996). This is the central challenge for education and for our democracy.

The goal of civic education ideally advances the liberal democratic tradition for its students. There is tension between democratic values and liberal values. At a glance, one doesn’t recognize this tension. It would seem the values are the same, but they are not. While democratic values assume a common rights and a general welfare, liberal values assume individual rights and welfare. Democracy without rights implies totalitarianism; liberalism without democracy can foster self interest and no active participation. Rather, this is a passive or non participatory citizenship. Educators aim to

promote an active citizenship based upon common good and individual rights and liberal values. Sandel (n.d.) writes, “a liberal conception of freedom...exerts a kind of soulcraft”, a way of life (p. 140). Soulcraft assures the level of understanding that Sandel suggests is connected to everyday life. Indeed, students might be better served if teachers assert a “soulcraft by default” (Sandel, n.d. p. 144). “Soulcraft” is missing in education for our students today. It can be fostered through dialogue and friendship, and the inherent skills to engender trust, honesty, and integrity. These are important to liberalism and to democracy. Given the challenges in our society, it serves community and society to imbue these values in education. “Citizenship in its highest form involves something distinct from alert and faithful attention to the immediacies of political events and options” (Porter and Vanning, 1984, p. 217). Civic education suggests virtue and regard for others. It creates character. These values will help students in schools and ultimately participants in society resolve conflict. As Wesley (1939) writes, the students with character in school will eventually come into control of “banks, utility companies, and community activities, municipal, state, and national.” (Wesley, 1939, p. 77). Civic education, therefore, teaches citizenship values and not about politics (Porter and Vanning, 1984). Education encourages active citizenship and not passive citizenship. Teaching values resonates Aristotle’s model for citizenship (Aristotle, 1984). Aristotle was concerned about the good of the city and that man be virtuous enough to assert this good. Individuals who engage in dialogue and friendship work towards this end. This is an ultimate guide for responsible citizenship behavior.

Ours is a citizenship in progress. With a changing society that includes different lifestyles and increased diversity, a bond or tie keeps us together. It is a tribute to all

peoples to appreciate the diversity that abounds but it is critical that we “rediscover what values can bind together ‘our’ kaleidoscopic culture” (Higham ,1975 in Smith, 1987, p. 247). The foundation of a liberal democratic model will help to rediscover these values.

In spite of efforts toward an inclusive liberal democratic citizenship, history demonstrates an exclusive US citizenship. Samuel Huntington asserts that the American Creed of liberal democracy defined civic identity (Huntington in Smith, 1987). It did not play out that way as Smith asserts. However, if policy makers on national, local and state levels assert dialogue and friendship learned in education, virtue and community and not difference will assure that the backdrop of the goals in liberal democratic ideals may in actuality define civic identity.

## Part V

### Challenges and Vision

#### For Oppressed Regimes

The backdrop of classical liberal democracy stands as a vision for democratic citizenship for existing democracies and oppressed regimes. While circumstances challenge this model, the goal of individual active citizenship for everyone looms largely. Important is dialogue and friendship. The state has some responsibility to create conditions which would permit friendship and dialogue to encourage its citizens to discuss and participate. Without dialogue and friendship, the liberal democratic model will continue to struggle in those circumstances where oppression and exclusion prevail. The quest for liberal democratic citizenship, dialogue and friendship is finding success,

however, in areas of the world where dictatorial rule and repression of its people defined the leadership.

The Middle East has experienced turmoil since December 2010 in when police in Tunisia confiscated young Mohamed Bouazizi's fruit and vegetable cart. They charged he operated the cart without a permit. Incensed by the action, Bouazizi stood in front of the local governor's office, lit a match, and set himself ablaze (Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/10). Bouazizi's self immolation ignited protest in Tunisia. That this action in tiny Tunisia could catapult the Middle East in mass protest and demand the resignation of the area's established dictators leaves spectators in awe of the liberal democratic model and the profound worth of dialogue and friendship amongst existent liberal democratic citizens and reformers.

The horrific act of Bouazizi's self immolation signaled a wave of protests amongst individuals from all quarters of life, social, economic, political, and demographic. Aspiring youths amidst a sea of declining economic opportunity defined by political repression and a corrupt ruling family led the movement towards reform. "Our social compact failed", said Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, Economics Professor at the University of Tunisia. "Tunisians sacrificed freedom of expression, association, and political participation for prosperity and stability" (NY Times, 12/17/10).

Broadcast of protests and alleged massacres were posted on the social median, Facebook, where thousands of individuals from around the world cast their support for the plight of Tunisians. Within weeks, the ruling family Ben Ali resigned from power. Presently, after 23 years of autocratic rule, Tunisians struggle to establish a democratic society.



The tiny country of Tunisia, established in 1956, with a population of 10.6 million people, spurred protest throughout North Africa, The Arabian Gulf States (Yemen and Bahrain), and Iran. Protestors share a common theme. Individuals create dialogue amongst themselves. Through dialogue, they seek liberty. Individuals seek a voice, a reciprocal voice, a dialogue between themselves and with the government whereby reforms through democratic government yield freedom of opportunity in the economic, social, and political realm. This is evidence of the significance of dialogue. It is further evidence of the tragic commentary where the lack of dialogue allowed repressive regimes to maintain power for decades.

Since Ben Ali's resignation in Tunisia, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has resigned after more than thirty years of dictatorship. A grass roots movement not an extreme group organized the three week protest. This was not a movement towards extremism. It was a movement for democratic reforms. People seek basic freedoms, not extremism (NY Times, 2/22/11). After Mubarak's resignation on February 11, 2011, mechanical engineer Mohamed Aidarus said, "It's like a dream...whatever happens, we've shown that we can make our voice heard and that no government can do whatever they want to us again" (Christian Science Monitor, 2/11/11). In Bahrain, the ruling constitutional monarchy that controls the executive and legislative branches of government faces challenge and conflict amongst its people. A country of 800,000 people demands a voice in government (Christian Science Monitor, 2/18/11). Sudan's President Omar Hassan Al Bashir faces charges of international genocide and repression amongst his people. He has since announced he will not run for re election (NY Times, 2/21/11). Muammar Qaddafi, in power since 1969, struggled to hold power amidst

protest in Tripoli and beyond (Christian Science Monitor, 2/18/11, NY Times, 3/6/11). The dictator was killed on October 20, 2011 after eight months of fighting between loyalists and rebels who now run the country (NY Times, 10/23/11). The Green Movement, an Iranian based reform movement started in 2009, was quashed after claims the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was rigged. The government jailed, tortured, conducted mass trials, and publicly shot demonstrators. Since the current of reform in early 2011 swept through North Africa and the Arabian States, the Green Movement resurrected itself (NY Times, 2/17/11).

Classical liberal democracy has met challenge and conflict since its theoretical foundation during the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The vision of individual rights through dialogue, however, meets head on challenge and conflict and creates a means for classical liberal democracy to prevail. The contemporary conflicts of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century resonate the dream of classical liberal democratic citizenship. It also assures the worth of dialogue. Without dialogue, the reciprocal relationship between individuals and eventually between individuals and their community and government will not prevail.

### Conclusion

The history of citizenship exposes tension between active and passive citizenship, the spirit of individualism, challenges to the modern civic model of the liberal civic state, and claims of liberalism and democracy in theory that are not the reality. Significant to this challenge is the ongoing vision of liberal democratic theory where individual rights

are experienced through natural law and protected by the government. A reciprocal relationship exists between the individual and the government.

For this relationship to exist fruitfully, a discourse of friendship established with dialogue exists. In this regard, individuals experience self reliance and engage in a reciprocal relationship with others. The relationship resonates the richness of Plato's and Aristotle's call for virtue. Rather than for only a few, however, the discourse of friendship through dialogue assures the equality of opportunity and resource in liberal democratic theory. The discourse is found in the writings of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson.

### Chapter 3

#### Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson

##### In Context

The works of Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson are responses to challenge and change in society. Epicurus wanted to alleviate man's turmoil in the wake of war. Emerson urged man to find his place in society given the demands of industrialization in the early American republic. Each man is credited with contributions to friendship based upon inner content and self reliance.

Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) was founder of a movement that lasted seven hundred years throughout the Mediterranean region. He was a reactionary and a reformer. He sought to bring happiness back to a war torn Greece fraught with civil strife. The cultural context of this movement was the Athenian debate on the ideal state and the martyrdom of Socrates. Epicurus wanted to spread personal contact by example and persuasion. He wanted to spread friendship, the essence of man. As a movement, Epicureanism attracted intellectuals and the general populace (Farrington, 1967). Because of war, many people had struggles and challenges that were assuaged by Epicureanism (DeWitt, 1954).

Epicurus sought pleasure as the end of life, but not pleasure in the sense of overindulgences such as eating, drinking, and making love. For him, it was a large, more profound pleasure. It was simple, sober reasoning.

When I maintain that pleasure is the end, I do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some

people who are either ignorant, or disagree with me, or do not understand; I mean freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. It is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life; no, it is sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and all avoidance, and banishing mere prejudices, to which the greatest disturbances of the spirit are due (Freeman, 1938, p. 158).

Epicurus sought happiness for man. He rejected the notion of destiny or determinism. “Necessity is an evil; but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity” (Freeman, 1938, p. 160). He sought man’s freedom of will. Men could come together by chance and find happiness. Happiness was determined through friendliness or affection. The relationship was possible, however, only in a small, closed community. The community, for Epicurus, allowed man to live a quiet, retired life away from the conspicuousness of power and fame in the cities and towns. The quiet, secluded community that described the Garden allowed man to take careful inventory of himself and that around him. He took account of that which endangered his peace and sought to make the situation less hostile. The most efficient way to ensure that this could continue outside of the secluded community of the Garden was to live in a community where help and support was always available (Freeman, 1938). A community of this nature was devoid of leisure, praise, and self righteousness. The community was characterized by isolation and security. Yet, this is not in the actual sense of isolation and security in the literal sense. Rather, this condition allows the human “free play” (Freeman, 1938, p.

163). It allows the individual to experience “self development” and “self-realization” or the “complete life” and sustain this realization as definitive of his character in the larger community (Freeman, 1938, p. 163). To sustain the happy life, man is mindful of choice and avoidance. Pleasure should not be taken for pleasure’s sake. Man is mindful of the advantages and disadvantages of judgments. Life’s journey is filled with virtuous pursuits. Virtuous pursuits have no aftermath of pain. Wisdom and virtue guide one’s existence. One’s health of body and peacefulness of mind lie in the reciprocal self realization of the self and the other. Interactions are virtuous and sincere. The sharing of friendship was sharing in the awareness of the goodness of the other (Farrington, 1967). Man lives well, free of the “subtle antagonisms” that Emerson describes in a superficial relationship that is not friendship.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), like Epicurus, was a reactionary and a reformer. He was the leading voice of Transcendentalism, a movement that stressed happiness and a complete life was sensory and empirical. Historically, transcendentalism came about during a shift in thought and sensitivity in American life. The Calvinism of the Puritan Era was replaced by less fearful, more humanized religious practices. The role of intuition played a large part in the re-evaluating classical literature of the Transcendentalist movement. A newness of thought in the air was evident. Most transcendentalists were ministers, as was Emerson. The idea of a “mental calm in the clergy...where difficulties were ignored, doubts were a waste of thought, nothing exacted solution” (Emerson, *Letters*, in Myerson, 2000, pp. 412-413). Transcendentalists sought dialogue amongst individuals after established tenets of religion were sealed with no opportunity for further discussion. Religion was democratized. Individual

interpretation of religious texts through one's intuition was encouraged.

Transcendentalists prized individuality. They did not dictate what was acceptable or proper (Myerson, 2000). Transcendentalists emphasized education. The goal was to create a new generation that was free of the restraints and conventions of older generations and present generations. Reform movements centered on self improvement were necessary (Myerson, 2000). Emerson's surroundings, the Concord community once fraught with revolutionary fervor from 1775 and beyond were filled with the same enthusiasm and challenge that Transcendentalists expressed. In this atmosphere, Ralph Waldo Emerson began his journey for the self improvement of mankind (Gross, 1976).

Emerson reached maturity as industry and labor had begun to specialize. The early Industrial Revolution was in progress. The factory system had begun. The transportation revolution was in full swing with the Erie Canal and the railroad, and immigration was on the rise. The self sufficient agricultural village was beginning to fade into a bygone era (Buell, 2003).

Emerson did not share the vision of growth and progress in the United States in the same way as its innovators. Where industrialists saw wealth and prosperity, Emerson saw a fragmentation of social unity with divisiveness. He saw a division of labor as a signal of oppression. The loss of economic individuality or the self was troubling (Myerson, 2000). Man was not able to fulfill himself emotionally (Buell, 2003). "The age of severance of dissociation, of freedom, of analysis, of detachment...everyman for himself...there is universal resistance to ties and ligaments once supposed essential to civil society. The new race are fanatics in freedom" (Emerson, *Collected Works* Van Cromphout, 1999, p. 92). Emerson tried to reconcile this void. His philosophy was

characterized by oneness, universality and morality. He felt man and nature were one and the same. Every individual's being is one with others. It is immortal and universal. The individual embraced thought and energy in total. An individual was reborn in this regard (Padover, 1959).

Emerson saw evil and selfishness in the world. Man must realize this evil and selfishness and lessen it or at least deal with it. Evil and selfishness brought cynicism and materialism. He sought to reform the nature of man and make him capable of brotherhood. Emerson wanted to replace selfishness and materialism with love and sharing. How could the finite and the ordinary relate to the infinite and the extraordinary, reconcile evil with good, pain with joy, death with birth? The reality is dynamic, not fixed. Man is always involved in death, and death is from another point of view, life. Death is not the end for man, but a new relationship. A dialogue or the dialectic occurs (Sebouhian, 1989). Emerson saw this as answer to death, despair, and stagnation.

Emerson was a man with personal dignity, very delicate in nature, and with a demeanor that while pronounced and decided was modest (Muzzy in Myerson, 2003). His purpose, according to Elizabeth Peabody, active in the Transcendentalist Movement, was to minister the living spirit whom he sought alike in the material universe and in human history, in literature, and in ethics, in art, and, in his own heart and imagination. He felt it his duty to affirm for the individual all that his experience was proven true. He had faith that all growing experience would contain the solution of all questions, the sum of all hopes, the satisfaction of all unselfish desires. Emerson was not arrogant, but humble (Peabody in Myerson, 2000).



His daughter, Ellen Tucker Emerson noted lecturing was his passion and his business. He sought to benefit and teach his country and make a living (Tucker in Sanborn, 1885). Early on, he possessed a love of country and the hope of the new tomorrow. No remnants of yesterday's ills or mistakes would be carried throughout today. "We may have failed yesterday, but we would never think of it again and start right today." (Tucker in Sanborn, 1885, p. 171). Emerson had a vision of hope for the individual with each new day and everyday thereafter. He stressed the significance of sensed and observed experiences (Padover, 1959). Many challenges faced man. Emerson sought to reconcile man in the present with man in the past. He sought to promote reason so that man could find a place for himself in the new and tumultuous world of the early Industrial Age.

Both men, Epicurus and Emerson sought a content, happy, contemplative individual in the face of strife and questions of belonging. Dialectical determinism was absent. The individual was urged to find comfort and self reliance in a new and evolving society. The most fortuitous opportunity for this was friendship.

## Chapter 4

### Epicurus and *Friendship*

#### Ralph Waldo Emerson and *Friendship*

This chapter explores the works of Epicurus and Friendship and Ralph Waldo Emerson's works on Self Reliance and Friendship. Each of these works reveals the critical self awareness and reciprocity in a relationship necessary for friendship, community, and the good ends of government to evolve. Individual experience freedom, liberty, humanitarianism, and understanding amongst people.

Epicurus sought a happy and contented man. He defined the happy man as one who had a healthy mind and a healthy body (DeWitt, 1954). Epicurus did not see a distinction between political and social contexts. He felt man should have the same happiness in both realms. He disagreed with Plato that virtue or that which contributed to happiness (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice) was defined within a political context. He also disagreed with Aristotle that happiness as it contributed to the best life in politics was in the social context. Epicurus believed the political and the social were one in the same. These views evolved because of civil strife in Greece. Free Greek cities fell to Macedonian rule in 400 B.C. (Farrington, 1967). Epicurus was angry that man was oppressed and stripped of his freedom. Because of this, he favored minimal government and looked upon men as free individuals in society that transcended political boundaries (DeWitt, 1954).

Not only did Epicurus favor minimal government, he did not advocate public service. His goal was not to produce a good citizen. Like Socrates, Epicurus felt

politics was an unsafe business (Farrington, 1967). Life in public service was competitive. Competitive activities placed happiness at the mercy of others. The avoidance of political careers would preserve liberty. In Vatican Saying 67, Epicurus writes, “A life of freedom cannot acquire great wealth because of success in this being difficult apart from servitude to mobs or monarchs (i.e. democracies or royal courts).” Rather he begs man to “escape and make haste before some major emergency should arise and deprive him of the liberty of withdrawing (DeWitt, 1954, p. 186). Visions of civil strife lingered for him. Even though Epicurus did not favor government, he understood government was a necessity in society. The most advantageous government for man was democracy (DeWitt, 1954).

In society, however, there were demands for virtue that allow men to be contented and happy. For Plato, a happy contented man was a just man. Aristotle believed the good man was a happy man. Epicurus believed the road to happiness and contentment was through friendship. Friendship was a way to create happiness. It would recreate Greek life based upon current conditions. Friendship would be spread in Epicurus’s Garden.

In the Garden, the principle which bound the community was friendship or affection (*philia*). There was a trust amongst people (Freeman, 1938). The Garden was adjacent to Epicurus’s house. He resided with his friends in his home beside the Garden. The two were distinct but closely associated. This was not unusual in the Greek city. Outside the Garden, man was thought a suspicious character (Wycherly, 1959). He was perceived to be a threat to the sanctity of the Garden. What men wanted, therefore, was protection from this threat. To ensure their safety, they formed a compact amongst men.

Epicurus was a contractarian. He sought a voluntary acceptance of a contract of friendship (Farrington, 1967). Each individual was obligated to behave rightly for the good of himself and for each other. This compact was not perceived as a service towards others, but rather as an individual proclamation or manifestation of their way to promote happiness (Freeman, 1938). The social contract or compact was not a man made contract in the Hobbesian or Lockean sense. Rather, it was a natural contract. In Authorized Doctrine 31, Epicurus writes “the justice of nature is a covenant of advantage to the end that men shall not injure one another or be injured” (DeWitt, 1954, p. 295). Therefore, there is an obligation to cultivate good will and love toward mankind. This is love of justice and love toward man.

Epicurus felt the Garden experiment could only be carried out in isolation. Individuals were able to express themselves openly. Human faculties or thinking processes were allowed “free play” (Freeman, 1938, p. 163). The goal was self realization. Individuals found happiness within themselves. Not until they found happiness within would they find happiness with others. Epicurus called this the “complete life” (Freeman, 1938, p. 163).

The pursuit of this philosophy, friendship, was a matter of individuals living their lives together, not simply getting together for an ad hoc conversation or discussion. The goal was to trust, to create an intimate sharing of life, a friendship (Wycherly, 1959). Friendship was in an ethical and political context. Friendship would be cultivated and shared in the Garden and ultimately shared in the community outside of the Garden where it held them together.

Friendship in the Garden and eventually in the community led to the happy life and harmonized with other ends in life. The particular choices made in a friendship are attentive to ethically relevant circumstances of a person's life (Sherman, p. 592). Ethically relevant circumstances are dialectical. Friendship allowed individuals to live not as isolated individuals but as an extended self, a person with attachments to others. The link or attachments led to happiness. Relationships were dependent upon and interwoven with others. To enjoy peace, a man should make as many friends as possible. Friendships are not left to chance but diligently cultivated and evolving through time. If friendship prevails, it is without greed or antagonism (DeWitt, 1954).

Friendship is an immortal good. Hostility amongst men is alleviated. This is not to suggest that friendship is Darwinian or a means of self preservation. Rather this suggests man is in a social state where there are open, civil, and honorable exchanges. Friendship through the social or natural contract that Epicurus suggests maximizes happiness.

Epicurus describes the contract of friendship in the following ways. He writes the natural contract provides that man loves his friends as he loves himself. He also writes even though individuals provide material help through friendship, friendship provides confidence between and amongst individuals. Confidence suggests there will be help or aid if one needs it. Confidence is more significant than the actual physical help (Freeman, 1938). This can be interpreted as trust amongst individuals. "It is not so much our friend's help that helps us as the confidence of their help" (Turner, 1947, p. 353).

Of course, friends should not be parasites.

He is no friend who is continually asking for help nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barter gratitude for a practical return and the latter destroys hope of good in the future (Vatican Saying 28 in DeWitt, 1954, p.310, Turner, 1947, p. 353).

Epicurus suggests friendships are equal. “Any right thinking individual, man, woman, free, slave is acceptable” (Rist, 1980, p.125). Epicurus’s contract is non political. All can live equally and happily if they live in the spirit of friendship. Friendships have a high regard of loyalty. Relationships are not broken unilaterally (Rist, 1980). If so, confidence is broken amongst individuals and also questions the reliability and worth of future friendships.

Affection amongst friends is significant. Affection or *philia* in this regard, however, does not suggest a passionate love. Epicurus used passion without with a sexual connotation. As a matter of fact, he disapproved of passionate love. He considered it “a vehement desire after sexual pleasure accompanied by goading restlessness” (Turner, 1947, p. 352). Epicurus was not an advocate of marriage or a passionate partnership. Epicurus felt that love was a natural desire. The lack of it brought no pain. The benefits of it brought pleasure.

Friendship filled the gap between marriage or companionship and security needed by man. Epicurus insisted that this leads to a complete life. Friendship was a reciprocal relationship, not exclusive to a few, and not formed in haste or slowness. Friendship was mutual.

We must not be critical either of those who are quick to make friends or those who are slow but be willing to risk the offer of friendship for the sake of winning friendship. The tie of friendship knits itself through reciprocity of favors among those who have come to enjoy pleasures to the full (Vatican Saying 28 in DeWitt, 1954, p. 310).

Epicurus wanted individuals to share a fellowship of friendship that was embraced and maintained in the community.

Friendship too has practical needs as its motive. One must indeed lay its foundations (we seed the ground, too) but it is formed and maintained through community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure (Epicurus in Turner, 1947, p. 354).

In the community, individuals are perpetually grateful for their friends. They are to be spoken well of and defended when others speak ill of them. Friendship provided peace and safety, an essential prerequisite of the happy life, and for good companionship, an essential component of happiness.

Friendship has its origins in human needs. It is necessary, however, to prepare the way for it in advance for we also sow seed in the ground, but it crystallizes through a reciprocity of benefits among those who have come to enjoy pleasures to the full (Diogenes Laertius in DeWitt, 1954, p. 324).

Human needs change over time and friendships are developed with expediency. They are to ensure peace and safety.

Friendships are reciprocal also.

The good and wise man declares himself willing to assist the deserving and I, too, shall show myself deserving in proportion to the merit of my benefactor (Diogenes Laertius in DeWitt, 1954, p. 324).

Finally, friendships are cultivated wisely.

The wise man alone will know through gratitude and with respect to friends whether present or absent, and will be of the same mind throughout the whole journey of life (Diogenes Laertius in DeWitt, 1954, p. 324).

Only a fool will be ungrateful to his friend and so he would not be a friend. This connotes despicable dishonesty, which Epicurus abhorred. Honesty was virtuous. By being honest, the wise man will always be loyal. Ethics between and amongst friends were critical. With awareness of self and other, affection, loyalty, trust, and honesty, friendships evolve and continue to adapt to the needs of the individual. Emerson's view on friendship mirrors Epicurus's view.



Ralph Waldo Emerson was a pastor by profession. He attended fashionable elite schools, Boston Latin, Harvard College, and Harvard Divinity School. After his wife, Ellen Tucker died of tuberculosis, he left the Boston pulpit in 1831. He traveled to Europe in search of solace. By his nature, he was opinionated, resolute, and dogmatic. Early on, one senses his dogmatism and resoluteness when he refused to administer the Lord's supper to his parishioners.

Freedom is the essence of Christianity...its institutions should be as flexible as the wants of men. That form out of which the life and suitableness have departed should be considered as worthless in its eyes as the dead leaves that are falling around us (Emerson in Buell, 2003).

The divine was not to be found strictly in a spiritual being. Emerson affirmed the divinity of the self. Freedom of expression helped shape man.

You can never come to any peace or power until you put your whole reliance in the moral constitution of man, and not at all in a historical Christianity. The belief in Christianity that now prevails is the unbelief of men. They will have Christ for a Lord, and not for a brother. Christ preaches the greatness of man, but we only hear of the greatness of Christ (Diary, March 5, 1835 in Padover, 1959).

Emerson was a religious man but he distrusted religious sects and the routine of worship. He felt man would be best served if he disconnected himself from established churches. He believed,

I suppose it not wise not being natural to belong to any religious party. In the bible, you are not directed to be a Unitarian or a Calvinist or an Episcopalian. Now if a man is wise, he will say to himself, I am not a member of any party. I am God's child, a disciple of Christ. As fast as we use our own eyes, we quit these parties of Unthinking corporations, and join ourselves to God in an unpartaken relation. A sect or party is an elegant incognito devised to save a man from the vexation of thinking (Diary, June 20, 1831 in Padover, 1959).

Still profoundly religious, Emerson's conception of God was not institution like. God was an all pervasive force in every man. "The purpose of life seems to be to acquaint a man with himself. The highest revelation is that God is in every man" (Diary, September 8, 1833, in Padover, 1959).

Emerson preached in American Lyceums. These were town and city based forums for lectures, debates and other modes of instruction of character. Lyceums were popular between 1820 and 1865. As Epicurus used the Garden, Emerson used the Lyceum. Emerson spoke on behalf of representative democracy. He was an advocate of an informed citizenry in the public sphere motivated by voluntary participation (Buell, 2003).

The Lyceum allowed individuals to challenge circumstance with an opportunity to express themselves. Topics and responses varied from the inspiring to the insulting. Emerson had faith in the reasonableness of his audience. He realized the Lyceum could be their connection to society (Padover, 1959).

Emerson was practical in his message. Fixed intellectual assumptions were a denial of his philosophy. An openness of mind was significant for Emerson (Padover, 1959). Man lived, according to Emerson, in a fluid or transitional world that was always becoming (Seboughian, 1989). Man's world was dialectical.

As with Epicurus, Emerson disliked strong government but he had a greater toleration for individual participation. He saw politics on a local level. It was a relationship between neighbors. Morality was important to this relationship. Low moral character was irksome and intolerable to Emerson. Epicurus abhorred these as well. Man was to be mature, uplifting and with a universal spirit of morality. His character base enriched the democratic mind (Padover, 1959). The individual had an awareness of self. He was self reliant.

Significant to Emerson's works is Self Reliance. In this work, he urges the individual to find himself, his place, amidst the sea of change in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. The growth of mass culture, the increasing complexity and interdependence of modern life, urbanization, and industrialization all contributed to the fading of self (Van Cromphout, 1999). The individual needs to reclaim his self. Emerson acknowledged this was an ongoing endeavor for man. "The end of self is indefinite. It is an end forever unattainable: no degree of self realization can ever be assumed to have realized the full potential of the self" (Emerson in Van Cromphout, 1999, p. 57). The individual is

steadfast in the dialectical evolution of self. After this, all other tasks fall into place. In particular, friendship or relationships (that are also dialectical) amongst individuals who claim the realization of self can enhance government and citizenship. To be a friend, however, the individual knows himself best of all. Only then can he truly be a friend.

Emerson values the distinctive worth of individuals. When he suggests they should be self reliant, the individual has a full awareness of himself. He “detects and watches the gleam of light from within” and begins to “trust thyself” (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844, pp.45-47). Trusting oneself is accepting oneself. An individual can carry himself in the face of all opposition. One will do what concerns the individual to create and sustain personal and ultimately community growth. Self reliance is not easy.

It is the harder because you will always find those who think they know what is your duty better than you know it. It is easy to live after the world’s opinion’ it is easy to live in solitude to live after our own, but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with sweetness the independence of solitude (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844, p. 53).

It takes courage to be independent in thought and action. To exude this courage, however, is to exude principle. Ethics was important. “Nothing can bring you peace but the triumphs of principles” (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844, pp. 89-90).

Emerson was not suggesting a selfish, arrogant self. He was asserting the worth of the self in order to openly accept the worth of others. This is a criterion for friendship.

A nation of friends could devise a good government. Emerson wrote “the state must follow not lead the progress of the citizen...law was only a memo” (Politics, *Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 562). The wise man knows that legislation is simply a “rope of sand” (Politics, *Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 562). It erodes when manipulated. Do statutes or laws stand the test of time? They do not. Nature, asserts Emerson, has a way of changing circumstance that is not always fair, not always equal. Sometimes nature creates despotic and brutish circumstances for men. Some governments are better than others. Governments need to fit the needs of men. In America, democracy is best for its people. Yet, still one must always proceed with caution.

Our institutions, though in coincidence with the spirit of the age, have not any exemption from the practical defects which have discredited other forms. Every actual state is corrupt. Good men do not obey the laws too well. What satire on government can equal the severity of censure conveyed in the word politic, which now for ages has signified cunning, intimating the state is a trick? (Politics: *Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 563).

We must trust our laws that they will serve men well. Government has its origin in the moral identity of men. “Reason for one is seen to be reason for another, and for

every other...every man finds a sanction for his simplest claims and deeds in decision of his own mind, which he calls Truth and Holiness” (*Politics: Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 566). Emerson looks to truth and holiness in government. Government should be fair, honest and accommodate the needs of man. Friends could achieve this end. Regrettably, however, government does not work this way. Occasionally, there is corruption. Governments, however, provide for all not just a few of the best citizens. Governments that should invite participation of all invite a participation of a few or to one who may establish his “own set of agents” (*Politics: Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 566). Agents are not in a reciprocal relationship with others in society. Nor are agents in government sustaining in law.

All forms of government symbolize “immortal government” but governments are not immortal. Governments change when laws are inappropriate to all men. At the outset of legislation, Emerson suggests what is “my right and wrong” is their “right and wrong”. “Whilst I do what is fine for me, and abstain from what is unfit, my neighbor and I shall often agree and work together” (*Politics: Essays: Second Series*, 1844, p. 567). If, however, one overpowers another in strength or skill who will mediate? Who will protect the disadvantaged? “Love and Nature cannot maintain the assumption: it must be executed by a practical lie, namely by force” (*Politics: Essays: Second Series*, 1844, p. 567). This, Emerson writes, is the blunder of governments. Laws made by a quarter of the population are not suitable for the entire population. Laws are not representative of the people. This is regrettable history for governments. “All public ends look vogue and quixotic beside private ones” (*Politics: Essays: Second Series*, 1844, p. 567). He does, however, give credit to the notion that the history of

governments is one where “one man does something to bind another” (Politics: *Essays: Second Series*, 1844, p. 567). Therefore, Emerson sees small government as the solution to corrupt, selfish, big government. The solution to the abuse of formal government is the growth of the individual, of his character, the end of nature. Integrity prevails. From integrity and good character “freedom, cultivations, intercourse, and revolution form and deliver” (Politics: *Essays: Second Series*, 1844, p. 568). Character replaces any necessity of state. The *wise* man, the conniving, cunning man, not the man of character, is regrettably the state.

He needs no army, fort, or navy. He loves men too well; no bribe, or feast or palace, to draw friends to him, no vantage ground, no favorable circumstances...he needs no library, he has not done thinking, no church; for he is a prophet; no statute book for he is the lawgiver; no money; for he is value...he has no personal friend for he who has the spell to draw the prayer and the piety to him, needs not husband (Politics: *Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 568).

Emerson finds the abuse of government disturbing and unsettling. He finds hope that society can change because the nation is young. The “influence of character is in its infancy” (Politics: *Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 568). There is time to change the direction of government. If men were sincere there would be no need for corruption and an overpowering government. The idea of self government is popular but no party has adopted this revolutionary platform. Were there to be a valid self government, “a

recognition of higher rights than those of personal freedom, or the security of property” would prevail (*Politics: Essays: Second Series* 1844, p. 569). Emerson asserts love and character is the basis of self government. Could not a nation of friends devise a better government? Yes, they could.

Emerson asserts “we are in a low state of the world where we pay unwillingly to governments founded on force” (*Politics: Essays: Second Series* 1844, pp. 570-571). He woes that there is no sense of moral sentiment or confidence that governments could successfully function without artificial corrupt selfish restraints. He cautions that there is no acknowledgement of the reasonable private citizen or the good neighbor who will not overstep his boundary. Individuals are in contempt of the moral sentiment that could reshape government. “It takes only one man to pursue this that the authority of law is averse to one man’s own moral nature” (*Politics, Essays: Second Series* 1844 p. 570). Let one voice speak and others will join. The result is a fair government, one with a regard for each other as though a “knot of friends” or a “pair of lovers” (*Politics, Essays: Second Series* 1844 p. 271).

How can friendship contribute to a better state or government? Emerson writes there are two elements of friendship. These are truth and tenderness. (*Friendship, Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 347). If these are evident in relationships, the individual who brings his own opinion or “definition or partiality” into conversation will not be rebuked but rather be welcomed into another’s life (*Friendship, Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 342). Truth is sincerity. Sincerity is not easy to come by in a relationship. As a singleton, the individual is sincere. When another individual enters his life, suspicion and apprehension arises. There is unease in the relationship. “We try to get along by means of gossip,



amusements, affairs” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 347). Individuals do not reveal their true self but rather a front, a façade, a falseness of self. Man seldom reveals his true self to others. The true self is not in tandem with the “false age” individuals dwell in (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 347). Emerson realized the coldness of friendship and, therefore, sought real friendship. Regarding his dear friend, Margaret Fuller, he wrote, “She would gladly be my friend, yet our intercourse is not friendship, but literary gossip.” (Emerson, *Letters* 1852, 1:202). He sought to change this and cite inclusion rather than solitude. “We are armed all over with subtle antagonisms.” (Emerson, *Letters* 1852, 2: 325). Yet “I awoke this morning with devout thanksgiving for my friends, the old and the new...a new person is to me a great event.” (Emerson, *Journals*, 5: 278). Man in this regard embraces the other individual.

Truth is difference. “There must be two before there can be very one...let him be to thee forever a sort of beautiful enemy, untamable, devoutly revered.” (Emerson, *Collected Works* 1971, 2:121) There is resolution of difference through dialogue. “We will meet as though we have not met, and part as though we parted not.” (Emerson, *Collected Works* 1971, 2:126). “The essence of friendship is entireness, a total magnanimity and trust. It does not surmise or provide for infirmity. It treats its object as a god, that it may deify both.” (Emerson, *Collected Works* 1971, 2: 127). Emerson urged his readers to engage in dialogue, challenge difference and not remain passive to a given or prepared truth. Openness was significant for truth and ultimately friendship.

Why does man shy away from such truth? Everyman has his worth. Everyman requires some “civility...some fame, some talent, some whim of religion or philanthropy which is not to be questioned” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 347). Man

rather withdraws from further conversation. Fear or risk of openness propels this withdrawal or isolation from others. A true friend, however, would not withdraw from conversation but welcome it. Individuals see themselves in other people. They acknowledge the shortcomings and recognize that they too have the same particularities. One infers that the individual find comfort in himself to see the worth of the other. This is the worth of self reliance.

Emerson cites the second element of friendship is tenderness.

We are holden to men by every sort of tie, by blood, by pride, by fear, by hope, by lucre, by lust, by hate, by admiration, by every circumstance and badge and trifle, but we can scarce believe so much character can subsist in another as to us by love (Friendship, *Essays: First Series*, 1841, p. 348).

Individuals do not value the love or the tenderness that is shown. Individuals are socially hesitant, filled with reserve that tenderness is not appropriate. This is a troubling revelation. If individuals could acknowledge an appeal based on love, it acknowledges a higher sense of self beyond the actual worth of the friendship. This indicates an inner growth of the individual. This inner growth could only compliment the friendship relationship.

Tenderness allows individuals to cultivate relationships from the worldly to the local. "I much prefer the company of ploughboys and tin peddlers to the silken and perfumed amity which celebrates its days of encounter by a frivolous display" (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 348). The beauty of this down to earth

relationship is aid and comfort through all relations and passages through life. “It is fit for serene days and graceful gifts and country rambles, but also for rough roads and hard fare, shipwreck, poverty, and persecution” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 348).

Friendships should never be taken for granted but should be “alert and inventive” so that when individuals engage in a “discourse” it goes beyond the simple conversation. There is no “partiality” but rather a welcome exchange of each other (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 348).

The friend should be regarded as a counterpart. “Are you the friend of your friend’s buttons or his thought” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 352)? This is another indication for the individual to be in touch with self and with others. After individuals accept themselves, they accept and value others for who they are in society. Do not be envious of him or devious with his nature. “Treat your friends as a spectacle...let him grow” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 352). If the individual rejoices in the wonders of his friend is he not also rejoicing in the wonder of himself? “I will receive from my friends what they are not what they have...they shall give me that which properly they cannot give, but that which emanates from them” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 352).

A friendship is the “solidest” thing we know. It is a strong relationship not made of “glass threads...friendships are to be treated with the roughest courage” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 346). Courage does not tempt friendships but rather tests the validity and the reliability of the relationship. Friendship is the “alliance of two large

natures mutually beheld, feared, before they recognize the deep identity between them” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841. p. 340).

Emerson cites a deep spiritual regard for the individual. He regards man with an inner spiritual conviction privately exemplified not publicly practiced with religious rigor. The individual with the deep seated moral character and conviction is a friend. Emerson felt character was key to one’s moral identity. Character guided individual actions. Moral sentiment shaped and measured individual health. The glory of the human being is love, humility, faith, and the intimacy of the divinity. As soon as man had this within him he is like a “ripened flower” (*Conduct of Life*, 1860, p. 1071). If man has these traits within himself he can “run into flame, bullets, pestilence with duty for his guide” (*Conduct of Life*, 1860, p. 1071). He can also create the most risky relationship of friendship. Friendship is not only the giving of self. For it to be a true friendship, the acknowledgement of self is significant before any relationship becomes real. Yet, the reality is not fixed or finite. To suggest a bond that is lasting suppresses change and growth. Suppressing change and growth is a threat to imagination and openness. Friendships are, therefore, dialectical. “I feel how clearly the law of friendship requires the grandest interpretation, when I glance from the dearest love to the vast spirit impatient of bounds, impatient of persons, foreseeing the fall of every fondness, of every speciality” (Emerson, *Letters*, 1971, 2:326). Emerson saw unity as harmful, a bondage or continuity at the cost of change, and a threat to art, writing, and imagination. A threat to imagination was a threat to life; no friendship or relation was placed before it (Sebouhian, 1989).

Epicurus and Emerson sought friendship amongst individuals that exuded trust, honesty, truth, and love. Each man cautioned that acceptance of self was important before they could accept another. Friendship created no barrier; it was open to everyone. It was a tender, reciprocal relationship that constantly experienced growth overcoming shallowness and the subtle antagonisms that both Epicurus and Emerson explained were not elements of real friendship in the community.

## Chapter 5

Martin Buber and Paulo Freire

### Dialogue and Community

Community is vital for democracy to flourish. Communities do not evolve spontaneously. Communities are spurred by dialogue and friendship. Dialogue, genuine conversation amongst or between individuals is necessary for friendship or reciprocal relationships to ensue. Without dialogue, friendship is a superficial, baseless relationship that creates a void between individuals rather than a foundation for community. The focus of this chapter is dialogue as the foundation for friendship and community. The work specifically of Martin Buber, Paulo Freire, particularly, and John Dewey purports dialogue essential for community. Dialogue, if appropriately undertaken, creates an awareness of self and the other. The awareness of self and the other is with a sense of dignity, worth, and hope for the participants. Dialogue in this sense is exchanged with regard for responsibility to self and other, and an open, equitable opportunity where all are invited to participate in the community discourse. It is a process of being with self and the world. This is particularly evident in the work of Buber and Freire.

This chapter first examines dialogue as essential for community. In particular, what are the characteristics of dialogue? What are characteristics of anti-dialogue? What are the challenges to dialogue? Secondly, how can dialogue and friendship and community be encouraged? Dialogue as a process of being with self and world is

discussed. Thirdly, what is the role of the educator or the subject in dialogue? What should be included in the education process?

## Part I

### Dialogue

Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) marveled at the sorts of associations he encountered in the United States in the 1840s. He admired the art of the individual to freely and eagerly associate himself to assert a common goal for the community. Whether the goal is political or social, Americans gather to reach a common ground (de Tocqueville, 2000). The dialogue or the exchange amongst and between individuals is an art. To create dialogue is to create relationships that sustain the democratic community. The give and take, the reciprocity and regard for these relationships are emblematic of democracy. They are a right and a privilege for the individual. The dialogue is a mutual, reciprocal relationship, a friendship between individuals. Dialogue and friendship define citizenship.

Dialogue is vital for the democratic community. Democracy as a government is often perceived by its participants as a given form of freedom, equality, and opportunity. Characterized by openness and association, a dialogue between individuals exudes a give and take of ideas and knowledge to create and maintain a status quo or to relieve the tension between two polar opposites. Vertical relationships are not dialogue. Vertical relationships mask themselves as a reciprocal relationship, but these are not dialogue. The subject subverts the other or the object. Absent is reciprocity and regard for the

other. Dialogue is not hierarchical. Dialogue is a horizontal relationship that creates engagement and openness to change. Vertical relationships are evidence of oppression. They create a “twisted democracy” (Freire, 2010, p. 9). The elite or sectarians speak for the people to “protect the people.” This type of social interaction asserts the need to protect the people from “foreign ideologies” or anything that could create or stimulate an active thinking of the people (Freire, 2010, p. 11). This is anti-dialogic. It does not create or enhance community. Rather, this form of interaction asserts a vertical relationship. It preserves a social order where there is a dominant subject and a submissive recipient. The quest for control precludes any reciprocal exchange. Dialogue, in contrast, is a dynamic activity where participants share information with the goal of some transformation. Individuals through dialogue learn together. Immersed in the reality of each other’s presence, individuals not only acknowledge each other’s ideas, they recognize the worth and perspective of the idea. Through basic characteristics of respect and trust, dialogue is welcome and creative. This is the notion put forth by both Buber and Freire.

Anti-dialogical practices are not conducive to democratic life. How can democracy survive if anti-dialogical practices are the norm? Dialogue is essential for democracy to thrive. It celebrates a way of living. Democracy celebrates dialogue. It “encourages all citizens to actively construct and share power over those institutions that govern our lives” (Giroux, 1993, p. 12-13). It allows for questioning, rather than subordinate obedience. This, one could argue, is an element of patriotism. Dewey (1927) wrote “only through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and usefulness” (p. 69). The state is not



only maintained in integrity and usefulness, the state is also open to change. Dialogue amongst all groups assures this. The only hope for democracy is to encourage marginalized groups to develop the power and will to effect change (Henckley, 2004).

## Part II

### Encouraging Dialogue and Friendship

Martin Buber and Paulo Freire

How can individuals promote and encourage dialogue? The individual is particularly noted as the subject or the initiator of the dialogue. Individuals engage in dialogue and are responsible to engage the other in dialogue.

Martin Buber is a twentieth century educator philosopher who sought to establish genuine dialogue and therefore community. Buber (1996) wrote of the relationship of “I and Thou.” This, his central work, focused on the tremendous value of dialogue. It suggests that reality is not oneself, not the world and not God. The strength of his argument suggests man needs to turn with his whole being to the other; to relate to the other as a thou, and then establish a new reality or an aspect of reality that had not existed for the individual. Buber focuses on the openness, the trust, the readiness to speak and respond and confront fellow man, the world, and ultimately God (Glatzer, 1981). Buber’s emphasis on this results from his life experience.

At an early age, Buber was estranged from his mother. This may have ultimately contributed to thoughts of the alienation between humans in his later years. In addition, Buber writes of the encounter with a young troubled man who came to see him post

World War I. Regrettably, after the encounter, the young man committed suicide.

Buber acknowledges that he really hadn't heard what the young troubled man was trying to say to him. He realized that conversation was not dialogue. Buber realized that he had not responded to the entire man. He did not hear the words which were not being spoken. As a result, he came to see dialogue as responding to the whole person. Communication or the response to the whole man was dialogue (Glatzer, 1981). Thus, *I and Thou* was drafted in 1916 and 1919.

Buber writes the world is twofold according to man's two fold attitude, I- Thou and I-It. He notes a relationship between men is open, direct, mutual, and present. He wrote of two relationships: "that in which I recognize It as an object, and that in which I respond with my whole being to you" (Buber, 1947, p. 16). In the I-Thou, the dialogue between them is an expression of inclusion. One experiences the other being in the relationship. Towards this end, one realizes their own being prior to this. This realization is not empathy, it is the Thou (Buber, 1947, p. XII-XVII). In order to establish the I-Thou relationship man needs to acknowledge the presence of the You in his life.

There are two relationships, I-You and I-It.<sup>1</sup> In the I-You relationship, the I is different from the I in the I-It (Buber, 1996). You is spoken with one's whole being.

Whoever says You does not have something for his object. For wherever there is something there is also another something; every It borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on others. But where You is said there is no something. You has no borders.

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<sup>1</sup> In the Kaufman translation, Buber uses "You". In the Smith translation, Buber uses "Thou".

Whoever says You does not have something; he has nothing. But he stands in relation (Buber, 1995, p. 55)

The I is totally immersed in the end of the You. Buber wrote:

--What, then, does one experience of the You?

--Nothing at all. For one does not experience it.

--What, then, does one know of the You?

--Only everything. For one no longer knows particulars (Buber, 1996, p. 61).

If one enters into the I-You it is with no preconceived notions. The You encounters the I with no imagination or memory or means. It is with openness not condition that the encounter occurs. The fullness of the other person is felt. The I should feel “addressed by the human” or the You. Two relations occur. When the I-You occurs with no preconceived notions or memory there is not only openness and acknowledgement of the other person, there is also an openness and acknowledgement with a willingness to contribute to community. Individuals engage in a discourse which seems basis for community. The result is the association of two and then additional persons who naturally view the good ends of democracy.

For Buber, human relationships are created and shared through language. They are undertaken with and received with goodness and love. The third relationship lacks

language but one hears language. There is the presence of You, the basic word is You but unable to literally say You (Buber, 1996). This, then, is the first challenge, the greatest challenge of dialogue. How is You found or as Buber asks, “How can we incorporate into the world of the basic word what lies outside our language?” (Buber, 1996, p. 57).

When individuals encounter one another as You or with openness, all aspects of his physical being are absent from perception or literal observation. One does not see things or experiences, tangibles or characteristics. If the individual acknowledges or defines the other with his physical characteristics, he establishes the realm of It. If, however, the presence of You “is spread over me, the tempests of causality cover at my heels and the whirl of doom congeals” (Buber, 1996, p. 59). The relationship is not with a purpose or a cause. Buber is relating to the reader that if one comes to dialogue with openness and seeks openness and a sense of being with the other, fruitful dialogue will ensue. Humans will find renewal in the encounter. Buber acknowledges this is not easy to bring to actuality. There are causes or changes in the world that tempt this presence. He realized genuine dialogue was not always attainable. “This, however, is the sublime melancholy of our lot that every You must become an It in our world” (Buber, 1996, p. 68). Once the relationship or encounter is permeated by particulars or experiences the You becomes an object. That reciprocal openness is no longer. It is, however, necessary if I am to gain a full understanding of Thou. The particular phenomena of everyday life define and describe world’s evolution. These cannot be discounted. The physicalities of society’s institutions will not and cannot change. This is critical for world growth. To eliminate these phenomena voids the world of change; stagnation occurs. What is

significant is that the reciprocal openness in dialogue be a part of this so that individuals do not succumb or only acknowledge the “It” but rather put it into perspective. The You who was once “devoid of qualities, not at hand, but only present not experienceable, only touchable (fulfillable) has again become a He or She, an aggregate of qualities” (Buber, 1996, p. 69). Dialogue is a process. The ultimate encounter, however, is possible. Despite change in the world, it is important that the spirit remains alive and actual.

Whether the institutions of the state become freer and those of the economy juster, that is important, but not for the question concerning actual life that is imposed there; for they cannot become free and just on their own. What is decisive is whether the spirit, the You-saying, responding spirit remains alive and actual; whether what remains of it in communal human life continues to be subjected to the state and the economy or whether it becomes independently active; where what abides of it in individual human life incorporates itself in communal life. But that certainly cannot be accomplished by dividing communal life into independent realms (Buber, 1996, p. 99).

Further, Buber acknowledges the worth of the It world particularly as it orders nature. It is not evil. It is necessary. Its potential oppressiveness, however, is limited by the individual who can step into the relation of the I-You.

The unlimited sway of causality in the It world which is of fundamental importance for the scientific ordering of nature is not felt to be oppressive by the man who is not confined to the It world but free to step out of it again and again into the world of relation. Here I and You confront each other freely in a reciprocity that is not involved in or tainted by any causality; here man finds guarantee the freedom of his being and of being (Buber, 1996, p. 100).

What needs to be “given up” is not the I but that “false drive for self affirmation, which impels man to flee from the unreliable, unsolid, unlasting, unpredicable dangerous world of relation into the having of things” (Buber, 1996, p. 126). Finally, the You is in man by his very nature, “only *our* nature forces us to draw it into the It world and It speech” (Buber, 1996, p. 148). Yet, these are rare moments. Not all will find the “You.” (Haim, 2001, p. 118). In order to find the “you”, one must live wholly in the present, not the past. The past is the “It”(Haim, 2001, p. 119). If man acknowledges this, the three spheres of relation are acknowledged. This is dialogue.

The life of dialogue is a relation of men to one another. Where there is dialogue, there is a genuine responsibility to respond to what happens, what is seen, heard, and felt. Where and to whom is this responsibility? One would think it is to the other but the responsibility is to the true self. Once the individual becomes the “true self” and when the outside world confronts the individual as a “thou” or as a “You” the ethical situation

arises. At this point, the “responding” is undertaken with genuine dialogue (Vogel, 1970, p. 173). Once this is established, the individual enters the reciprocal relationship.

The importance of dialogue in human relationships and its connection to political participation is re-emphasized by Paulo Freire. Freire sought to create adult literacy throughout Brazil prior to the military coup in 1964. Born in 1921, the Brazilian philosopher of education dedicated his life to oppressed peoples. He developed methods of teaching adult illiterates to read and, therefore, become politically aware and challenge their status. His efforts resulted in his imprisonment and exile in 1965 (Betz, 1992).

There was no democratic experience in Brazil. Colonization stripped them of this opportunity in spite of claims that democracy was evident. Rather, a slavocracy existed. A commercial enterprise with large estates and plantations gave no sense of community or a middle class. Individuals experienced no civil rights. They remained at the margins of society. A “Europeanism” overtook the masses with the characteristics of a dominant culture including class, forms, and ideology discussed in the first section (Freire, 2010). Clearly, a “culture of silence” described a dispossessed population (Freire, 2009). Change was difficult to come. To precipitate change, Freire argued a critical consciousness between men creates a world where man can relate to man and work to solve a problem.

Individuals must engage in dialogue with people. If this be undertaken, the oppressed will unveil their world of oppression and commit themselves to transformation and a liberating practice becomes a practice for all individuals (Freire, 2009). Imagine this in the face of the oppressors who, as part of the dominant culture, have wealth and material to sustain themselves. Oppressed peoples undergo self depreciation and become

emotionally dependent on the oppressors. When oppressed peoples undergo self deprecation or dehumanization, how is transformational dialogue or a critical consciousness initiated?

The process of humanization may be blocked by oppressive structures. Individuals are dehumanized by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and violence. History creates oppression or human distortion but oppression or human distortion is not history's fate or destiny. If there is dialogue, there is the possibility of liberation. Eventually, the distortion of being more human propels the oppressed to struggle against the dehumanizers or the oppressors. (Freire, 2009). Through dialogue, oppressed peoples restore humanity to the oppressors. The dialectical is driven by the dialogical. As individuals fighting for generosity and humanity, oppressed peoples are in an ideal situation to do this. Freire asks, "Who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible significance of an oppressed society? Who can better understand liberation?" (Freire, 2009, p. 45).

To undertake the struggle, however, is a process. In the beginning oppressed peoples accept their status. Their thought has been conditioned by their existence, dictated or shaped by their oppressors. Oppressed peoples adopt an attitude of "adhesion" to the oppressor (Freire, 2009, p. 45). To answer "who am I outside of this situation?" is impossible. Individuals cannot see outside themselves. They are not aware of the struggle for liberation. Instead, they see themselves as ultimately oppressors themselves. For example, the peasant does not see freedom first and then land but land first and then what they perceive as freedom later. If they have land or become an overseer or become an overseer of land, they seem free. The peasant, however, is still



oppressed. He must be as rigid in function and message as his oppressor. In this regard, Freire writes the oppressed find their model of “manhood” (Freire, 2009, p. 46).

For years, oppressed peoples adapted to their condition. Changing this is a risk.

...what happens to a greater or lesser degree in the various “worlds” into which the world is divided is that the ordinary person is crushed, diminished, converted into a spectator, maneuvered by myths which powerful social forces have created. These myths turn against him; they destroy and annihilate him. Tragically frightened, men fear authentic relationships and even doubt the possibility of their existence. On the other hand, fearing solitude, they gather in groups lacking in any critical and loving ties which might transform them into a cooperating unit, into a true community. “Gregariousness is always the refuge of mediocrities,” said Nikolai Nikolaievich Vedeniapin in *Dr. Zhivago*. It is also an imprisoning armor which prevents men from loving (Freire, 2009, p. 5).

In society, groups (be they social, ethnic, or racial) are often unable to assimilate. Different customs and traditions, as well as language, separate individuals. Ethnicity or race, not friendship and citizenship, define group behavior and conversation. Dialogue is absent. There is no interaction with other groups. A growing divisiveness amongst groups evolves.

Divisiveness threatens dialogue and community. Separate individuals and groups do not dialogue with each other and create community. There is no spirit of association that de Tocqueville marveled at as one of democracy's finest and most genuine traits. Rather than exalting citizenship and democracy, isolated groups, limited by their own "gregarious refuge" withdraw from the very possibility of democratic association.

Individuals listen to others in their group or oppressed state and to their own consciousness. This action is continued conformity in their oppressed state (Freire, 2010). Even though ethnic and racial groups form and engage with each other in their groups, there is no freedom or liberation in society. Individuals continue to adapt to their oppressed condition. Dehumanization continues. This creates a "closed society" (Freire, 2010, p. 7). Individuals unable to change the reality of divisiveness adjust themselves to the reality within their own ethnic or racial group. They are eventually dominated by it and unable to actively engage or intervene in the reality of community.

In a closed society, the meaning of democracy is "twisted." Popular participation, freedom, and friendship are absent. If individuals do not exercise these characteristics, society cannot evolve and democracy is at risk.

How is it possible to enjoy a liberating dialogue with the oppressed? First, there is an awareness or acknowledgment of oppressor and oppressed. It takes into account each other's behavior, view of the world, ethics. Secondly, the old order myths or prescriptions are expelled from society (Freire, 2009). Dialogue is carried on at each stage. Dialogue allows each to be a subject with reflective participation in accordance with historical conditions. Reflection leads to action. A humanizing pedagogy is significant. Individuals do not manipulate (Freire, 2009). They create a consciousness

that represents “things and facts as they exist empirically, in their causal and circumstantial correlations (Freire, 2010, p. 39).

A critical consciousness evolves as a dialectical relationship with social reality. Epicurus and Emerson emphasized the significance of man’s reflection and self reliance that eventually opened the means to participation, dialogue, empathy, and friendship. Buber and Freire echo these sentiments. Each of these philosophers asserts the dialectical relationship or the causes of reality that bring about division, oppression, and exclusion. When the causes of reality are acknowledged, understanding and dialogue will ensue. This lay the groundwork for a critical consciousness. As Freire writes, “what is true today may not be so tomorrow” (Freire, 2010, p. 39). A horizontal relationship evokes a critical consciousness of and on material conditions. It is a relationship that is nourished by love, humility, hope, trust, and good criticism. Dialogue that results

...is the only way, not only in the vital questions of the political order, but in all the expressions of our being. Only by virtue of faith, however, does dialogue have power and meaning: by faith in man and his possibilities, by the faith that I can only become truly myself when other men also become themselves (Freire, 2010, p. 38).

In this regard, Freire suggests a “culture circle” (Freire, 2010, p. 38). Instead of a teacher, there is a coordinator; rather than a lecture, there is dialogue; rather than pupils, there are group participants (Freire, 2010). Each participant is a subject of knowledge, not a receiver of knowledge. Between subjects, there is a relation of “empathy” between

two “poles” who are engaged in a joint endeavor or search of each other’s perspective. Subjects join in a search for the other (Freire, 2010, p. 40). This dialogic exchange is the antithesis of an anti-dialogic exchange or a vertical relationship nourished by loveless, arrogance, hopelessness, and mistrust. A dialogic encounter acknowledges or recognizes the active role of men in and with reality, mediation in relationships and communication among men, culture as a consequence of man’s efforts to “create and recreate” society (Freire, 2010, p. 41). Man as a subject in the world and with the world is acknowledged. Man as a subject makes culture.

Freire suggests the culture circle evolves from the discussion of a series of existential situations. In the circle, individuals discuss what or who people are not what other people think and want or demand from them. This allows individuals to reflect about their position in the world, their work, their contributions to the world and so their power to transform the world. It is an encounter of consciousness or a creation from within.

During the encounter or visualization of the existential situations, a number of elements are “decoded” or identified by participants (Freire, 2010, p. 42) The once excluded oppressed individuals begin to integrate themselves in the picture and in culture. Individuals see the value or worth of their contribution to culture.

For example, see Figure I



*Figure I.* Man in the World and with The World, Nature and Culture

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From Freire, P. (2010) *Education for a critical consciousness*. London: Continuum. p. 56.

In Figure I, a coordinator presents a “situation”, a peasant homestead with a well and a small patch of farmland. He asks questions such as “Who made the well? Why did he do it? How did he do it? When did he do it?” These questions are repeated to evoke a conceptual understanding of necessity and work. The individual needs the well for his necessity and for his work. The additional conceptual understandings as they relate to his house, his clothes, and his tools create a relation to not only other subjects but to culture (Freire, 2010, p. 57).

As the discussion continues, individual realize their connection and their worth to their culture. This is significant for the discourse or the dialogue to continue. The exchange instills confidence in the individual and a willingness to continue with dialogue.

A sense of worth is important in democracy not only for the individual but eventually for the democratic community. If individuals do not feel that they can contribute to the community, they will remain isolated in their groups. No outside exchange will be present, there will be no existence with society. There will be no democratic community.

Dialogue in the community brings together not only diverse ethnic and racial groups but also different socio economic classes, walks of life, and professions. The reciprocal exchange and the consequential recognized worth of the individual cannot be minimized.

The individual’s worth is further explained in Figure 2.



*Figure 2. Man Transforms the Material of Nature by His Work*

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From Freire, P. (2010) *Education for a critical consciousness*. London: Continuum. p. 66.

In Figure 2, the individual acknowledges the transformation of materials of nature by his work. Individuals working with clay eventually create an object of culture, “a vase, jug, or pot.” The individual realizes a conceptual understanding of the connection to culture (Freire, 2010, p. 67).

Eventually, in another, the individual realizes:

I make shoes, and now I see that I am worth as much as the Ph.D. who writes books.

Tomorrow, I’m going to go to work with my head high. I know now that I am cultured. Because I work, and working, *sic* I transform the world (Freire, 2010, p. 42).

Individuals recognize the democratization of culture and the perspective of acquiring literacy. Literacy in this regard is more than reading and writing. It is an “attitude of creation and recitation, a self-transformation producing a stance of intervention in one’s context” (Freire, 2010, p. 43). The self transformation that produces a stance of intervention in one’s context carries over into the democratic community. As individuals recognize their worth in culture, a positive attitude unfolds. In a democracy, the individual’s positive attitude characterizes a willingness to engage with others, to dialogue and sustain friendship. Ideally, with an awareness of self, the individual exudes confidence and reacts to the other with honor, integrity, and love. A reciprocal friendship, an association evolves.



The role of the educator is to enter into dialogue. The educator shares concrete situations and offers a means where the participant can teach himself to read and write. What is essential is an instrument for both learner and educator where “learning content” is identified with “learning process” (Freire, 2010, p. 43). Therefore, manuals that cast the participant as an object rather than a subject are inappropriate. Instead, “generative words” are offered. These words are not the educator’s choice but are rather appropriate to the language culture. Further the creation of “codifications” or existential situations is made available for discussion and contribute to a critical consciousness. These familiar situations open perspective for analysis of regional and national problems (Freire, 2010, 43-45). These create an atmosphere with regard and acceptance.

Individuals learn to read and write about the world they are a part of, the culture they create. Reflecting on the world they are a part of is a transformation. It prompts communication of knowledge between individuals, rather than an extension of knowledge. Communication encourages understanding between individuals; extension of knowledge negates the individual as capable of transforming the world. The individual (the oppressed or the peasant) is not educated but is treated as a depository for propaganda.

Extension is the transmission of knowledge by one active subject to a passive object. The result is not a communication of knowledge but a cultural invasion of the chosen receiver. There is no regard for the recipient’s world. They are instead, forced to make knowledge “resemble their world” (Freire, 2010, p. 89). Individuals are transformed into things and negated as subjects or beings who can transform the world. It is not liberating. There is no developing consciousness. “Extending subjects are active

in that they are actors in the presence of spectators in whom they deposit what they extend” (Freire, 2010, p. 92). The spectator is forced to substitute one form of knowledge for another. There is no reflection.

Knowing, whatever its level, is not the act by which a subject transformed into an object docilely and passively accepts the contents others give or impose on him or her. Knowledge, on the contrary, necessitates the curious presence of subjects confronted with the world. It requires their transforming action on reality. It demands a constant searching. It implies invention and reinvention...In the learning process the only person who really learns is s/he who appropriates what is learned, who apprehends and thereby re-invents that learning; s/he who is able to apply the appropriate learning to concrete existential situations. On the other hand, the person who is filled by another with “contents” whose meaning s/he is not aware of, which contradict his or her way of being in the world, cannot learn because s/he is not challenged (Freire, 2010, p. 82).

It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about their view and ours. We must realize that their view of the world, manifested variously in this action reflects their *situation* in the world (Freire, 2009, p. 96).

If the individual is treated as a depository or an object, “dialogue is subverted and education is changed to deformation” (Freire, 2010, p. 45). However, if reflection is present, it allows individuals to understand dialectically the different capacities when humans know their relation to the world. As a person becomes consciously aware of his surroundings as a subject, he becomes politicized. An I-Thou relationship occurs, a relationship between two subjects. Reflection recognizes the “raison d’etre” of the subject, not an object (Freire, 2010, p. 93). It is a horizontal not a vertical relationship. Reflection allows for a dialectical exchange, a reflection upon material conditions. The reflection upon material conditions is the art of freely associating with another as a subject and asserting a common goal for the democratic community.

As Buber noted, dialogue is an encounter in a democratic community (Buber, 1947). Dialogue is an encounter between individuals that stimulates knowledge. Freire writes ethics are important for dialogic thinking. Dialogue is not the depositing of ideas but rather the stimulation of ideas through love, trust, and hope. Ideas are not deposited or banked. They are encouraged through awareness inspired by openness to the other. If individuals share these ethics in dialogue, a respect for and realization of others becomes apparent. Man looks to himself with no preconceived notions. With openness of mind, he moves beyond the past without rejecting it. Man puts his own view into perspective and listens to his counterpart. If man does this, he exists with the world (Freire, 2009). Beyond existing with the world, he is “becoming with the world” (Freire, 2009, p. 98).

People aware of their activity and the world in which they are situated, acting in function of the objectives which they propose, having the seat of their decisions located in themselves and in their relations with the world and with others, infusing the world with their creative presence by means of their transformation, they effect upon it unlike animals, not only live but exist (Freire, 2009, p. 98).

The dialectical relationship inherent in communication generates new ideas and solutions. It liberates individuals with new awareness of themselves and their changing world. Through reflection it lifts the silence of the oppressed and reveals new ideas or a real consciousness.

Real consciousness (is) the result of the multiple obstacles and deviations that the different factors of empirical reality put into opposition and submit for realization by (the) potential consciousness (Goldman in Freire, 2009, p. 113).

This consciousness is a means for new knowledge. It calls to mind the “untested feasibility” that is particular to man’s reason. Opportunity for answers from different perspectives allows individuals to exercise their autonomy, their reason. This dialogic exchange fosters movement and then change. If this exchange is denied then revolutionary change, cultural change is denied.

Dialogue has four challenges to its proper exchange. Freire refers to these as four anti dialogical theories. The first is conquest. Conquest, simply put, aims at overcoming the other. An individual imposes his will or thoughts upon another. This reduces the other to a non thinking being, a thing. It not only is debilitating, it is lifeless. The second is divide and rule. Overbearing individuals, a singleton or a group oppresses any action that awakens or vitalizes thought. Unity, organization and struggle are labeled as dangerous. Those in charge, the oppressors, do not favor community but rather they select leaders or those who lead thought. While unity and harmony of thought is impossible, leaders assert there is, in fact, a harmony amongst them. Third, manipulation of the other conforms thinking to their own (the leaders) objectives. Regrettably, the more innocent or “immature” the group or individual is, the more easily they are manipulated. Emerging critical consciousness in the people or the group is necessary to avoid manipulation. For obvious reasons, the oppressors try to prevent the emergence of critical consciousness. Finally, cultural invasion destroys attempts at dialogue. A dominant culture is established. Thoughts are molded and ideas are chosen. Community dwellers have no choice but to follow the dominant culture or thought pattern. Individuals have the illusion of participation but through manipulation, inflated assertions, and propaganda their participation is a falsehood (Freire, 2009). These four anti dialogical theories operate historically, as well as in the simplest of encounters. The everyday partnership, the teacher, the preacher, the parent-child relationship each has the potential to reduce or prevent dialogue.

Critical consciousness is the foundation for cooperation and unity in dialogue. Cooperation is necessary for dialogue. Individuals are willing to cooperate with others

with a commitment to freedom or liberation of thought and status. “Cooperation leads dialogical subjects to focus their attention on the reality which mediates them, and which posed as a problem challenges them” (Freire, 2009, p. 168). The response is dialogue. It is “critical analysis” of a problematic reality (Freire, 2009). A communion of the people is evident with elements of trust and love. Communion elicits cooperation, unity, and humility (Freire, 2009).

Unity is the participatory practice of dialogue. Individuals have been divided in this oppressed state. To come together, to be united in the pursuit of dialogue is important for dialogue to ensue. To transform ideas, individuals need to unite to the common cause (which can be large or small). “The methods used to achieve unity of the oppressed depend on the latter’s historical and existential experience within the social structure” (Freire, 2009). Individuals are subjects. There is no sense of domination.

In all, participants synthesize their thoughts and objectives. These are thoughtfully exchanged with no imposed models, with creative guidelines for action, and acknowledgement of differences.

Revolutionary leaders commit many errors and miscalculations by not taking into account something so real as the people’s view of the world: a view which explicitly and implicitly contains their concerns, their doubts, their hopes, their way of seeing the leaders, their perceptions of themselves and of the oppressors, their religious beliefs (almost always syncretic), their fatalism, their rebellious actions (Freire, 2009, p. 182).

Knowledge of this totality is vital for change or cultural synthesis. This not only ensures cultural synthesis, it avoids the transformation of the I into the Thou, or where the anti dialogical I transforms the dominated into a mere “it” or “thou” (Freire, 2009, p. 167).

Buber (1947) sought dialogue through an internal transformation. Freire (2009) sought a dialectical approach to dialogue. Each man hoped for the individual’s being with another and the world. Dewey, half a century earlier sought man’s and democracy’s survival as well. He, however, sought this through education. Educating individuals in a democratic society was paramount to his goal. The school is the social institution, the community life where children are encouraged to share in the resources of race and are enabled to use their powers for social ends. The school (education) is a process of living (Dewey, 1897). Were it not for the acknowledgement of school as a form of community life, education fails. He understood class was an issue but he felt the school community would breakdown race, gender, class, religion, ethnicity, and all/any other barriers to the common experience. Dewey does not advocate special interests or what he called an “anti social spirit” (Ravitch, 2001). Dewey wants to overcome any element of division amongst people with public education. To do this in the school community is a social affair.

In the school, communication is important. Dewey wrote when “communication occurs all natural events are subject to reconsideration and revision” (Dewey, 1971, p. 138). Reconsideration and revision resonates in the work of Buber where dialogue engenders transformation of the individual and Freire who professed a dialectical approach. For communication to engender this transformation, the individual looks to his

private realm of events or “his own soliloquy” (Dewey, 1971, p. 141). If the individual encounters the other with an openness of mind and with no preconceived notions of his own experience, as Buber and Freire would advance as well, a “mind” emerges (Dewey, 1971, p. 141).

If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to and with ourselves. Because of converse, social give and take, various organic attitudes become an assemblage of persons engaged in converse, conferring with one another, exchanging distinctive experiences, listening to one another, over-hearing unwelcome remarks, accusing and excusing. Through speech a person dramatically identified himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive states of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind emerges (Dewey, 1971, p. 141).

Through language, individuals react upon other events and give them meaning. New interpretations and perspectives evolve. Language brings an associative quality for the individual. An association is not simply two or more individuals coming together to converse. Both or all participants share the consequence. Language is communication or cooperation, a partnership. Individuals are subjects. When individual subjects converse new meanings are consequential to the conversation. The dialectical experience generates new perspective and interpretation. “All discourse, oral or written, which is more than a routine unrolling of vocal habits, says things that surprise the one that says



them, often indeed more than they surprise anyone else” (Dewey, 1971, p. 160). New combinations of meanings evolve and an essence or significance becomes evident. A thought is made common between two people. Essence is not existence; it is the meaning of existence (Dewey, 1971, p. 148). “An expert in thought is one who has skill in making experiments to introduce an old meaning into different situations and who has a sensitive ear for detecting resultant harmonies and discords” (Dewey, 1971, p. 161). Dewey’s thought echoes Freire’s (2010) dialectical approach.

As men amplify their power to perceive and respond to suggestions and questions arising in their context, and increase their capacity to enter into dialogue not only with other men but with their world, they become “transitive.” Their interests and concerns now extend beyond the simple vital sphere. Transitivity of consciousness makes man “permeable.” It leads him to replace his disengagement from existence with almost total engagement. Existence is a dynamic concept, implying eternal dialogue between man and man, between man and the world, between man and his Creator. It is this dialogue which makes of man an historical being (Freire, 2010, pp. 13-14).

If individuals find essences in communication new meanings are found which can generate harmony and discourse. In this regard, Dewey felt education was not a process of prescribed meanings for students.

Dewey felt education prepares students for a life where the students had command of themselves. The only way this is achieved is through constant regard of the individual's powers, tastes, and interests (Dewey, 1997). The individual is a social being. This social capacity cannot be ignored.

If we eliminate the social factor from the child, we are left with an inert and lifeless mass. If we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass (Dewey, 1927, p. 3).

The powers and interests of the student are continually interpreted. Educators strive to understand their meanings and help students reach their capacity in terms of what they are capable of doing.

If he is an educator, be able to judge what attitudes are actually conducive to continued growth and what are detrimental. He must, in addition have that sympathetic understanding of individuals as individuals which gives him an idea of what is actually going on in the minds of those who are learning (Dewey, 1997, p. 39).

Dewey sought a constructive education where there is no succession of studies in the ideal curriculum. "If education is life, all life has a scientific aspect, an aspect of art and culture and communication" (Dewey, 1927, p. 7). Education is too removed from "conditions of everyday life which will generate difficulties" and overemphasize

“listening, reading, and what is told and read” (Dewey in Boisvert, 1997, p. 105). Dewey saw education tied to growth, “a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience” (Dewey in Boisvert, 1997, p. 106). For individuals, education is an activity of the present. If education is prescribed with set studies, there is no worth of present experience (Dewey, 1927, p. 7).

Education with a blueprint for study disengages students as subjects. The opportunity for fruitful dialogue is absent. Absent is the culture circle that evokes reflection. Reflection or critical consciousness necessary for openness and acknowledgement of the other is replaced with rubber stamp or deposits of education that are tailored not for the individual but for the massification of society. The worth of consciousness is discarded. It is replaced by an unthinking, manageable group that does not contribute to society in transition but to society fixed in epoch. A dialectical relationship in communication that liberates individuals with awareness of their world and real consciousness is woefully missed. The human spirit, the worth of man’s autonomy to reason and to act in community is violated.

In a democracy, individuals are credited with the ability to reason their existence. As subjects, they interact with each other to adapt to society in transition. If dialogue is encouraged in education, relationships and friendships form. A friendship formed with a critical consciousness is expressed with truth, honesty, integrity, respect, and regard for self and other. As Epicurus and Emerson will assert, the relationship between two and extended to others in community maintains the democratic spirit (Epicurus in DeWitt, 1954, Emerson, *Essays*, 1896). This is the meaning of citizenship. The discourse of friendship that results from the reflection or critical consciousness cultivated in the

culture circles or the I-Thou relationships so profoundly asserted in Freire and Buber and exemplified in Emerson and Epicurus is a mandate for citizenship in a democratic society. Without this discourse and friendship, all other efforts at democratic citizenship will fail. The discourse of friendship is the foundation for scaffolding a democratic society. The absence of discourse that starts in education discredits the contribution of the active citizen. Like Freire (2010), Dewey (1897) asserts an evolving or dialectic experience. We note this in the study of Epicurus and Emerson as well.

Buber (1947), Dewey (1897), and Freire (2010) all view human interaction as the source of knowledge. Human dialogue plays a critical role for each thinker's landscape. It is the great challenge for the educator to implement each theory. How can the teacher utilize this notion of dialogue?

### Part III

#### The Educator or Subject

#### In Dialogue

What is the role of dialogue in education? John Dewey's view is that individuals engage in orderly and ordered activity, and in a democracy, individuals share common values in order for the community to function with a purpose or a vision of a good life. A functioning dialogic community is the goal of instruction.

Dialogue is significant in order for individuals to acknowledge common values and recognize the vision of a good life. If dialogue is absent, individuals will isolate themselves from others and share only their distinct ethnocentric values. There is no

opportunity for individuals from varied backgrounds and abilities to realize a common vision. Individuals will live in their own group but not exist with society. If individuals engage in dialogue, the good life inherent in a democratic society is found. The educator's task is to aid the individual, the student in the development of dialogue.

Various philosophies have been adapted as methodologies or tools for instruction. The history of educational philosophy shows an evolution of thought in teaching or determining appropriate epistemology for the student. What is the best way to determine and acquire knowledge is front and center in educational methods. More appropriately, however, given that individuals seek common values and a vision of the good life in a community, how can educators encourage horizontal dialogue?

Depending upon one's individual philosophy of education, instruction varies. Over the decades of public and private instruction, educators have delivered curricula through core subject areas and student centered discoveries of knowledge as they relate to the subject area. Whatever the philosophy the teacher decides to employ in everyday delivery, the teacher is critical in the learning setting. With this in mind, early philosophies of essentialism and perennialism are discussed. Additionally, existentialism and social reconstruction are included. These are written as historical venues for education. Finally, as it relates to a philosophy of education and the relationship of teacher and student, this section discusses the contributions of Freire, Buber, Dewey, and others.

Essentialism is based on the belief that there is a core curriculum that all students should learn. This curriculum can change in response to societal changes, but should

always be basic and rigorous. The concept “back to basics” helps to explain essentialism (Powell, 2009, p. 276).

An essentialist philosophy of education places the teacher at the center of instruction. The teacher is the quintessential role model and dispenser of knowledge. In a serious atmosphere, direct instruction involves memorization of material with proven methods at hand. A vertical relationship, teacher to student, is evident. Students’ interests are not priority. They are disciplined with an emphasis on hard work and mastery of the core curriculum (Powell, 2009).

Perennialism is similar to essentialism in that it suggests a core curriculum. The difference, however, is what constitutes the core curriculum. Perennial means “everlasting” (Powell, 2009, p. 276). A perennialist advocates a curriculum with themes and questions that stand the test of time. Even with societal changes, the essence or real substance and truth remains the same. There is no choice in curriculum. Perennialists ascribe to a rigid curriculum for schools (Powell, 2009).

The perennialist teacher is in control of the classroom. Differences in students are rarely considered. All are expected to learn the prescribed curriculum with little or no consideration of particular student interest. Traditional methods of direct instruction including lecture or a depositing of knowledge are evident. The goal is a state of excellence based upon intense, rigorous, focused teacher centered instruction (Powell, 2009). Horizontal dialogue is absent. A vertical exchange between teacher and student is apparent.

Focused teacher centered instruction shifted to a more student centered instruction in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Principles of progressive education, particularly constructivism,

were becoming popular for educators. Gone was the notion of “silence is golden” for students. A vertical relationship became anachronistic. Students are encouraged and challenged to construct, or discover, knowledge about their environment. The process of discovering knowledge is valued more than the product. Why? Construction of knowledge leads to problem solving, a skill that appropriately prepares students for society (Powell, 2009).

Teachers act as facilitators of critical thinking for students. They serve as guides and resources to promote student development. The classroom is an atmosphere of give and take. It is based upon democratic principles that include active engagement, cooperative learning, and interaction amongst students. The goal is student discovery and problem solving complete with critical thinking skills. The successful student brings these achieved goals into society (Powell, 2009). Horizontal dialogue is encouraged.

Rather than simply learning about society, social reconstructionists seek to change society. This philosophy seeks to educate students in ways that move beyond elements of racial and ethnic divide, environmental issues, and class struggle. The notion of a social revolution that brings equality amongst individuals is popular in the 20<sup>th</sup> century but its roots are found as early as the ancient Greek civilization (Powell, 2009).

In the classroom, teachers promote student involvement in society’s problems. With elements of constructivist pedagogy, students explore issues, engage in critical thinking and problem solving each with respect and regard for others. Social reconstruction avoids the demoralization of person or group. These skills are usefully incorporated into reading, research, analysis, and writing. The teacher promotes active engagement, a sense of responsibility, respect, and regard for the individual and

community (Powell, 2009). Educators purposefully promote dialogue between teacher and student.

As it regards the individual, existentialism focuses on the whole person. The existentialist purports the whole person, not a particular subject, is important. If, while learning takes place, the student becomes particularly adroit in a given discipline, it is worthwhile. Compulsory education, standardization, tracking, and testing are not accepted tenets for the existentialist educator. Traditional education is not the norm. The classroom presents choice and promotes responsibility for students. Teachers and students together participate in the classroom. As an existentialist proponent, the teacher is a role model who demonstrates self discipline, an awareness of self and pursuance of academic goals. Students' goals are personal awareness and freedom with personal responsibility. However, it is not freedom without limit. It is freedom with responsibility to others as well (Powell, 2009). Self awareness and freedom with responsibility toward self and others evolves through a reciprocal relationship between educator and educatee. The reciprocal relationship is horizontal dialogue.

In the classroom, the student is a participator not a spectator. Knowing and doing is a partnership between teacher and student. It is a practice related to actions and guided by thoughtful preparation. The teacher is not magistrate but co partner and guide for all students of all levels. The teacher and student work together to formulate problems and solutions in society. They are not separate entities. Together, they problem solve with elements of critical thinking towards that end. Dewey (2006) implied a philosophy of education should include a social aim. Progress (industrial and technological) can create harsh social divisions. Elements of class division are evident with advancements of



industrialization. Some individuals feel a sense of abandonment. Buber would agree seeking man's survival in a world that abandons him in its quest for progress and power. Freire would affirm this, albeit more conflicting, noting a class distinction of oppressors and oppressed. Democratic schools, therefore, seek to overcome racial and national prejudice. Schools can rebuild a spirit of common understanding and good will. Schools can foster understanding of human nature so that people do not disregard another's nature. Educators are privileged to be part of this process.

Martin Buber (1947), an existentialist, asserted the primacy of doing in education not having. This is a praxis that implies growth. The "thou" is present for communion in education. The educator's role is not to dominate or bank (as Freire (2010) says) but to experience a communion with the other so that critical thinking skills are bred and articulated. "Allow the child to venture out...and establish a reverence for thought or form and be educated" (Buber, 1947, p. 105).

The educator, for Buber, has lost the ability to embark upon shared knowledge or the mystery of the personal life that was exchanged and learned in the days of the "philosopher, coppersmith with journeymen and apprentices" (Buber, 1947, p. 107).

Buber (1947) disdains compulsory education. This is a catalyst for disunion, humiliation, and rebellion. If communion was to define education, there would be a means for students to be drawn in to education. This negates old education (Freire's (2010) banking) that assured only the educator was the bearer of values and tradition who represented the world of them and us, an antagonistic world devoid of a "spirit" (Buber, 1947, p. 107-108).

Buber (1947) cautions the educator to be present among all students in all situations. The educator is to be present in the reality of the situation. If this be done, trust evolves and a dialogue ensues. Buber affirmed the educator needs to be there for the individual. He/she should one, gather the child's presence into his own, two, put himself/herself "over there" to see from the child's perspective and three, create a friendship or a mutual experience of inclusion of the other's soul (Buber, 1947, pp. 116-119). Freire (2010) noted this as well.

Buber (1947) felt education was to instill character growth. Therefore, ethics was critical. The educator should be "alive" and able to communicate. "Impression" is important. It is the link between man's being and his appearance, the connection between what he is and how he feels. Being aware of this, the teacher exudes his character with a responsibility to guide the individual through all circumstances to assert for himself and the individual what is right and wrong. This can be done only if there is confidence between educator and educatee (Buber, 1947, pp. 120-127). The teacher acknowledges his character and that which shapes his character, in particular for Buber, house, street, culture, media (Buber, 1947). Students, through dialogue, question and interact with the teacher and the material and draw conclusions about important issues. Therefore, situations demand presence, responsibility, the You in life. Still, however, Buber acknowledges the acceptance of norms and responsibility. Discipline and order in one's life are starting points for responsibility. Buber felt education for character was education for community and unity. It brought the individual to the spiritual state necessary for fullness of being, and therefore, community (Buber, 1947).

Paulo Freire, (2010) a social reconstructionist, writes, “democratic educators can only see the acts of teaching, of learning, of studying as serious, demanding tasks that not only generate satisfaction but are pleasurable in and of themselves. The satisfaction with which they stand before the students, the confidence with which they speak, the openness with which they listen and the justice with which they address the student’s problems make the democratic educator a model (Freire in hooks, 2003, p. 42). Their authority is affirmed without disrespect of freedom. “Because they (democratic educators) respect freedom, they are respected” (hooks, 2003, p. 42). Conversation fosters community. Thoughtful dialogue that is conversation fosters closeness and connection. This notion applies to communities world wide.

In a true dialogue, both sides are willing to change. We have to appreciate that truth can be received from outside of, not only within our own group...by engaging in dialogue we have the possibility of making a change within ourselves that we can become deeper  
(Thich Nhat Hanh in hooks, 2003, p. XV).

Education is a gnosiological situation. It is a study of knowledge similar to epistemology. To implement this, a partnership and, therefore, an exchange between educator-educatee and educatee-educator exists (Freire, 2010, p. 133). This relationship, asserts the human in the world. “Ideas, convictions, aspirations, myths, art, science” are discussed openly and critically. There are not static; they are dialectical (Freire, 2010, pp. 136-137). Anti dialogical educators sometimes resist this, regrettably. Resistance is

motivated by fear of losing authority or respect in the classroom or school community. Freire suggests teachers be open to a praxis that creates critical thinking. How? Rather than depositing or “banking” knowledge in students through a narrative education, the teacher poses questions and methods where students begin to problem solve. If a teacher banks or deposits education, the students’ creative power is squelched. This is counter to the purpose of education stated in the beginning of this section (Freire, 2009). Banking education rebukes the notion that acquiring knowledge and applying it is a dialectical endeavor. Banking is “necrophilic” not “biophilic” (Fromm in Freire, 2010, p. 77).

While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, the necrophilous person loves all that does not grow, all that is mechanical. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as all living persons were things...Memory, rather than experience; having rather than being, is what counts. The necrophilous person can relate to an object...a flower or a person...only if he possesses it; hence a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he loses possession he loses contact with the world...He loves control, and in the act of controlling, he kills life (Fromm in Freire, 2010, p. 77).

This necrophilic characterization negates the wonder of education for both the teacher and the student. There is no dialogue, only monologue. There is no I-We or I-Thou, only I. There is no reflection, no hope. There is no praxis. Dialogue is praxis (Freire, 2004).

Freire suggests teachers face their educational autonomy or authority with freedom. This sounds contradictory, however, teachers face their autonomy with a freedom to acknowledge that education as a dialectic is positive. Educators can do this not by ridding themselves of all traces of their particular baggage, but rather by putting it into perspective. “I cannot be a teacher without exposing who I am” (Freire, 1998, p. 89). Exposure to self and acknowledgement of self is liberating. This is a common denominator for dialogue and for teaching. “We are subject to genetic, cultural, social, class, sexual, and historical conditionings that mark us profoundly and that constitute for us center of reference” (Freire, 1998, p. 91). If teachers acknowledge self, they acknowledge others as well. This breeds respect and openness in education that propels understanding and decision making in individuals. Individuals view freedom not as without limits but with self imposed venues to accommodate a dialectical world.

Teachers can create an atmosphere to speak with and listen to their students. Hearing an individual is not listening. Listening is openness to the other’s gestures and differences. It is respectful; it is generous. It does not negate one’s autonomy but creates an atmosphere where others can disagree, oppose, or take position. It enhances critical thinking...dialogue to educate (Freire, 1998). Listening creates openness to the world of others with whom one shares their pedagogical undertaking. Teachers become acquainted with their students and listen to their voice.

Freire stresses an “open minded teacher.” This teacher cannot ignore anything that concerns the human person. A teacher’s work is with people, it is a human act towards individuals of all ages, no matter their endeavor. A teacher has high standards of responsibility of themselves and for others. Simply stated, the teacher needs to care for students. Teachers look at their students not for what they are simply in the moment but what they can become.

If teachers substitute this (what this writer terms) biophylic education, education that is liberating and democratic will spill into the community. Human ethics learned in the classroom become universal ethics of the democratic community (Freire, 2004).

John Dewey’s educational practice advances the fulfillment of common democratic values though individual practice cultivated in the classroom. A constructionist, Dewey asserted the responsibility of the teacher to facilitate instruction but also to allow the student to grow (Dewey, 2009). Dewey’s methods seem more perfunctory than thoughtful or evocative of the individual self evidenced by Freire (2010) and Buber (1947). He looks to the individual rather Darwinian like as an organism perfunctory in manner rather than in the thoughtful or evocative manner of the individual self evidenced by Freire and Buber. He looks to the individual rather Darwinian like as an organism in its environment, one that reaches perfection through doing. Problem solving results (Betz, 1992).

Dewey, (1997) like Freire (2010), saw the teacher as a moderator, facilitator in a school that was a form of community life. School is a place where certain lessons are learned and habits are formed. It is a form of community where “all agencies are concentrated bringing the child to share in inherited resources of the race and to use his

own powers for social ends. I believe education, therefore, is a process of living and not a preparation for future living” (Dewey, 1897, p. 3). Indeed, it is for the present, but the effects are for the future. The teacher “looks ahead” (Dewey 1997, p. 76). This cannot be discounted. A school community engenders the child, it cultivates growth for the democratic community. There is no succession of studies in the ideal school curriculum.

If education is life, all life has, from the outset, a scientific aspect; an aspect of art and culture and an aspect of communication. It cannot, therefore, be true that the proper studies for grade are mere reading and writing, and that at a later grade, reading or literature, or science, may be introduced. The progress is not in the succession of studies, but in the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in experience...I believe...that education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience; that the process and the goal are one and the same thing (Dewey, 1897, pp. 7-8).

Education is therefore dialectic. Freire (2010) and Buber (1947) would concur.

The teacher is an ostensible authority, is moderator, but not a banking or old educator. The authority is a gift of freedom for the teacher. It is generous. The teacher’s self confident authority breeds respect born of “just, serious, humble, and generous relationships in which both the authority of the teacher and the freedom of students are ethically grounded” (Freire, 1998, p. 86). Freedom for teacher and student creates not a

“classroom” but a center for sharing and learning. This assures education is a process of development. Respect for self and for student is significant.

It is vital that a spirit of dialogue, a free communication of interchange of ideas, suggestions, results, both successes and failures of previous experiences, becomes the dominating note of the recitation (Dewey in Kosnoski, 2005, p. 665). Education is participatory. If a child is inundated with deposited knowledge, “the child is thrown into a passive, receptive or absorbing attitude, the conditions are such that he is not permitted to follow the law of his nature; the result is friction and waste” (Dewey, 1897, p. 8). Further, “image is the great instrument of instruction. What a child gets out of any subject presented to him is simply the images which he himself forms with regard to it” (Dewey, 1897, p. 8). Education is, therefore, not only participatory, it is in partnership with the teacher who looks to every child in a unique situation, to consider the differences among children. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey asserts acknowledgement of difference in education is analogous to the farmer who needs to plant certain crops in particular soils. Schools (educators) cannot ignore characteristics.

The educator, like the farmer, has certain things to do, certain resources with which to do, and certain obstacles with which to contend. The conditions with which the farmer deals, whether as obstacles or resources, have their own structure and operation independently or any purpose of his. Seeds sprout, rain falls, the sun shines, insects devour, blight comes, the seasons change. His aim is simply to utilize these various conditions; to make his activities and their energies work together, instead of against



one another. It would be absurd if the farmer set up a purpose of farming without any reference to these conditions of soil, climate, characteristic of plant growth, etc...It is the same with the educator, whether parent or teacher. It is absurd for the latter to set up his own aims as the proper objects of the growth of the children as it would be for the farmer to set up an ideal of farming irrespective of conditions...Any aim is of value so far as it assists observation, choice, and planning in carrying on activity from moment to moment and hour to hour; if it gets in the way of the individual's own common sense (as it will surely do if imposed from without or accepted on authority) it does harm (Dewey, 1914, pp. 106-107).

To acknowledge the other, the teacher is open to self first. Otherwise, acknowledgement of difference is difficult.

Dewey's (1914) message is similar to Freire's (2010) and Buber's (1947) To encourage dialogue and so community, teachers and schools are areas of community themselves that are identified by a partnership between educator and educatee. This partnership is formulated to inspire understanding and acknowledgement of difference.

Dialogue and community inspires and sustains community and democracy. For its part, education is sine qua non to lay foundation for a discourse that supports dialogue and community.

In Deborah Meier's (2002) *The Power of Their Ideas*, the Central Park East School, a model for schools, celebrates public education. The model is based upon the

relationships students build with their peers and the adults throughout the school, the school's respect and nourishing of students' personal interests and passions, and finally the strong ties that the school maintained with the students' families (Meier, 2000). A critical aspect of this model stands out for deliberation. It is the teacher (Meier, 2002). The significant elements of class size, a curriculum that "kids fall in love with" (Meier, 2002, p. 21), parent involvement, collegiality amongst the staff, and small schools, each important, the teacher and ethics stand significantly amidst these elements.

Not all teachers are able to teach in a modeled Central Park East school. Yet all teachers can share in the power of their ideas, in the wonder of their students in their own classroom. All teachers need to be caring and compassionate. They need to be open to student ideas, to experience the "You" in their students. Small schools are idyllic for dialogue as Meier suggests. However, not all educators are part of a small school setting. The catalyst for dialogue is the teacher, whether the school or class is large or small. A teacher is a subject who does not look at students as Its or as objects. Teachers as subject look to their students not as they are in the moment but for what they can become. The works of Buber, Freire, and Dewey can resonate in all teachers as subjects in relation to their students. Teachers can get to know their students if they make a concerted effort to do so. .

Meier asserts small schools are safer because teachers know their students (Meier, 2002, p 107). However, all schools can be safe if teachers get to know their students, share in their lives and create a model ethic or model character. Clearly, however, if the school staff exerts genuine action towards students, such as sharing in their lives and modeling ethical behavior in whatever means appropriate, all schools can

be safe. What happens in the classroom can extend into the school community. Teachers wield an enormous amount of influence in this regard. Further, teachers and parents can share the common interest that is the student regardless of class or school size. The obstacles to this such as “the smell of who’s the boss,” who is the principal or the superintendent or the School Committee, and the need for teacher respect notwithstanding is evident in all schools (Meier, 2002, p. 124). Yet, teachers can get beyond this. Is this easy? Indeed not. It takes tenacity of spirit and awareness and comfort with the self. This is the wonder of Freire’s (2010) and Buber’s (1947) message as it relates to dialogue.

If teachers in all schools, regardless of school size, socioeconomic makeup of student body, and curriculum open themselves to the awareness and respect for their students, then real dialogue can occur. Freire (2010) aptly wrote that teachers face their educational autonomy or authority with freedom. To engage in this freedom, teachers are aware of themselves and so open to others.

The critical issue for Freire (2010), Buber (1947), and Dewey (1897) is that the teacher treats students as subjects. But in order for the teacher to engage in the wonder of the dialogue he must know who he is. Dialogue begins with an awareness of self and openness to others.

### Conclusion

To imagine community and citizenship without dialogue is to negate the essence of democracy. If dialogue is present, individuals will acknowledge self and others through friendship. Real friendship established through dialogue contributes to

community. Community is essential to democracy. At the outset of this chapter, it was noted Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) marveled at the sorts of associations he encountered in the United States in the 1840s. He admired the art of the individual to freely and eagerly associate himself to assert a common goal for the community. Whether the goal is political or social, Americans gather to reach a common ground (de Tocqueville, 2000). This is a remarkable trait. It is a characteristic that gives all groups, regardless of background, opportunity to engage in community.

To establish a community, the real dialogue that is suggested by Buber (1947), Freire (2010), and Dewey (1897) begins with acknowledgement of self and the other. The acknowledgement of self presents an opportunity of acknowledgment of the other without pretension or circumstance. If this exchange is appropriately undertaken, dialogue will ensue.

The rewards of dialogue are without limit. The human exchange in community and ultimately in a democratic society is without measure. As it relates to citizenship, the possibilities for growth are endless. Democracy rests upon the backs of its people. Real dialogue allows friendship in the manner of Epicurus, Emerson, Peaceable Schools, and citizenship to flourish.

Chapter 6  
Peaceable Schools  
And Philosophical Foundations of Friendship  
In the Works of  
Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson

Can secondary institutions teach or create a discourse that contributes to one's civic identity? The school is arguably the first public institution where children experience a civic disposition. Individuals learn to share, make choices, become responsible, and accountable. The school embodies democratic norms and values along with practices. These norms are not dictatorial. They are part of the school's mission statement to promote responsibility amongst students. Norms, supposedly, contribute to character building, but not always.

The advent of technology and advancements in mechanization has brought the global realm into every national culture in the world. The effects are astounding and awesome. Across America, public and independent or private schools are no longer populated homogeneously. School cultures are identified with multi cultural backgrounds including race, ethnicity, and socio economic backgrounds. Diversity, or the broad based pan cultural characteristics of the population, is a key word to describe differences amongst the masses. Some differences (for example: one's color, language, religion) are more or less than others depending upon one's own cultural acceptance of others.

Individuals from every walk of life can recall a situation that brings question to mind in terms of “belonging.” Imagine the young student who at sixteen moves from a major city filled with the wonders of her culture, Jewish, Moslem, Roman Catholic, or other with striking characteristics of feast days, clothing, traditions, and indigenous food. She moves to a new region where her culture is “other” to the endemic or particular life. Soon, our young student is called hurtful names and she learns through the vicious chain of gossip that town officials sought to keep her family out of town because of their background. Catapulted from the comfort zone of the big city and sameness of culture back home, she now faces stares, innuendoes, and insults.

The story is a mere dot, a tiny atom amidst infinity. This story pales in experience to other harrowing stories of exclusion. Exclusion for the young girl is a new experience. More significantly for this situation, it results in the lingering questions of self. “Who am I?” and “Where do I belong?” and “How come they don’t like me?” and finally, “How can I change to be accepted?” The last question is the most wrenching of all. Rather than have pride in oneself or the realization of self, one seeks to be like the other to be accepted. Participation in community is limited by exclusion and domination. How can this change?

Schools have been charged with the task of addressing the ills or woes of society. Events ranging from teen-age pregnancy to drugs to school violence to discrimination and citizen apathy demand a solution from education. Curriculum writers agonize over effective models where students develop the skills to graduate and live an equitable, free, participatory, and happy life. Individual teachers are consumed with academics. Yet if schools truly seek to manifest the skills needed to assuage challenge and conflict in

society, they need to live these skills daily (Meier, 2002). Inclusive rather than exclusive practices are important. Meaningful dialogue regarding how atmospheric infractions are disruptive the individual and community are more important than punitive measures that respond to infractions (Meier, 2002). Curriculum models are traditionally driven by a hierarchy of administrators and staff who dominate and control the student body (Caulfield, 2000). This suggests an atmosphere that is neither progressive, nor in keeping with democratic ideals and a civic life. It is critical to this end of progressive education and demonstration of democratic ideals and citizenship participation, it is important that curriculum models not be control models but participatory models. All students and staff should have a part to play. In order for schools to be effective, curriculum models do well to address human beings, their relationships and their beliefs. How do individuals shape their cultures? How are these cultures different? How are they the same? What can we share? Given 21<sup>st</sup> century globalism, how can schools really address what some refer to as society's "ills"? The answer may be in our history.

Ancient Greek History and Early American History reveal a possible solution. Epicurus (300 B.C.) and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1830), with more than two thousand years separating their work, give insight and guidance for curriculum models that foster inclusion and participation and not exclusion and domination. Referencing the works of these two philosophers, histories schools can create curriculum models that foster inclusion and participation and not exclusion and domination. Each edifies a dialogue amongst individuals built upon a consciousness of self and other. Dialogue is the arbitrator of conflict and challenge. The friendship that results identifies the ongoing

active citizenship in the community. The Peaceable Schools have evidence of these lessons in their philosophy.

This chapter first examines characteristics of Peaceable Schools. The second part analyzes the works of Epicurus and Emerson, particularly their essays on friendship. These two works are foundational for the Peaceable Schools model. Friendship, through dialogue, is the means to active citizenship. This is cultivated in the Peaceable Schools.

The Peaceable School model is foundational for active citizenship. Everyone is made to feel important and youths are given meaningful opportunities to explore learning. The atmosphere is not competitive or hierarchical. It takes “into consideration the social arrangements of U.S. society and the larger social issues of diversity and tolerance” (Brush, Caulfield, and Snyder-Joy, 1998 in Caulfield, 2000, p. 173). Relationships built within the school community are extended into the outside community.

Peaceable Schools envision a community that embraces empowered learning, consensus building, excellence, and equity for all members (Caulfield, 2000). The schools are built with values of working on the systemic transformation on all levels. School climate presents opportunities to link individuals to each other rather than create a rank of individuals (Caulfield, 2000). Diversity is viewed as a resource, not as a problem. Tension is absent and justice is sought. The significance of the self, reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power is important. Also, holistic solutions, conflict as an opportunity for change, and equity in the community characterizes the growth or lived process of Peaceable Schools. ([http://www.lesley.edu/academic\\_centers/peace/institute.html](http://www.lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html)).



The school community acknowledges the realities of life. What creates exclusivity in the community? Are there alternatives to exclusivity that are realistic and rather than alienate, encourage individuals to participate in school life and beyond? The Peaceable Schools typify a journey that includes “transformation of selves, of beliefs, or relationships, and perhaps most important of the ways in which we both view and treat the youths of our communities” (Caulfield, 2000, p.171).

The Peaceable Schools vision or mission statement integrates

a global community free of violence, disconnection, and systemic inquiry.

This community offers inclusive, empowered learning that is rooted in the values of affirmation, consensus building, excellence, and equity as a reality for all members. As a result of the center’s efforts, educators, young people and other community members will have the tools, knowledge, and relationships to live out and generate welcoming, dynamic, and interconnected communities.

We believe that peaceable schools and communities are built on the following values:

- Systemic transformation requires working on multiple levels: the individual, interpersonal and institutional; the personal, professional and political.
- Diversity is a resource, not a problem. Multiple lenses and multiple voices are necessary to build just communities and effective programs.

- Change happens from the inside out change starts with the self.
- Reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power are important components in all learning and helping relationships.
- All people, children, youth, and adults, have the capacity to be leaders. New leaders and inclusive leadership must be supported.
- It is important to go beyond individualistic solutions in order to create communities that work for all members. Holistic and collective analysis and strategies are more effective.
- Conflict is an opportunity for growth and transformation. Effective strategies for dealing with conflict should be rooted in principles of respect and non-violence.
- Building an intentional community in which all voices are heard is the underpinning for all learning in a peaceable setting.
- Creating and sustaining peaceable schools and communities is an on-going work and a lived process  
([http://lesley.edu/academic\\_centers/peace/institute.html](http://lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html)).

The Peaceable Schools model integrates diversity, popular education, and developmental assets (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005). These three lenses that contribute to the overall framework for Peaceable Schools are acknowledged through dialogue. Dialogue is foundational for friendship that defines living citizenship in the larger community. The relationship amongst individuals transcends the perfunctory actions of the community. Respect, regard, and compassion are *lived* (my italics).

Martin Buber writes relationships are open, direct, mutual and present (Buber, 1947). It is important for the individual to recognize the other, not as an object or with circumstance, but with the whole being. There is no condition that identifies the relationship only the genuineness of their self is significant. The relationship has no barriers or parameters; the relationship is a mutual immersion in the other. Void of Particulars, individuals enter into relationships with no means or preconceived notions. Relationships are without realms but with openness, and a sense of being with another (Buber, 1996).

Paulo Freire (2010) reiterates Martin Buber (1996). The process of humanization is blocked by oppression. Through dialogue, peoples can restore humanity. To do this, there is a consciousness of each other. It takes into account the other's behavior, view of the world, and ethics. Myths or prescriptions are examined and rejected. Reflection leads each participant to action. Individuals create a consciousness of each other (Freire, 2010). Without consciousness of each other, the three lenses that frame the Peaceable Schools cannot occur. The individual cannot acknowledge the other if they do not allow themselves, open themselves to understanding of the other. Understanding or empathy is apparent, perspective is acknowledged, and a search for the other is evident. The dialogic

exchange is described with love, hope, and trust. It is the segway or the impetus to create a different association or community where inclusivity is the goal. Understanding and acceptance of each other yields limitless possibilities standing aside obstacles or oppression society fixes among them. Both parties recognize and acknowledge the other as participants and contributors to the world, not simply as stationery or mired participants resultant of the world's socio economic or cultural circumstances. Dialogue is a possibility. Without this, friendship cannot evolve.

The first lens, cultural diversity, is modeled on Ten Cs of Awareness (one's individual awareness of self) and Change (one's individual capability to change) (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002). In order to accept others, the individual accepts self by acknowledging the Five Cs. The Five Cs are color, culture, class, character, and context. Color describes those aspects of the individual that are unchangeable. For example, these are skin tone, sex, and physical appearance. Culture determines the meaning of color as it relates to race or gender. What are the beliefs, behaviors, modes of living for the individual that describe his/her culture? Class addresses power relations and creates a status or hierarchy. Where is one's position in the social structure? Character represents the personal attributes and idiosyncrasies that make each person unique. Individuals share character traits with others but also have particular traits unique to them. Context represents the external and institutional factors that shape our identity. In particular, time, history, environment, location, and social conditions in which each of us develops describes context (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005, DeRosa, Johnson, 2002).

Once the individual has identified the Five Cs of Awareness, they begin to change their surroundings. The Five Cs of Change are confidence, courage, commitment,

conflict, and community. Confidence in oneself acknowledges the ability that change is within oneself. Courage is the ability to take action in spite of risk or fear of repercussion. Dr. Martin Luther King described courage as “the inner resolution to go forward in spite of obstacles and frightening situations” (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 7). Commitment is the “focus, strategy, determination driven by love and knowledge...the deep and consistent passion for justice and embrace of humanity...” and “accurate education about history and culture inclusive of multiple perspectives (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 8). Conflict refers to “reflection, struggle, and tension that promotes growth and justice” (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 8). Finally, community means working with others together toward a “shared vision that acknowledges, values, and affirms human diversity essential to the individual and the community” (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, p. 8). In other words, I equals We.

Once the individual grasps the first Five Cs of Awareness, the Five Cs of Change ideally occur. The Five Cs of awareness do not “deny the genetic, cultural, and social conditioning we are subjected to” (Freire, 2004, p. 99). Rather, they “recognize that we are conditioned but not determined” (Freire, 2004, p. 99). They mean that “history is a time of possibility rather than of determinism, and that the future is problematic rather than inexorable” (Freire, 2004, p. 99). Individuals are aware of what is around them. Through a unique background and experience in the world, the individual develops a consciousness and begins to understand other individuals. The consciousness of the non self (the other) leads to a new consciousness or a new presence in the world (Freire, 2004). Freire suggests a culture circle where individuals talk about their particular stations or circumstances in life. Individuals share their work and contributions to the

world. They recognize their power to change or transform the world, their own particular worth as part of the whole. Individuals do not degrade themselves or withdraw with resignation but rather see themselves as an equal. They have the capability to contribute to the world regardless of class or socio-economic standing. Individuals, without apprehension engage in a fruitful, reciprocal dialogue symbolic of worth and value to the community (Freire, 2010). Their former oppressed station in life is now a participatory engagement in civic life. Because of the new consciousness, individuals seek alternatives to exclusion and oppression. They work for a peaceful, just, and humane society (DeRosa, Johnson, 2003). This process is not easy. The individual faces risk of alienation from his conditioned existence in society. Change is, however, possible. Epicurus and Emerson realized this as well. Even though we wish for self-preservation our instinct is simply to clutch at a painless state (pleasure). Conformity and not change prevails (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844). If pleasure is to be maximized, however, self is realized (Epicurus in Rist, 1980).

The second lens, popular education and democratic participation focuses on the work of Paulo Freire and critical pedagogy, dialogue, democratic participation and popular education (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005). Freire's work recognizes human oppression and points in the direction of human liberation, and political development. Freire begins by analyzing the nature of oppression and its effect on the consciousness of those oppressed. Passivity, non reflectiveness, and an inability to engage in productive dialogue characterize the oppressed. They talk about their differences and try to correct them. They realize that they, too, are actors in a world where possibility had real meaning. Through dialogue, they transferred their fixed station in life and begin a

participatory engagement in their civic life. The recognition of each of these invokes a critical consciousness that precipitates dialogue and democratic participation (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005). Dialogue and democratic participation prevails in a reciprocal relationship.

Popular Education begins with the teacher and the Five Cs of Awareness and Change. Teachers also experience dialogue. The critical consciousness is not exclusive for students, but for all staff, especially teachers. Indeed, “teaching is a human act” (Freire, 1998, p. 85). Teaching is an expression of the individual. It is not a matter of transmitting content of discipline or depositing knowledge against which Freire cautions (1998). Teaching is an act of humanity. It is a self confident authority based on their (the teacher’s) education. “The teacher is not in the school to impose certain ideas or to form certain habits in the child, but as a member of the community to select the influences...and to assist him in properly responding to these influences” (Dewey, 1897, p. 5). Recall the earlier assertion where teachers look to students not in the moment but with potential and not as an It or an object (Meier, 2002).

In Peaceable Schools, the authority is a gift of freedom for the teacher. It is generous. The teacher’s self confident authority breeds respect born of “just, serious, humble, and generous relationships in which both the authority of the teacher and the freedom of students are ethically grounded” (Freire, 1998, p. 86). Freedom for teacher and student creates not a “classroom” but a center for sharing and learning. This assures education is a process of development. An ethic which values respect for self and for student is significant. Life is faced with challenge. In order to address the challenges of

life, regardless of discipline, ethics is critical if the human existence is a beneficial one (Freire, 2004, p. 98).

Ethics determines a good fate. Respect for self and respect for student is critical. Respect is part of living ethically. The ethics referred to are not “marketplace ethics” but human ethics (Freire, 2004, p. 115). These allow individuals to “speak with” rather than “speak to”. Individuals do not speak to someone as an object but speak with someone as a being (Buber, 1996). Respect creates an atmosphere for listening to other opinions. Listening is not agreeing with another. It is rather knowing how to “listen well so that I can speak or situate myself vis-à-vis the ideas being discussed...of listening connectedly and without prejudice” (Freire, 2004, p. 107). Listening stimulates conversation or dialogue and change. If individuals, teachers, and students listen, open their minds and thoughts, then dialogue is not a power struggle or authoritative in nature. It is democratic. “Conversation is the central location of pedagogy for the democratic educator” (hooks, 2003, p. 44). Difference and oppression in the classroom is acknowledged. Change or social justice is a positive focus.

Change or social justice alleviates control statements or ideological statements that are harmful to human beings. A comment such as “do you know to whom you are talking?” or “you’ll never be as good as we are” signal a lack of respect and closed or single minded thinking (Freire, 2004, p. 118). An ethics of respect, and listening, and dialogue dispels any hurtful, critical comments in the classroom.

The benefit of popular education typical in Peaceable Schools is multifaceted. Popular education as Freire suggests cultivates understanding. “I am learning who I am by relating to what is my opposite” (Freire, 2004, p. 119). A teacher’s self confident



authority creates freedom and generosity in the classroom that breeds generosity towards students. A generous spirit creates an atmosphere of respect between teacher and student and amongst students. Respect allows listening, genuine listening (that which may/may not be pleasant), to create an open, creative dialogue where constructive thinking towards goals of social justice and absence of oppression takes place. An opportunity for progress for all groups in a democratic society is present. Teachers and students open themselves to each other's world. The result is an adventure that the teacher and the student embark upon not only for the present classroom time but for life. The classroom becomes a partnership of thoughts and ideas that is taken beyond classroom.

The partnership requires that ideas of young people are regarded seriously. The third lens looks towards the ideas and resources young people bring to schools and communities (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005). "A constructivist approach to youth development involves making and protecting opportunities for young people to actively create or construct new ideas, values, and meanings as they struggle to understand and to remain engaged in the interpersonal and community relations that are critical to their health and happiness" (Carlson-Paige, Levin, 1992, Kohn, 1999, Christensen, 2000 in Brion-Meisels, Johnson 2005, p. 11). This constructivist approach is possible only in a democratic school and community. In order for development to occur, all cultures, races, genders, and institutional factors need to be acknowledged and recognized (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005). This lens is closely related to the first two lenses previously discussed. A democratic education is foremost the most beneficial. Participants are in touch with self (the Ten Cs) and with the pedagogy and goals of popular education.

The acknowledged differences among children in democratic education will create a seedbed for growth. It is the responsibility of the educator to create growth, to judge, and devise conditions, materials, physical constraints or concerns, moral and social concerns that interact with existing powers and preferences to bring about the transformation of the individual. There is no cookie cutter approach or one size fits all. Teachers have confident authority and enthusiasm to go beyond the textbook. No curriculum or textbook is sacred in delivering content. Educators feel free to take the initiative or make changes if appropriate. Above all, teachers take time to “listen” to their classroom dynamic with passion and diligence. This realizes an “I-We” relationship that Freire asserts necessary for dialogue and critical consciousness (Freire, 1998). Development is a thoughtful, continuous process where all levels of skills and all groups are considered part of the process (Dewey in Archambeault, 1964).

The democratic educator works to create closeness in the classroom. Parker Palmer writes this is the “intimacy that does not annihilate difference” (hooks, 2003, p. 49). The commitment to intimacy and openness of thinking fosters teacher and student success. Teachers create an atmosphere of “doing with” rather than “doing to” or rather creating biophilic education and not necrophylic education (Freire, 2010). Teachers encourage creative thinking for students. In biophilic education, teachers urge students to acquire knowledge dialectically. If education is necrophylic or knowledge is simply transferred from teacher to student or deposited through a narrative, the openness of thinking that characterizes a dynamic dialogue and classroom is absent (Freire, 2010). Banking is “necrophylic” not “biophilic” (Fromm in Freire, 2010, p. 77).

As previously emphasized, the notion of self is critical in this regard. Individuals need to get in touch with whom they are. If one's records or grooves (part of the Five Cs of awareness) are acknowledged then change (the Five Cs of Change) becomes a reality. Acknowledgement and work toward the Ten Cs values "wholeness over division or splitting". A transformation of self occurs. A democratic "closeness" ensues. Individuals experience equality amongst others. Through respect of self and each other fidelity and equality are taken beyond the classroom and into the community (hooks, 2003, p. 49).

The three lenses, cultural diversity, popular education, and developmental assets are foundations for the holistic framework of Peaceable Schools. The self is first and foremost. Given the Ten Cs, individuals celebrate self, diversity, and change. The focus on democratic practice fosters reciprocity and conflict resolution. School-community partnerships are created that were otherwise hierarchical and power based. Social justice or the creation of democratic communities and visioning life through different or multiple lenses is promoted. Finally, a community that was based on "I" is now based on "we". A transformational leadership occurs. Everyone is responsible; everyone is a leader ([http://www.lesley.edu/academic\\_centers/peace/institute.html](http://www.lesley.edu/academic_centers/peace/institute.html), Freire, 1998).

The holistic framework for Peaceable Schools, in this author's view, is a dialectical progressive pedagogy for education that assures a living citizenship model. Awareness of self is encouraged with shared power and leadership with others, in particular with students and staff and parents and family. Guidance and input is solicited from all. Every educator, parent or teacher ensures the vision prevails. John Dewey asserted the goal of education is to prepare the child.

To prepare him for the future life means to give him command of himself; it means so to train him that he will have the full and ready use of all his capacities; that his eye and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, that his judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under which it has to work, and the executive forces be trained to act economically and efficiently. It is impossible to reach this sort of adjustment save as constant regard is had to the individual's own powers, tastes, and interests-say, that is, as education is continually converted into psychological terms. In sum, I believe that the individual who is to be educated is a social individual and that society is an organic union of individuals. If we eliminate the social factor from the child we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass. Education, therefore, must begin with a psychological insight into the child's capacities, interests, and habits. It must be controlled at every point by reference to these same considerations. These powers, interests, and habits must be continually interpreted-we must know what they mean. They must be translated into terms of their social equivalents-into terms of what they are capable of in the way of social service (Dewey, 1897, p. 3).

Peaceable Schools complement this goal. The model helps students create a sense of self, necessary for friendship.

How do the ideals of the Peaceable Schools reflect the ideas of Epicurus and Emerson? Of course, these men do not assert a Peaceable School per se, but the notion of self and community with a vision of social justice is evident. The Peaceable Schools' goal for individuals to live lives with peace and justice, with reflection, celebration and renewal of their self is rooted in the works of Epicurus and Emerson.

Epicurus's and Emerson's motivation for reform each parallel the motivation for Peaceable Schools. Epicureanism began as a movement in response to the civil strife in Greece circa 400 B.C. as Peaceable Schools developed as a response to racial, ethnic, and cultural divisiveness in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Epicurus sought to eliminate subjugation of free people. He struggled to achieve a condition where the individual reveled in the acknowledgement of self and realized a happy, contented life. In this regard, Epicurus in the 4<sup>th</sup> Century B.C. urged what Peaceable Schools urge in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century classroom, "attention must be paid to the reality of people's lives" (Caulfield, 2000, p. 178).

Understanding is not only the highest virtue, it is the highest happiness for it avails more than any other faculty to avoid pain and grief (Durant, 1939). The self would be realized in the Garden, an area free from the pressures and influences of society discussed in chapter 4. Here in this intellectually provocative environment, the individual developed ontologically. The individual eventually created relationships with others who had experienced oppression or subjugation (Freeman, 1938). The Garden is the equivalent of the Peaceable Schools' present day campus buildings.

Epicurus was a contractarian who sought a voluntary acceptance of an unwritten contract of friendship (Farrington, 1967). Each individual was obligated to behave rightly to promote happiness for his good and for each other's good. Similar to the

promotion of social justice in the Peaceable Schools, there is an inherent obligation to cultivate good will and love toward mankind. Good will and love equates with love of justice and love toward man. There needn't be a formal contract. The goal of Peaceable Schools obliges the individual through a natural compact to sustain social justice.

In the Peaceable Schools setting, what was free play for Epicurus resulted in self realization or the Five Cs of Awareness, color, culture, class, character, and context (DeRosa, P. Johnson, U. 2002). The Five C's of Awareness are what Epicurus called the "complete life" (Freeman, 1938, p. 163).

The particular choices made in a friendship (in the Garden circa 300 B.C.) are attentive to the same ethically relevant circumstances in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Peaceable Schools of a person's life (Freire, 2004). Friendship allowed individuals to live not as isolated individuals but as an extended self, a person with attachments to others. This notion for Epicurus led to happiness or for the Peaceable Schools, the Five Cs of Change, confidence, courage, commitment, conflict, and community (DeRosa P. Johnson, U. 2002). Relationships were dependent upon and interwoven with others. To enjoy peace, a man makes as many friends as possible. Friendships are not left to chance. They are diligently cultivated (DeWitt, 1954).

Epicurus insisted friendship is open to all groups, regardless of class, color, or gender. Friendship was a democratic and a reciprocal relationship. It was not exclusive to a few. It was not formed in haste nor slowness. It was mutual.

We must not be critical either of those who are quick to make friends or those who are slow but be willing to risk the offer of friendship for the sake of winning friendship. The tie of friendship knits itself through reciprocity of favors among those who have come to enjoy pleasures to the full (Vatican Saying 28 in DeWitt, 1954, p. 310).

Epicurus created an open, peaceful atmosphere that was caring, reflective, and cooperative without rank. He would applaud the inclusion of his efforts in Peaceable Schools where

Teaching about peace and social justice is of little value if it is done in an environment that is largely competitive and hierarchical (Brush, Caulfield, and Snyder-Joy in Caulfield, 2000, p. 173).

For Epicurus, if man was to develop ontologically with opportunity for reflection, celebration, and renewal a democratic atmosphere was essential. In the Garden, Epicurus counseled everyone to open their minds and allow free exchanges amongst themselves. He urged careful listening that bred understanding and a presence of all where individuals shared the realized the circumstances of oppression and exclusion (Freeman, 1938). The result mirrors Peaceable Schools where individuals value fairness and social justice without rank (Brion-Meisels, Johnson, 2005, Freire, 2010).

It is democratic as the friendships in Peaceable Schools and part of everyday life.

Peaceable Schools, like creating a peaceable world, requires that all persons are treated as though they matter, that all persons are treated as unique people with their own gifts, talents, and contributions, and that ways of teaching should provide opportunities for different gifts and talents to be utilized and recognized (Caulfield, 2000, p., 174).

Individuals have a happy contented life with a critical consciousness of the other. In Peaceable Schools, the individual recognizes that each is connected to the collective (Brion-Meisels, Brion-Meisels, Hoffman, 2007) just as Epicurus assumed men derive intangible rewards of pleasure from the contemplation of one another and from their conversations presently and beyond (Rist, 1980). Epicurus wanted individuals to share a fellowship of friendship that was embraced and maintained in the community.

Friendship too has practical needs as its motive. One must indeed lay its foundations (we seed the ground, too) but it is formed and maintained through community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure (Turner, 1947, p. 354).

In the community, friendships are developed with expediency to ensure peace and safety in the community just as the promotion of social justice is asserted in the Peaceable Schools. Of course, friendships are cultivated wisely. As Epicurus insisted and Peaceable Schools assured, ethics were critical if human existence was to have a presence in the world (Freire, 2004). “It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently,



honorably, and justly; nor to live prudently, honorably and justly without living pleasantly” (Diogenes in in Durant, 1938, p. 647).

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), like Epicurus, was a reactionary and a reformer. Emerson sought to reform the nature of man, make him capable of brotherhood and replace selfishness and materialism with love and sharing. Human love could create a political and social revolution, a revolution in human affairs (Padover, 1959). “The purpose of life seems to be to acquaint a man with himself. The highest revelation is that God is in every man” (Diary, September 8, 1833, in Padover, 1959).

As Peaceable Schools use school and community, and as Epicurus used the Garden, Emerson used the Lyceum. The Peaceable Schools worked with school and community for the promotion of social justice. For Epicurus and Emerson, the fruits of the Garden and the Lyceum sought recognition of self, equality, reciprocity, and social justice. Like Epicurus, Emerson insisted ethics were important. Virtues realized in the Garden in the 4<sup>th</sup> Century B.C. and the Lyceum in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century set the precedent for Peaceable Schools in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Emerson implores the individual to find himself amidst the sea of change in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. He is troubled that society has absorbed the human side of the individual. The individual has lost his sense of self and would do well to reclaim it. Evidence of Emerson’s appeal to the individual is reiterated in the Peaceable Schools with the Five Cs of Awareness, color, culture, class, character, and context. (DeRosa, P. Johnson, U. 2002). Only after this realization can the individual truly be a friend.

Emerson values the distinctive worth of individuals. When he suggests they should be self reliant, discussed in chapter 4, the individual has a full awareness of

himself. His heart beats to thy “iron sting”...he accepts his place in life in the society of his peers and the connection of events” (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844, p. 47).

Man carries himself in the presence of all opposition as if everything were titular and ephemeral but he. I am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844, p. 51).

It takes courage to be independent in thought and action. Self reliance asserts this as do the authors of the Ten C's for Peaceable Schools (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002). To exude this courage, however, is to exude principle or ethics. For Emerson, respect for individuality, independence, and dignity of others was the dominant principle of his ethics. “The virtue in most is conformity. Self Reliance is its aversion” (Self Reliance, *Essays: First Series*, 1844, p. 49-59). “Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your mind” (Emerson, *Collected Works*, in Van Cromphout, 1999, p. 93). Freire (2004) would agree with Emerson's triumphs of principles. These principles are the means of human existence critical for self reliance and Peaceable Schools (DeRosa, Johnson, 2002, Freire, 2004). Emerson does not suggest self centeredness or arrogance of self. He does not suggest the individual know only oneself and not the other. Know yourself, indeed, but also have regard, understanding, and compassion for the other. “Friends come unsought. They are within. The Deity (Spirit) in me derides and cancels the thick walls of character, relation, age, sex circumstances” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series*, 1841, p.

343). This resonates the same in Epicurus. Epicurus and Emerson maintain the openness to all groups, an opportunity for different “gifts and talents to be utilized and recognized” (Caulfield, 2000, p. 174). The open exchange is a criterion for friendship and for the promotion of social justice in Peaceable Schools.

Emerson writes of two elements of friendship, truth and tenderness (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 347). Truth and tenderness are resonated in Peaceable Schools as a developmental understanding of who people are in society. Truth is sincerity. Truth and tenderness allow individuals to see themselves in other people. They acknowledge the shortcomings and recognize that they, too, have the same particularities. Comfort with oneself is the worth of self reliance. Self reliance is the consciousness of the presence in the world that Freire affirms in order for the self to evolve (Freire, 2004). Self reliance allows for celebration of diversity in Peaceable Schools.

Friendships should never be taken for granted but should be “alert and inventive” so that when individuals engage in a “discourse” it goes beyond the simple conversation. “Partiality” is absent. A welcome exchange occurs between each other (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 348). Reciprocity, evident in Emerson’s essay on friendship is evident in Peaceable Schools.

The friend should be regarded as a counterpart. “Are you the friend of your friend’s buttons or his thought” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 352)? This is another indication for the individual to be in touch with self and appreciate the diversity of others. Do not be envious of him or devious with his nature. “Treat your friends as a spectacle...let him grow” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 352). Realize the

potential of the individual, not the circumstance or moment or the It or the Object. If the individual rejoices in the wonders of his friend is he not also rejoicing in the wonder of himself? “I will receive from my friends what they are not what they have...they shall give me that which properly they cannot give, but that which emanates from them” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 352). Appreciation and recognition of diverse others is critical for teachers and students in Peaceable Schools. Diversity in others is a celebration, a resource, not an obstacle.

A friendship is the “solidest” thing we know. “Happy is the house that shelters a friend—happier if he know the solemnity or strength of that relation and honor its’ law” (Friendship, *Essays: First Series* 1841, p. 346). To do this, Emerson, like Freire in the Peaceable Schools model, suggests one acknowledge the non self and then its own self to acknowledge the other (Freire, 2004, DeRosa, Johnson, 2002).

The individual with ethics or character is a friend.

Manners exude a personal beauty where victories of character are instant...Manners impress...a little integrity is better than any career.

Man must be self possessed, happy at home with himself. If man lives with ethics and character, he creates friendships that are ‘free from observations and the duties imposed on life from the rank and file of its members’ (*Conduct of Life*, 1860, p. 1046, 1047, 1049-1051).

Ethics in friendship is reciprocal. “Fine manners need the support of fine manners in others” (*Conduct of Life*, 1860, p. 1044).

Since the early civilizations, man has sought peace and social justice. While vehicles for these goals are different (the Garden, the Lyceum, and the Peaceable Schools) the objective of peace and social justice is common to all. A dialectical, progressive model for education, drawn from the lessons of history establishes a living citizenship model based upon a discourse of friendship. The Peaceable Schools philosophy reasserts the goal of Epicurus and Emerson.

As early as the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C., Epicurus asserted the complete life was defined by recognition of self and reciprocal relationships with others. Friendship assured peace and harmony in the community. Emerson in the 19<sup>th</sup> century assured the individual that self reliance was not easy to acknowledge, however, it was essential for the individual to acknowledge oneself before he could acknowledge the worth of others. The recognition of self allowed for trust and tenderness to characterize a reciprocal relationship or friendship. In a democracy, social harmony and justice ensued. The philosophy of Epicurus and Emerson laid the groundwork for the philosophy of Peaceable Schools. Common to all is “human transformation in the achievement of social justice, humanism, and friendship” (Caulfield, 2000, p. 174.)

The founders of Peaceable Schools sought a more perfect society. The works of Epicurus and Emerson are fitting to this end. At the outset, the individual seeks comfort with himself in order to find comfort with his fellow man through trust, civility, and equality in a democratic society, one that is dynamic and dialectic. There are no limits or boundaries to “the business of human understanding” (Caulfield, 2000, p. 174). The process is unending. Peaceable Schools is a model to sustain the ages. This notwithstanding, the actual process of being in the Peaceable Schools and creating

friendship in the manner of Epicurus and Emerson cannot occur without the essential dialogical progressions of the I-Thou and the critical consciousness of Martin Buber (1996) and Paulo Freire (2010).

Chapter 7  
The Implications  
For  
Secondary Education and Citizenship

The challenge to citizenship and the worth of friendship as a citizenship prerequisite has been established. Sanguinity of citizenship practice in the United States is the task of the educator through a discourse of friendship developed in the Peaceable Schools curriculum model. The curriculum, rich in the philosophical foundation of Epicurus and Emerson produces a citizen whose ultimate vision is toward the good and worth of the state. The effects of this citizen are seen in the growth of the individual. The individual, with understanding and acceptance of himself and others, becomes a striking force in the economic, social, and political sectors of the United States and globally. The striking force of the individual is evident not only in the present but in the future. Man's experience is not "fixed in time" but rather ongoing. Man's experience is dialectical and evolutionary, fluid, and transitional. Temptations and demands do not cease. The friendship experience is without parallel; it is always becoming without perfection. The individual meets the sensitive and the timid; the reaction is understanding without a shudder. As the dialectical is ongoing, so is the notion of friendship (Sebouian, 1989, p. 220). The discourse of friendship manifested in the Peaceable Schools curriculum is pertinent. This study asserts The Peaceable Schools model assures a dialectical progression as a pedagogical tool to accommodate transition

in society. As a pedagogy, rather than a civic curriculum, the model enhances living citizenship in the school and the community.

Public institutions often assert a civic curriculum as a citizenship handbook for students. The curriculum rests upon the commitment to civic education. The claim that liberal states mandate a liberal democratic curriculum is significant (Coleman, 1998). More significant to this end, however, is the pedagogy and not the curriculum. The pedagogy delivers the civic virtues that curriculum objectives forecast.

Civic virtues prescribed by curriculum are supposedly assured objectives through what is considered by some minority groups such as Christian fundamentalists as unsettling (Coleman, 1998). To alleviate this objection, the Peaceable Schools model assures suitable, dialectical pedagogy that promotes understanding, reasoning, and most importantly, active citizenship amongst cultural groups. Specifically, Gutmann (1998) and Macedo (1995) argue that a liberal state requires a minimum of civic virtue within society if the society and the state are to exist indefinitely.

Gutmann (1989) argues civic education gives students skills and virtues to enable them to consider social cooperation. Macedo (1995) further qualifies that political rights and institutions are understood and justified because of reasons and arguments with individuals who espouse a different understanding. Both assert social cohesion through particular study of a prescribed curricula whose goal is citizenship. Curricula refers to specific facts and subjects (Coleman, 1998). More significant, however, is the “pedagogy” (a dialectical progressive pedagogy) or the teaching of disciplines.

The dialectical progressive pedagogy described in the Peaceable Schools model is student centered. Students engage each other to construct understanding through



experience. With the teacher as facilitator, students approach issues with an appreciation of diversity, rather than the obstacle of diversity. Students' particular experience shared with acknowledgment of the self, reciprocity, collaboration, and shared power is *sine qua non* to understanding. A critical consciousness of self and others contributes to a classroom atmosphere typified by trust, safety, and autonomy. Students take ownership of the classroom and engage in the dialogue that propitiates the opportunity to resolve conflict and/or different standards of behavior. Students are not exclusive in this constructive discourse. Teachers, as facilitators, are also with a critical consciousness advanced by Peaceable Schools. Curriculum delivery and success is dependent upon the participatory actions of the teacher and the student. Each is "observant, imaginative, skeptical, and open indeed, respectful of evidence, mindful of the views of others, caring to communicate to learn and to work with an appropriate ethic" (Coleman, 1995, pp. 753-754). The exchange is ongoing, dialectical in nature. The result is tolerance, understanding and evaluation of other values and traditions. Autonomy and horizontal relationships exist in the classroom. The result is more effective than an outlined curriculum that seeds specific traits and actions as perfunctory elements of active citizenship. This does not, however, discount a civic curriculum that instructs the student in the mechanics of national and state organizations. Rather, the progressive pedagogy in Peaceable Schools cultivates the general curriculum so that individuals live or example the curriculum.

Why are Peaceable Schools appropriate for citizenship? Secondary institutions do well to adopt the Peaceable Schools model. The model not only assures social justice within the schools, but assures active citizenship dialectic in nature. The model sustains

the inclusion of multicultural groups in society and adaptations to the demands of a global culture.

In the introduction, active citizenship was defined as an individual who possesses a critical consciousness, is self reliant, assertive in the community, responsible, and accountable for their actions. An active citizen exudes civic virtue and pride in both community and country. Chapter 2 discussed the history of citizenship. In particular, the challenges to the modern civic model of the liberal democratic state and democratic principles were addressed. The challenges to democratic principles in the liberal democratic state are obliterated with a discourse of friendship in the tradition of Epicurus and Emerson fashioned in the Peaceable Schools.

Dialogue and friendship assures a citizenship that exudes a communitarian, mosaic, or model of shared values that Kymlicka (1998) seeks and a shared conception of justice or Rawls's (1998) goal. The discourse of friendship citizenship model assuages cultural vulnerability that Schachar (2000) fears and promotes a common ground for cooperation. In the discourse of friendship citizenship model, there is a basis for informed and willing political agreements amongst individuals freely and equally. Indeed, the prospect of a universal truth is not likely, however, through the dialectical model there is a workable and shared conception of understanding and cooperation. Disagreement on questions of cultural and religion doctrine are absent. Evident in the discourse is fairness, toleration, and cooperation. The partnership of citizens in the community or city, even if the city becomes different in kind, is evident and durable. The interaction is an edifying force for citizenship.

The model alleviates any notion of closed borders as legitimate to perpetuate the shared characteristics of the nation state that Walzer (1995) urged. Citizenship cultivated in Peaceable Schools promotes an open community without parameters. No “strong tradition” is needed. Citizens are bound by dialogue and friendship. Their differences and disagreements are resolved through a critical consciousness that vitalizes the discourse. It ensures the differences once determined “irreducible” (Young, 1998) are in actuality resolved. Commitment, tolerance, responsibility, accountability, and participation pervade public life. The resultant national citizenship is not characterized simply by perfunctory actions of patriotism. Man, at his best, promotes his greatest asset, his humanness through dialogue and friendship. The active citizen by virtue of his nature promotes not a temporary or perfunctory citizenship but an enduring, national citizenship for the nation and the global community.

James Madison wrote:

As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form (Madison, Federalist 55 in Rossiter, 1961, p. 346).

The Peaceable Schools model assures this assertion in our nation.

Peaceable Schools with philosophical foundations in Epicurus and Ralph Waldo Emerson gives answers to three critical questions, contemplative questions that arise when any innovation or movement comes anew in society. They are: “What was the problem?” “Does the answer ‘solve’ the problem?” “Is anyone short changed or left at a disadvantage?” (Postman, 1999, pp. 42-43).

The problem is clearly stated at the beginning of this dissertation. Given multiculturalism and diversity in our schools, citizenship is lacking. The answer lay in a discourse of friendship cultivated in the Peaceable Schools model. The model assures dialogue and community where citizenship is enhanced. Most significantly, to the third question, no one is left out nor short changed because of the innovation. All people, wherever their ethnic or racial heritage lie, can partake of the discourse of friendship made commonplace to society in the Peaceable Schools model. Assuredly, the model is a progressive pedagogical foundation for living citizenship to last the ages.

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